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KNOW
LEDGE & INNOVATION IN AFRICA SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 

often we assume that tomorrow will look like today, 
yet all too seldom it does. Scenarios provide us with 
a framework that enables us to examine any possible 
blind-spots we might have, to compare our individual 
assumptions about the future with others and to 
explore how the forces of change, both inside and 
outside Africa, might impact upon its future. 
These scenarios will be useful to anyone interested 
in how the future of innovation and creativity might 
unfold in Africa. Armed with foresight, it is easier to 
detect faint signals of change. They are particularly 
useful for strategic planning or policymaking. Both 
encompass the art of the long view – no easy task 
when dealing with turbulent environments or times 
of possible disruptive change. For both policies 
and strategies, there are grave risks of unintended 
consequences and maladaptive practices. Therefore,  
a thought exercise of ‘What if?’ is a useful economical 
way to avoid expensive ‘If only’ regrets. The scenarios 
set out in this document take an Africa-wide focus, 
and it is possible and probably useful to use them as the 
starting point for more focused scenarios dealing with 
the specific region, industry or subject matter – and 
outlines of how to do so are set out in the Appendix. 
The Open A.I.R. project has been a fascinating and 
informative journey for everyone involved.  
The hope is that we have simply arrived at a new 
starting point: that these scenarios, together with the 
research underpinning them, stimulate wider thinking 
about African innovation and creativity and that they 
enable readers everywhere to undertake further work 
toward realizing a collective vision of innovation and 
creativity in Africa that is sustainably vibrant, properly 
valued, democratically participatory, collaboratively 
shared, widely accessible, and justly distributed 
throughout society. 
Fernando dos Santos, Director-General,  
African Regional Intellectual Property Office
Foreword
Hardly a day goes by when we are not confronted by  
the word ‘innovation’. Innovation and creativity 
provide the alchemy that drives human development 
and welfare, that empowers individual and national 
economic growth – perhaps even contributes to 
democratic self-governance and longer healthier lives. 
However, it is very seldom that the adjective ‘African’ is 
associated with innovation – and it is this omission that 
the Open A.I.R. (Open African Innovation Research 
and Training) project seeks to address. 
The aim of Open A.I.R. is to understand whether 
and why informal innovation and creativity are 
not adequately and fully accounted for through 
the traditional Western-oriented prism of patents, 
copyrights and other IP metrics. It also explores the 
dynamics between innovation and creativity, and 
intellectual property (IP) in order to build capacity and 
generate practical lessons concerning the influence of 
intellectual property environments on innovation and 
creative activity in Africa. 
These Open A.I.R. scenarios are only part of this 
three-year, multidisciplinary, pan-African project, built 
by thinkers and experts from various parts of Africa 
and beyond. These contributors have also collected 
research, set out in a sister volume, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property: Collaborative Dynamics in Africa, 
which has been reflected in the scenario-building 
exercise. Collectively they have determined  
the relevant driving forces of change and identified 
three plausible, challenging, and relevant scenarios 
for the future. These scenarios – wireless engagement, 
informal the new normal, and Sincerely Africa – each 
present unique threats and opportunities, and take a 
broad continent-wide perspective. 
Why use scenarios? Simply because they are a useful 
tool – a tool that enables us to take a fresh look at the 
world and opens our eyes to other possibilities. All too 
This work was carried out with the aid of a grant from the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, Canada, and with 
financial support from the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), in cooperation with Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).
Fernando  
dos Santos  
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Oguamanam, C., and Rizk, N., 2013. Knowledge  
and Innovation in Africa: Scenarios for the Future.  
Cape Town: Open A.I.R. Network.
Conceived in 2009, established  
in 2010 and launched in 2011,  
Open A.I.R. is a pan-African 
network of nearly 60 experts from 
multiple academic disciplines, 
national and international 
government organisations, civil 
society advocates and private  
sector leaders.
Our aims are to conduct 
research that supports evidence-
based policymaking, build 
capacity to empower an epistemic 
community of African intellectual 
property (IP) experts, and 
generate practical insights and 
recommendations regarding IP, 
innovation and creativity, openness 
and development on the continent 
of Africa. Members of the Open 
A.I.R. network share a vision of 
innovation in African communities 
that harnesses IP systems to 
facilitate innovation through 
collaboration – to make processes 
more participatory, knowledge more 
accessible and benefits more widely 
shared. This publication is a tool to 
help us and others realise that vision.
Following three years of research, 
10 workshops involving dozens of 
participants, hundreds of interviews, 
and thousands of survey responses 
and pages of literature reviewed, we 
have constructed three scenarios for 
the future of African innovation. 
As important, we have placed these 
scenarios in the context of Africa’s 
broader historical trajectories, and 
the multiple driving forces exerting 
pressure in various complex ways.
These scenarios complement 
our project’s sister publication, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property: 
Collaborative Dynamics in Africa. 
That book (to be published by the 
University of Cape Town Press), 
contains conceptual analyses 
and on-the-ground case studies 
conducted in nine countries from 
the four main regions of Africa. Its 
description of the “current reality” 
reports empirical evidence, based 
on qualitative and quantitative 
data. Already we see signals that the 
scenarios envisioned in this book 
could soon become reality.
Locating 
Open A.I.R.
Open A.I.R. gratefully acknowledges the generous support it has received, both financially and strategically, from Canada’s IDRC and 
Germany’s BMZ, as well as from numerous individuals and organisations recognised in the acknowledgements section of this book.
The Open A.I.R. network was launched in May 2011.
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communication 
technologies 
(ICTs) were 
instrumental in 
empowering the research 
network. Online, the network 
includes hundreds of individuals 
and institutions throughout Africa 
and from all corners of the globe.
Of course, even this network 
could not, acting alone, undertake 
an exercise of this magnitude 
without relying on extensive 
consultation through formal and 
informal research methods with 
experts across different domains. 
We therefore engaged with external 
stakeholders and resource persons 
from many parts of Africa, as well as 
other parts of the world.
In constructing these scenarios, 
we also interacted with stakeholders 
from various sectors:
 n innovators, creators and 
entrepreneurs, including 
individuals and companies
 n business groups such as chambers 
of commerce and industry 
associations
 n national, regional, and 
international policy- and 
lawmakers
 n issue leaders, such as politicians, 
judges, professors and 
practitioners
 n scientific and cultural research 
and development funding bodies
 n university researchers, 
administrators and technology 
transfer officials
 n rights holders, including 
Among the spin-off benefits 
of scenario-building exercises is 
the creation of “social capital”, the 
human resources and relationships 
embedded within networks of 
interconnected actors. Foundations 
for the Open A.I.R. community 
were laid during a previous project 
exploring the role of copyright in 
access to educational materials. That 
four-year comparative study of laws 
and practices in eight countries led 
to the 2010 publication, also by the 
University of Cape Town Press, of 
Access to Knowledge in Africa: The 
Role of Copyright.
Connections established 
during the course of that and 
related projects supported by Open 
A.I.R.’s core funders – Canada’s 
International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC) and Germany’s 
Federal Ministry for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
(BMZ) – grew into the African and 
global community that worked on 
the scenarios in this publication. 
There are four African regional 
hubs – in Cape Town, Nairobi, 
Lagos and Cairo – linked to Ottawa, 
Rio de Janeiro, Bangalore, Geneva 
and elsewhere. This network has, 
directly and indirectly, served 
as a credible reference point for 
articulating, projecting, sustaining 
and amplifying African perspectives 
and voices regarding the role of IP in 
innovation and creativity.
Because of the immense 
geographic size of the African 
continent, and the unique logistical 
challenges of African intra-
continental travel, information and 
Above left:
Open A.I. R. 
hubs: UCT IP 
Unit in Cape 
Town, uOttawa 
in Ottawa, A2K4D 
centre in Cairo, 
NIALS in Lagos 
and CIPIT in 
Nairobi. 
Above right:
Monthly virtual 
interaction –  
a glimpse into 
the dynamics of 
the network’s 
physical 
and virtual 
interactions.
collective rights management 
organisations
 n representatives of indigenous 
communities.
The result of this broadly 
consultative approach appears in 
this publication. We hope it marks 
the beginning of your engagement 
with this crucial topic, and with 
our network of experts. To join 
our community of practice as we 
continue on our journey into the 
future, please visit our website at 
www.openair.org.za.
southern Africa
western Africa
easternAfrica
northern Africa
global
Below: Visually imagining a potential 
Open A.I.R. network, created in an 
early workshop.
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The continent is too large to 
describe. It is a veritable ocean, a 
separate planet, a varied, immensely 
rich cosmos. Only with the greatest 
simplification, for the sake of 
convenience, can we say “Africa.” 
In reality, except as a geographical 
appellation, Africa does not exist.
 Ryszard Kapuscinkski
Photos taken during various  
Open A.I.R workshops and events.
Africa sits astride the Greenwich 
Meridian, and stretches from above 
the Tropic of Cancer, through the 
Equator and past the Tropic of 
Capricorn, from 38° N to 34° S. It 
covers about 20% of the global land 
mass, with about 15% of the world’s 
human population. Over 1 billion 
inhabitants living in 55 countries 
(give or take disputed territories) – 
and half of this population is under 
the age of 20.1
It has 6 of the 10 fastest-growing 
economies in the world and 14 out of 
20 of the least competitive ones. The 
indicators below attempt to reflect 
the wide spectrum of conditions for 
any given issue.
A kaleidoscope 
of Africa
In exploring scenarios for Africa’s future, it is necessary to proceed with 
great caution when making generalisations about the continent.
Photos taken 
during launch 
of Open A.I.R. 
scenarios at 
the Open A.I.R. 
Conference on 
Innovation and 
IP in Africa (9-11 
December 2014)
(See page 143 for 
more photos)
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ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS
Biomes desert semi-desert grassland savannah rainforest woodland scrub
Average rainfall 
(mm)
29 
(Egypt)
1,120 
(Mali)
831 
(Zimbabwe)
509 
(South Africa)
Average 
temperature 
(°C)
28 
(Egypt)
35 
(Mali)
25 
(Zimbabwe)
21 
(South Africa)
Land area 
(1,000s of km2)
29,375 
(total Africa)
23,636 
(SSA*)
5,738 
(North Africa)
2,382 
(Algeria)
0.5 
(Seychelles)
HISTORICAL LEGACY
Language 
families2
Niger-
Congo
Afro-Asiatic Nilo-
Saharan
Khoi-San Indo-
European
Austro-
nesian
Creole
Religions Islam Christianity Traditional Hinduism Judaism
Colonial power Ottoman Britain France Germany Portugal Belgium Italy Spain
Legal system customary 
law
Islamic law common 
law
bi-juridical 
mixed
civil law
POPULATION AND LABOUR CHARACTERISTICS
Population3 
(millions)
1,008 
(total Africa)
841 
(SSA)
167 
(North Africa)
155 
(Nigeria)
2 
(Botswana)
Population 
density4 
(people/km2)
34 
(total Africa)
36 
(SSA)
29 
(North Africa)
628 
(Mauritius)
3 
(Namibia)
Life expectancy5 
(years)
56 
(total Africa)
53 
(SSA)
72 
(North Africa)
75 
(Libya, Tunisia)
45 
(Lesotho, 
Zimbabwe)
Labour force 
participation6 
(% of population)
71 
(SSA)
52 
(North Africa)
48 
(Tunisia)
88 
(Tanzania)
55 
(South Africa)
Adult literacy 
(% of men)
75 
(SSA)
45 
(Chad)
95 
(Zimbabwe)
Adult literacy 
(% of women)
56 
(SSA)
23 
(Chad)
89 
(Zimbabwe)
Migrants7  
(% of population)
2 
(SSA)
1 
(North Africa)
0.3 
(Egypt, Somalia, 
Eritrea, Tunisia)
12 
(Cote d’Ivoire)
18 
(Gabon)
ECONOMY
GDP per capita 
($)
879 
(total Africa)
618 
(SSA)
2,191 
(North Africa)
8,011 
(Equatorial Guinea)
97 
(DRC)
Classification  
of economy8 
(by $ GNI per 
capita)
High income: 
$12,196 or more  
 
(1 country)
Upper-middle 
income:  
$3,946–$12,195  
(6)
Lower-middle 
income:  
$996–$3,945  
(13)
Low income:  
$995 or less  
 
(33)
Least Developed 
Countries  
 
(34)9
Concentration 
of economy 
(top export as  
% of total)
7 
(Morocco: 
phosphate)
50 
(Ghana: cocoa)
86 
(Nigeria: oil)
96 
(Angola: oil)
9 
(South Africa: 
precious metals)
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TRADE AND FINANCIAL FLOWS
International trade10 
(% of GDP)
63  
(SSA) 
69  
(North 
Africa)
39  
(Ethiopia)
247  
(Seychelles)
31  
(DRC)
163  
(Lesotho)
Foreign direct investment11 
($ billion) [% of GDP]
45 [3] 
(total Africa)
30 [3] 
(SSA)
15 [3] 
(North 
Africa)
Migrant remittances12 
($ billion) [% of GDP
38 [3] 
(total Africa)
21 [2] 
(SSA) 
18 [3] 
(North 
Africa) 
Private debt and portfolio 
equity flows13  
($ billion) [% of GDP]
12 [0.8] 
(total Africa)
12 [1] 
(SSA) 
–0.5 [–0.1] 
(North 
Africa)
Official aid14 
($ billion) [% of GDP]
40 [3] 
(total Africa)
36 [4] 
(SSA) 
4 [0.6] 
(North 
Africa)
GOVERNANCE
Perceived corruption of 
public sector15 (best score is 
100) [global ranking]
65 [ranked 
30th] 
(Botswana) 
53 [50th] 
(Rwanda)
48 [58th] 
(Namibia)
45 [64th] 
(Ghana)
43 [69th] 
(South 
Africa)
20 [163rd] 
(Zimbabwe)
8 [174th] 
(Somalia)
Environmental 
performance16 (best score 
is 100)
58 
(Gabon)
56 
(Zambia)
55 
(Egypt)
54 
(Botswana)
49 
(Algeria)
40 
(Nigeria)
35 
(South 
Africa)
INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
Electricity consumption  
(kWh )
531 
(SSA)
1,282 
(North Africa)
42 
(Ethiopia)
127 
(Nigeria)
4,760 
(South Africa)
Use of solid fuels 
(% population)
82 
(SSA)
5 
(North Africa)
95 
(Congo, Ethiopia, 
Mali, Malawi, 
Rwanda, Uganda)
5 
(Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Tunisia)
Access to water17 
(% of total rural [urban] 
population)
60 [83] 
(SSA)
92 [95] 
(North Africa)
99 [100] 
(Egypt)
38 [98] 
(Ethiopia)
30 [67] 
(Somalia)
Access to sanitation
(% of total rural [urban] 
population)
31 [44] 
(SSA)
89 [94] 
(North Africa)
94 [97] 
(Egypt)
9 [34] 
(Niger)
23 [52] 
(Somalia)
CONNECTIVITY
Access to sea 15 landlocked countries 38 countries with 
access to sea
Lesotho 
surrounded by 
South Africa
Mobile phone 
subscriptions18  
(per 100 people)
37 
(SSA)
77 
(North Africa)
3 
(Eritrea)
105 
(Seychelles)
94 
(South Africa)
Landline phone 
subscriptions19  
(per 100 people)
2 
(SSA)
11 
(North Africa)
17 
(Libya) 
0.1 
(Congo)
30 
(Mauritius)
Internet users20 
(per 100 people)
9 
(SSA)
21 
(North Africa)
28 
(Nigeria)
0.6 
(Congo)
39 
(Seychelles)
All amounts rounded to nearest whole number, except those less than 1; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; $ = United States $ (throughout the 
publication)
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How do we understand progress? 
What role does innovation play?
How is knowledge governed?
How are answers to these questions shaped by 
the political, economic, legal, social, cultural, 
technological and environmental contexts of time?
What 
are the 
questions?

How do we 
under stand 
progress?
For centuries, philosophers and 
economists have tried to define 
what is meant by progress and 
development.1 We know that 
progress requires change, but change 
does not always mean progress. Real 
progress can only be evaluated by 
a given society at a particular point 
in time, within a particular context, 
because people attach different 
values to different goods and 
services, and do so under different 
circumstances.
Progress requires structural 
change: it requires changes to the 
economic, social and political 
structures within a given society 
to the benefit of all people. 
Change – the basis of progress 
and development –takes time, 
and like any system, there is a 
time lag between policies and 
their realisation. Progress and 
development require foresight, 
as there are no hard and fast 
rules about how to achieve either. 
The difficulty they pose is that 
the outcomes of these changes 
can usually only be measured in 
hindsight.
“Development is a comprehensive, economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the 
entire population and all individuals 
on the basis of their active, free 
and meaningful participation 
in development and in the fair 
distribution of benefits resulting 
therefrom.2
United Nations Declaration on the 
Right to Development
Probably the most critical measure 
of this comprehensive process is fair 
distribution, where the beneficiaries 
are society as a whole without the 
exclusion of anyone. All too often, 
benefits are not equitably spread, 
yet due to the inherent time lag, 
it is usually not possible for the 
benefits to be evident to all members 
of society at the same moment.3 
Africa has some of the greatest 
levels of inequality and poverty in 
the world – in 1981 there were 200 
million people living on US$1.25 per 
day, but by 2010 it had doubled to 
400 million. Despite all the aid, the 
poverty headcount ratio has hovered 
around 48% of the population of 
Sub-Saharan Africa.4 The figures 
are different in North Africa, but 
progress and development have 
clearly not been taking place across 
Africa as a whole.
Over the past decades, 
the concepts of progress and 
development have shifted to a 
holistic perspective of welfare, 
one which reduces income, 
production, distribution, personal 
procurement and social costs to a 
purely quantifiable economic set 
of measures: economic metrics 
of efficiency, rationality, financial 
risks, property rights and market 
mechanisms. The result has been 
competing paradigms, each with 
their own proponents: between 
the orthodox economic rationale, 
with its focus on reduction of 
poverty at the national level, and 
other rationales that focus on 
the capabilities and freedom of 
the individual, or on sustainable 
policies, based on the argument that 
development has to include future 
generations.
In addition, there is a further 
dimension that is changing the 
face of development and progress: 
global interconnectivity. This 
digital environment has led many to 
question whether the “open” model 
offers new opportunities. Structures 
and institutions have increasingly 
become organised around 
electronically processed networks 
of information.5 As a result, they 
are enabling people to mobilise 
and organise resources in different, 
innovative ways, thereby offering the 
potential for transformative change.
In the past five decades, there 
have been both successes and 
failures in Africa’s development. 
There are countless well-meaning 
development programmes in Africa 
that have become white elephants: 
often inappropriate, ill-conceived 
or even misappropriated. These 
programmes have left a lasting 
legacy of crippling debt for Africa, 
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which – despite many initiatives to 
reduce the burden – takes a sizeable 
proportion of government revenues 
to service. These mistakes have 
probably sabotaged many of Africa’s 
development and progress prospects 
for the future. Development and 
progress raise many questions, 
including: What works, and in 
what circumstances? Does progress 
mean growth? Who decides? Who 
benefits? Who pays? What about 
dependency? Short term or long 
term? There are no easy answers.
It is useful to recognise that one 
cannot solve problems with the same 
thinking that created them. Africa 
will have to find new solutions that 
match its uniquely African context 
and harness the skills, capabilities 
and endowments of its people to 
improve their wellbeing. What role 
does innovation play?
The economic model
The need for property rights, and law and order
“The major stumbling block that keeps the rest of the world from benefiting from capitalism is its inability to produce capital. Capital is the force that raises the productivity of labour and creates the wealth of nations. It is the lifeblood of the capitalist 
system, the foundation of progress […] The value of 
savings among the poor is immense: forty times all the 
foreign aid received throughout the world since 1945 
[…] Because the rights to these possessions are not 
adequately documented, these assets cannot readily 
be turned into capital.6
Hernando de Soto, economist
The human model 
Development as freedom
“Very many people across the world suffer from varieties of unfreedom […] Unfreedom can arise either through inadequate processes 
(such as the violation of voting 
privileges or other political and 
civil rights) or through inadequate 
opportunities that some people 
have for achieving what they 
would like to achieve (including 
the absence of such elementary 
opportunities as the capability 
to escape premature mortality 
or preventable morbidity or 
involuntary starvation).9
Amartya Sen, economics Nobel 
laureate
The capabilities model
Conditions necessary for a life with dignity
“The capabilities approach aims to give people the necessary conditions of a life with human dignity. It would be a self-defeating theory indeed if the injunction to promote human capabilities devoured people’s lives, removing personal projects 
and space to such an extent that nobody at all had the 
chance to lead a dignified life.7
Martha Nussbaum, ethics philosopher
The sustainable model
Equality for the next generations
“The word “development” has also been narrowed by some into a very limited focus, along the lines of “what poor nations should do to become richer”, and thus again is automatically dismissed by many in the international arena as being 
a concern of specialists, of those involved in questions 
of “development assistance”. But the “environment” 
is where we all live; and “development” is what we 
all do in attempting to improve our lot within that 
abode. The two are inseparable […] Many of the 
development paths of the industrialized nations are 
clearly unsustainable. And the development decisions 
of these countries, because of their great economic 
and political power, will have a profound effect upon 
the ability of all peoples to sustain human progress for 
generations to come.8
World Commission on Environment and Development
The open model
Networked access
“Open development refers to an emerging set of possibilities to catalyze positive change through “open” information-networked activities 
in international development 
[where] “open” is shorthand for 
information-networked activities 
that have, relatively speaking, 
more information that is freely 
accessible and/or modifiable and 
more people who can actively 
participate and/or collaborate.10
Matthew Smith, Laurent Elder  
and Heloise Emdon, researchers
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Yaoundé, Cameroon
Photo: Joona Pettersson
displacement of the incumbents, 
and the introduction of new and 
uncertain alternatives.12 Many 
policymakers and business leaders 
who talk enthusiastically about 
innovation appear to forget this. 
As Schumpeter described, the real 
rewards from innovation come with 
“gales of disruptive innovation” 
initiated by countless competing, 
risk-taking entrepreneurs.13 But, 
while there might be a few who 
benefit, the squalls hurt many who 
are currently thriving. Innovation 
does not always bring positive 
outcomes.
What is innovation? The 
widely used Oslo Manual defines 
innovation as “the implementation 
of a new or significantly improved 
product (good or service), or process, 
a new marketing method, or a new 
organisational method in business 
practices, work place organisation or 
external relations”.14
There are different kinds 
of innovation: incremental 
innovation, which involves small 
improvements to existing products, 
processes or services, and disruptive 
or breakthrough innovations, 
which are discontinuous 
revolutions in technologies and 
markets.15 The direction of change 
is also important. Continuous 
innovations follow in sequence 
from the status quo; discontinuous 
innovations break patterns to move 
in significantly new directions. 
Disruptive, discontinuous 
innovations usher in new social, 
technological, economic and/or 
political systems in their wake.
From time immemorial, people 
have innovated – it is this tinkering, 
adjusting and adapting that has 
been the driver of progress and 
development. All economic and 
social progress ultimately depends 
on new ideas that challenge the 
inertia of the status quo with 
possibilities for change and 
improvement. Innovation is what 
happens when this new thinking is 
introduced and bears fruit.
Today, “innovation” is the word 
on everyone’s lips, because in a 
knowledge-based economy it is 
knowledge – the intangible asset – 
that has the potential to create 
substantive value. Its great value lies 
in the fact that it can be reproduced 
without loss of the original, i.e. it 
is replicable. It is also scalable, in 
that once the knowledge has been 
discovered or created it is cheap to 
share – potentially, it can be used 
on an infinite scale at virtually zero 
cost.11 We are no longer interested 
in bigger factories or more stuff, 
such that the drive for greater 
industrialisation and, increasingly, 
physical and tangible properties 
have made way for a push up the 
value stack. Investing in intangibles, 
particularly knowledge, is the way of 
the future.
For those investing in knowledge 
and innovation, caveat emptor, 
buyer beware: innovation drives 
jobs, productivity, technological 
progress and social change, but it 
is also inherently unpredictable. 
Innovation means the destruction 
of the old tried and tested systems, 
institutions, processes and products, 
OTHER TERMS REGARDING INNOVATION
Open  
innovation
An emergent model of innovation 
in which firms draw on research 
and development that may lie 
outside their own boundaries.16
Closed  
innovation
Controlling all aspects of the 
creation and management of ideas, 
from conception to commercial 
application. This means that 
innovation takes place in a self-
sufficient environment with internal 
R&D, controlled by IP.
User  
innovation
Innovation by user firms, user 
communities and end-users, 
rather than by suppliers or 
manufacturers.17
“Bottom-
of-the-
pyramid” and 
“grassroots” 
innovation
Innovation by the poor – those 
billions living on less than $2 per 
day18 – or grassroots innovators and 
holders of traditional knowledge 
from the informal sector of 
society.19
Social  
innovation
Innovation linked to the “social 
business” concept, where a self-
sustaining company sells goods 
or services and repays its owners’ 
investments, with the primary 
purpose to serve society and 
improve the lot of the poor.20
Inclusive 
innovation
Innovation with a focus on 
inclusive growth and reduction 
of inequality,21 i.e. the “inclusion” 
of the “excluded” where exclusion 
could be due to disability, poverty, 
distance, migration or other 
factors.22
What role does 
innovation play?
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The Open A.I.R. scenarios shed 
light on what kinds of knowledge 
might become most relevant in 
different contexts, and how various 
forms of IP rights might be used 
to govern knowledge in different 
futures. To help you understand 
these insights, which are presented 
later, we introduce the basics of how 
innovation and knowledge systems 
are now governed by IP. In part this 
depends on what kind of knowledge 
we are talking about.
Today, our world is awash with 
data and information. Data is factual 
information that has been collected 
together for reference or analysis, or 
numerical information represented 
in a form suitable for computer 
processing. Information is facts 
that have been provided or learned 
about something or someone, or 
what is conveyed or represented by 
a particular pattern or sequence of 
things. Information and data are 
easily transferable from one person 
to another.
However, not all information 
is knowledge. While data is raw 
information without context, 
and information is organised and 
contextualised data, knowledge 
assimilates information and puts  
it to use.23 
There is a problem with 
innovative knowledge of potential 
value. Knowledge cannot be 
possessed, like land or goods. So 
someone who discovers or applies 
new knowledge will not necessarily 
reap the benefits of innovations 
they have enabled. Some say this is 
unfair: people have an innate right 
How is 
knowledge 
governed?
Types of knowledge
There are several different 
types of knowledge, each with 
different properties:
Codified knowledge is 
disclosed in writing and able 
to be stored in databases, 
documents, etc.
Non-codified knowledge is 
not fixed in writing, often 
remaining undisclosed, and 
passed on in oral traditions 
from generation to generation.
Tacit knowledge is difficult to 
transfer to another person by 
means of writing or description. 
Tacit knowledge can involve 
intuitive insights, or may 
require expertise, such as the 
ability to speak a language, 
make complex mathematical 
calculations, etc.
Contextual knowledge has 
particular meaning because 
of the surrounding conditions 
connected to its application, and 
will not be understood or used 
in the same way by everyone.
Acontextual knowledge 
is represented as rational, 
scientifically “objective”, 
impartial observations of stable 
social realities.
What, how, who and why
Knowledge can be categorised 
in other ways as well:24
Know-what: Facts; complex 
answers to questions that can be 
divided into discrete pieces of 
information. Lawyers, doctors, 
engineers and others rely on 
this type of knowledge.
Know-how: Skills; the 
judgement or capability to do 
something, like hiring staff 
or evaluating markets. This 
type of knowledge is typically 
shared between individuals, or 
within organisations or across 
networks of trust.
Know-who: Relationships; 
the creation and maintenance 
of special social networks 
and human capital. These 
relationships enable actors to 
identify and access other actors 
with complementary skills and 
knowledge.
Know-why: Theories; scientific 
knowledge regarding human 
behaviour or laws of nature. 
This underpins technological 
development and industrial 
innovations, and is often 
concentrated in research 
laboratories and universities.
Access to knowledge as IP policy
We now understand that innovation depends 
on knowledge flows throughout systems, and 
that IP can facilitate or frustrate the exchange of 
knowledge. We also understand that development 
means more than industrialisation and economic 
growth; development depends on human freedoms 
and capabilities. So it should not be surprising 
that our objectives of IP policy are also evolving 
to become more holistic, under the auspices of a 
movement toward “access to knowledge”.
Riding a bicycle is tacit and acontextual knowledge – people can 
usually do it without reading books, and do it in roughly the same 
way everywhere. In contrast, reading the Bible is codified and highly 
contextual knowledge – interpret ations of the same written text can 
vary widely based on beliefs, space and time.
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commercialisation of new products 
and processes. Empirical evidence 
proving this theory in practice, 
however, is scarce. Everything 
depends on context. The general 
consensus among economists is that 
while IP can and does stimulate 
activity in advanced markets, 
especially by multinational firms, 
patent law reforms have little, if 
any, impact on domestic innovation 
in poor countries. Evidence also 
suggests that patents, for example, 
are more important to large firms in 
industries such as pharmaceuticals 
and semiconductors. Small and 
medium-sized enterprises rely more 
on other kinds of protection, such  
as secrecy or trademark branding.
The value of knowledge often 
increases through network effects: 
the more people that share an idea, 
the more valuable it becomes. This 
fact leads to the insight that exclusive 
IP rights can sometimes frustrate 
rather than facilitate innovation. 
Too much IP protection can be a 
problem, especially for sequential 
innovations that build upon earlier 
technologies and especially if rights 
are fragmented among multiple 
owners.
country.
The relationships between IP and 
innovation are complex, variable 
and dynamic. But, in general, IP 
can sometimes be (i) an indicator 
of innovation, (ii) an incentive 
for innovation, and/or (iii) an 
impediment to innovation.
Researchers use many different 
metrics to measure innovation, 
including IP statistics. In this 
context, patent statistics dominate, 
partly because they are among the 
most readily available data, and 
partly because of the orthodox (but 
incorrect) view that they are the 
form of protection most relevant 
or important for innovation. 
Intellectual property indicators 
are not only a tool for econometric 
analyses, but are also influential 
in various organisations’ rankings 
of innovation performance, by 
country and by firm. Intellectual 
property outputs are weighted with 
other indicators, such as scientific 
publications, as well as inputs, 
like R&D expenditures, to create a 
consolidated measure of countries’ 
innovative activity.
As a matter of public policy, 
the exclusive rights protected by IP 
are predominantly justified as an 
incentive to invest in innovation 
through research, development and 
to control their inventions and 
creations. Some say this is unwise: 
without a way to capture economic 
returns, fewer people will invent or 
create things of social value. Others 
disagree, saying that knowledge is 
most useful when it is networked 
and widely accessible. They also say 
that access to knowledge (“A2K” 
for short) is a prerequisite for 
fundamental rights, like health care, 
food security, basic education or 
cultural participation.
Resolving such tensions is the 
role of knowledge governance 
systems. There are many ways of 
governing knowledge. Secrecy is 
the oldest, most well-known way 
that knowledge is shared among 
small, trusted groups of people. 
Reputation, in the form of word-
of-mouth referrals or recognisable 
brands, is also among the most 
well-established means of managing 
valuable knowledge. Other informal 
modes of appropriation, like first-
mover advantage and technological 
complexity, also play crucial roles in 
innovation systems.
In very general terms – more 
details are provided in Appendix 1 – 
patents protect scientific and 
technological inventions, copyrights 
protect works of creative expression, 
and trademarks protect brands 
and associated goodwill. One must 
apply to obtain a patent, showing 
that the invented product or process 
is new, applicable and inventive. 
In exchange for written disclosure 
of the technical specifications, a 
patentee receives the exclusive right 
to make, use and sell the patented 
invention for a period of 20 years. 
Registration is not always necessary, 
but is usually advisable, to secure 
a trademark in a distinctive word 
or image – or, in some countries, a 
sound, smell or other mark – used in 
association with wares or services. 
Trademark owners do not have 
complete monopoly over a mark, but 
may stop competitors from causing 
confusion in the marketplace for 
as long as the trademark remains 
distinctive. Copyright protection 
arises automatically upon the 
creation of an original literary, 
artistic, musical or dramatic work, 
and lasts for the life of the work’s 
author plus an additional period of 
50 to 100 years, depending on the 
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Perspective
Until the lions have their own 
historians, the history of the hunt  
will always glorify the hunter.1
Chinua Achebe, author
Before setting off to explore the future, we first 
establish our whereabouts – the current reality. 
This sets a baseline for what we know, what we 
believe, and what the rest of the world believes 
about Africa. Moving through snapshots 
of African history, we pull out features of 
development and progress, knowledge that 
was particularly valued, innovation systems 
and technologies, and relations of power and 
ownership of knowledge.
Origins of 
humanity
The oldest known human 
remains from our own species, 
the fossilised Homo sapiens skulls 
“Omo” I and II, have been dated 
at about 195,000 years old, and 
originate in Ethiopia.5 Their 
adaptations result from climatic 
drought conditions between 2.7 and 
2.8 million years ago in East Africa.6
Humans started to leave Africa 
between 60,000 and 70,000 years 
ago, probably due to major climatic 
shifts and the onset of the Ice Age, 
which resulted in a major drop in 
human population and almost led 
to our extinction.7 The Genographic 
Project by National Geographic used 
advanced DNA analysis and worked 
with indigenous communities to 
conclude that human migrations 
from Africa became isolated from 
one another about 150,000 years 
ago. Remains from such split 
populations, for example in Asia, 
led to the multi-region theory. 
Jared Diamond indicates how 
different populations encountered 
different regional geophysical and 
climatic conditions, with species 
which were more or less difficult 
(or impossible) to domesticate in 
the shift from hunter-gathering 
to pastoralism.8 Different modern 
human populations re-encountered 
each other some 40,000 years ago.9
“Africa is the “cradle of mankind”, possibly the cradle of modern man as well as the place where man’s expansion began, and the birthplace of the very 
first stone tools, the first symmetric 
stone tools, and the nest of so many 
discoveries, inventions, creations and 
cultures. … [T]he first 8 million years 
of [mankind’s] history (from 10 to 2 
million years BC) are only African. 
It is then prestigious for Africa to be 
the unique origin of the 100 billion 
human beings who have existed since 
the very first one. 2
Yves Coppens, UNESCO keynote 
speech, Addis Ababa 2011
In 1871, Darwin published The 
Descent of Man, demonstrating 
that humanity had evolved from 
primate ancestry and arguing that 
the origins lay in Africa. Both ideas 
were anathema to Victorian England 
of the time, and it took many 
decades, mountains of research and 
incontrovertible evidence to prove 
his theses.
There have been two competing 
theories about the origins of 
humankind: “out of Africa”, which 
contends that humans originated 
entirely from Africa, and “multi-
region”, which contended that 
humans developed separately in 
many places at the same time.3 
Today, scientific research concludes 
that our human ancestors, the 
hominids, came from the African 
plains and migrated to populate the 
earth tens of thousands of years ago.4
The oldest known  
human remains
The discovery of the specimen 
OH 5 (“Zinj”) in 1959, by Mary 
Leakey, was a watershed in the 
history of palaeoanthropology.  
The find added an important 
stage in a relatively sparse 
hominid lineage at the time, and 
was also important in focusing 
attention on multidisciplinary 
research.
The fairly complete 
cranium (sans mandible) 
eventually became known 
as Australopithecus boisei. 
Specimens attributed to 
Australopithecus boisei have 
been found mostly in Ethiopia, 
Tanzania and Kenya in East 
Africa.
The oldest Australopithecus 
boisei specimens were found 
at Omo, Ethiopia, dating to 
approximately 2.3 million years, 
and the youngest was found 
at Olduvai Gorge, dating to 
approximately 1.2 million years.
Source: http://archaeologyinfo.com/
australopithecus-boisei/
Omo I and Omo II
Australopithecus boisei skull
Photo: Shutterstock
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The Omo River in 
Ethiopia. 
Photo: Frank Brown, 
University of Utah
Inset picture left: 
The Kibish 
formation on the 
banks of the Omo 
where fossils have 
been found.
Inset picture right: 
Archaeological 
dig on the Kibish 
formation.
Photo: John Fleagle, via 
Wikimedia Commons
Founding 
civilizations
made it a major centre for trade 
and commerce. There is evidence of 
pottery, jewellery and woven cloth, 
and also a sophisticated ironworking 
economy, making both military 
and agricultural goods. For the next 
millennium the rulers of Kush called 
themselves the “Kings of Upper and 
Lower Egypt”. Kush’s power waned 
as its manufacturing dependency 
on charcoal led to widespread 
deforestation and soil erosion.
The Nok culture evolved in West 
Africa, at the confluence of the 
Niger and Benue rivers, today in 
Nigeria. It appeared around 1000 
and beyond, and at times even ruled 
them. Egypt absorbed some of the 
best minds of the day.
Egypt had a calendar of 365 days 
5,000 years ago; they developed 
writing and invented papyrus to 
write on. Imhotep was a notable 
scribe, the father of medicine in 
Egypt, and the designer of the 
original “house of eternity” step 
pyramid for his king Zoser in 2700 
BC, which created the blueprint for 
the pyramids as we know them.
Punt is generally held to have been 
southeast of Egypt. It traded gold 
and copper with the rest of the 
civilized world of the time. By 2500 
BC it was building ships of 60 oars – 
2,500 years before the Romans did.11 
In 1470 BC, Queen Hatshepsut, 
the fifth pharaoh queen of the 
Egyptian 18th Dynasty, undertook 
a large expedition to Punt, with five 
21-metre sailing ships each with 
over 200 men on board. Reliefs at 
her temple show the ships returning 
with live myrrh trees.
Kush (also known as Nubia) was 
another complex and flourishing 
kingdom, which remained stable 
from 1070 BC to 350 AD, situated 
around today’s Sudan. Its economy 
produced ebony, ivory, gold and 
silver, gems, metals and wood, and 
also slaves and soldiers. Between 
730 and 656 BC, Egypt was ruled 
by Nubia, the 25th Dynasty of the 
“black pharaohs”.
After Egypt’s power waned, 
Kush’s strategic position with 
trading outlets on the Red Sea 
and its strong manufacturing base 
“As Egypt slowly emerged, the thing that made it different from Babylonia and the Indus River Valley of the same time was an African organisational idea. 
This concept was that of divine 
kingship – an idea so familiar to 
us from Western history that we 
scarcely think of it as first emerging 
in Africa. While the city-states were 
rich, well-fed, keeping written records 
and able to communicate among 
themselves, the Egyptian towns and 
cities were unified under one ruler, a 
god-king and because of this unity 
their civilisation was leaping forward 
while the Babylonians and Indians 
were squabbling among themselves, 
jockeying for power.10
Lester Brooks, in Great Civilizations of 
Ancient Africa
DYNASTIES OVER CENTURIES
Egyptian civilization stretched from 
the Upper Nile with its origins in 
Lake Victoria to the Lower Nile, 
which flows into the Mediterranean 
Sea. Fertile sediments deposited 
by the annual flooding of the Nile 
left a sustaining strip of arable land 
thousands of kilometres long, farmed 
since at least 3000 BC. The upper 
and lower entities were united circa 
3100 BC, by the first Pharaoh, called 
“Menes”, founding the first of over 30 
dynasties that stretched for centuries. 
For centuries, these dynasties 
interacted with the many other 
cultures of the Middle East, Africa 
Scholarship
For seven centuries, from the 
time of Alexander the Great 
who founded the city in 332 BC, 
well into the 4th Century AD, 
Alexandria was the intellectual 
capital of the Western world. It 
invented modern scholarship, 
attracting the greatest scholars 
of the time and producing the 
definitive texts upon which 
our history is based. The Great 
Library of Alexandria was one 
of the wonders of the Ancient 
World, amassing most of the 
scholarship of the day and 
the past, with some 490,000 
books written on papyrus, and 
later 42,000 contained in the 
“daughter library” housed in 
the Serapeum. The texts were 
destroyed over time in a series 
of disasters, with only a few 
copies or fragments surviving.
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the beginning of human records in 
Ancient Egypt. They were coastal 
agriculturalists and desert nomads, 
who were often in conflict with one 
another. Berber middlemen crossed 
the Sahara with packs of camels, 
trading salt, metal goods, gold, 
beads, slaves, and ivory between 
northern and inland Africa.13 By 
the 2nd Century BC, they had 
established several large, loosely 
administered kingdoms, which were 
to be divided and reunited several 
times over the next millennia. 
Berber kingdoms, in modern-day 
Algeria and Morocco, included 
Numidia (202 BC to 46 AD) and 
Mauretania (3rd Century BC to 40 
AD), before each was annexed by the 
Roman Empire.
By the 10th Century, climate 
changes had led to desertification 
ordnance supply units, and separate 
transport units for light and heavy 
bows, spears, cavalry, infantry and 
heavy chariots.
Carthage was founded by the 
Phoenicians on the North African 
Mediterranean coast in 814 BC. 
It became a major power with 
extensive links with tropical Sub-
Saharan Africa and the Greek and 
Roman empires. Carthage was 
a rival to Rome, and they fought 
three wars: in 264 to 241 BC over 
Sicily, in 218 to 201 BC when 
Hannibal invaded Europe, and in 
149 to 146 BC when it was destroyed. 
Carthage became a Roman province, 
supplying wheat, olives and olive oil 
to imperial Rome.
Berbers had occupied northwestern 
Africa for thousands of years, before 
BC and remained active until about 
300 AD. Iron smelting took place 
there from 280 BC, the earliest dates 
for iron smelting in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The culture included art, 
organised worship, horses and 
sufficient population to support 
these activities.12
Assyria became the centre of the 
greatest empire the world had 
yet seen. From 911 BC to 608 BC 
much of the Middle East and 
Mediterranean was under its control. 
Assyrians defeated the Nubians and 
drove them from Egypt. They were 
able to achieve such victories due 
to their military technological and 
organisational advantages. Assyrians 
had developed iron weapons and 
armour, which were stronger than 
the bronze of Egyptians. Their 
innovations included siege units, 
Above left:
Old Egyptian 
calendar in the 
Karnak temple.
Source: www.
timecenter.com/
articles/the-history-of-
the-western-calendar/
Above right: 
Carthage 
Electrum coin 
dating from 250 
BCE
Current location: British 
Museum
Left:
Fragment of a 
limestone tomb-
painting found 
in the tomb of 
Nebamun in 
Thebes, Egypt 
(1350 BC), 
representing 
the assessment 
of crops, for the 
purposes of tax, 
on Nebamun’s 
estate. Five 
vertical registers 
of hieroglyphs 
survive; the rest 
of the fragment is 
divided into two 
registers, with 
a horse-drawn 
chariot above 
and cart drawn 
by onagars 
beneath.
© The Trustees of the 
British Museum
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of North Africa, and the balance 
between sedentary cultivators and 
nomadic pastoralists had shifted. 
The nomadic Berbers expanded 
northwards into Morocco, the 
Arabs westward along the North 
African coast. Successive Muslim 
Berber empires, the Almoravids 
and Almohads, gathered power and 
swept down through Africa and into 
Spain, converting local populations, 
often by the sword. From 1000 to 
1500 AD, Islam spread southwards, 
up into the Nile kingdoms of Nubia 
and across the Sahara.
Axum, the Axumite Empire, 
(about 100 to 940 AD) was based 
in the area that is now Eritrea and 
northern Ethiopia.14 Alongside 
Persia, Rome and China, it was 
one of the four great powers of the 
time and its power stretched well 
into the Arabian Peninsula. Axum 
had extensive trade links with the 
Roman Empire and ancient India, 
and minted its own currency. It 
had a high literacy rate and valued 
written documents. It was the 
first major empire to convert to 
Christianity, in about 350 AD.
The first recorded steam engine
In the 1st Century AD, the 
world’s first basic steam engine 
was invented by Hero of 
Alexandria. It was a rocket-like 
reaction engine which was used 
to open the temple doors. It 
was called an aeolipile, which 
translates to “the ball of Aeolus”, 
who was the Greek god of the 
wind. The implications of this 
design were only realised 17 
centuries later in Europe, with 
the advent of the Industrial 
Revolution.
Source: Knight’s American Mechanical 
Dictionary, 1876.
The Pharos of 
Alexandria, a 
lighthouse in 
Alexandria, Egypt, 
was considered 
one of the Seven 
Wonders of the 
Ancient World. 
This mosaic from 
Olbia, Libya, 
shows the form 
of the lighthouse 
after the quake of 
796 when it lost 
its upper tier.
Source: Qasr Libya 
Museum, via Wikimedia 
Commons
A proto-Suez canal
There are indications that a canal linking the Red Sea and the Nile existed as far back as the 13th Century BC 
during the time of Rameses II. A granite monument known as the Chalouf stele was discovered at Kabret, 130 
kilometres from Suez. It is inscribed:
Saith King Darius [king of ancient Persia from 550 to 486 BC]: I am a Persian; setting out from Persia,  
I conquered Egypt. I ordered to dig this canal from the river that is called Nile and flows in Egypt, to the sea 
that begins in Persia. Therefore, when this canal had been dug as I had ordered, ships went from Egypt through 
this canal to Persia, as I had intended.
The canal later silted up and it was only centuries later, after Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1799, that 
archaeological excavations proved its existence. It then took 70 years before the Suez Canal, as we know it 
today, was opened in 1869. It enabled ships to avoid going around the southern tip of Africa, or via the northern 
sea route during summer when the Arctic ice shrank. 
Knowledge and Innovation in Africa – Scenarios for the Future26
Power and knowledge governance
Within Africa, there were two main forms of 
ownership which dictated the structure of society, 
power relations and economic relations within the 
society:
Divine and absolute rule, with an emphasis on 
magical powers and ceremony. The strict hierarchy 
had the pharaoh at the top and, below her or him, 
the priests of the temple, an army of officials, scribes 
and civil servants and finally, the populace. The 
priesthood guarded knowledge and literacy, and the 
pharaoh controlled the dissemination of knowledge 
through scribes.
Collective governance by a council of male chiefs or 
elders, or by several neighbouring people bound by 
loyalty or common ancestry.
Innovation systems and technology
Agriculture: Arable farming techniques (3000 BC); 
access to new animals and crops such as wheat, 
sorghum and bananas from Asia.
Transport: Invention of the wheel (Mesopotamia 
3500 BC); sail (Egypt 3000 BC); the horse and chariot 
(Hyksos Asia from 1783 to 1570 BC); introduction of 
the camel into Sahara (100 AD).
Irrigation: The development of canals, basins, dams 
and dykes to control the annual flooding of the Nile 
and use the fertile silt for farming.
Writing and printing: Egyptian writing or 
hieroglyphics and the use of papyrus paper (from 
3200 to 2755 BC). This allowed the Egyptians to 
record daily events throughout the kingdom. The 
Chinese invented paper in 105 AD.
Military technologies: Organisational innovations 
such as special military units, and technological 
innovations, such as the Assyrians’ use of iron 
weapons, which were much stronger than the bronze 
already in use and led to their overthrow of the 
Egyptians.
Permanent structures: The pyramids (2590 BC) 
created awe by the sheer size and complexity of 
construction (by slave labour) and the grasp of 
astronomy, mathematics and geometry involved in 
their construction.
What held particular value?
Different religions, each with its own belief 
systems, value systems and cultures, and its own 
form of valued knowledge: divine kingship and the 
“Osiris” myth, based on the tribal chieftain’s role 
(BC); traditional African spiritual systems; Judaism 
with the Jewish exodus from Egypt (1200 BC); 
Christianity (AD); Islam (622 AD).
Wealth-in-people rather than wealth-in-things: “The 
goal was not to accumulate a labour force or material 
things, but rather the ability to mobilise various 
knowledge and skills in order to be successful in a 
challenging environment.”16
Features of development
Development was mostly dependent on the ability 
to adapt to the uncertainties of rainfall and disease, 
and to warfare. Some groups and regions had natural 
advantages, but this could change over time, as it did 
for Kush. In many parts of Africa, cattle provided 
a resource to mitigate this uncertainty, and thus 
became a source of wealth. The origins of modern 
settlements can be recognised when cattle enclosures 
were first built and people made the transition from 
hunter-gatherers to ethnic, tribal and later national 
concepts of civilization.15
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AFRICAN EMPIRES TO 1500 AD
In East Africa, the kingdom of 
Axum retained a key position 
trading from its port on the Red 
Sea until the 11th Century. Ancient 
Ghana flourished from the 8th 
to 11th Centuries in West Africa, 
followed by Mali between the 
12th and 14th Centuries, and then 
Songhay, from the 14th to the 16th 
Centuries. East of Mali were the 
Hausa city states that survived until 
the 19th Century. 
In Southern Africa, the kingdom 
of Zimbabwe flourished between 
the 13th and 16th Centuries as 
an important trading hub, with 
networks extending across the 
Indian Ocean.18 The empires were 
maintained through a mixture 
of military force and diplomatic 
alliances.
Kings such as Mansa Musa and 
Sonni Ali were famous throughout 
the Western and Muslim worlds for 
the scientific, medical and artistic 
achievements of their subjects, and 
for the wealth of their kingdoms. 
Their capitals were immense walled 
cities with universities that attracted 
traders, scholars and poets from all 
over the world.
AT THE CROSSROADS
African empires established 
extensive trading links across 
the world. Royal bureaucracies 
administered taxes and controlled 
trade. The strength of kingdoms in 
West, Central and East Africa lay in 
their geographic position between 
the Berber and Arab traders of 
Later 
empires
There are in 
Timbuktu 
numerous 
judges, teachers 
and priests, 
all properly 
appointed by 
the king. He 
greatly honours 
learning. Many 
handwritten 
books imported 
from Barbary are 
also sold. There 
is more profit 
made from this 
commerce than 
from all other 
merchandise.17
Andalusian 
diplomat Leo 
Africanus in 1510
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This 14th Century map shows 
Mansa Musa offering a gold 
nugget to an approaching Muslim 
merchant on a camel.
The Catalan Atlas of 1375 is attributed to 
Abraham Cresques, and the original is in the 
Bibliotheque Nationale de France.19
Abubakar equipped 200 ships filled 
with men and the same number 
equipped with gold, water and 
provisions, enough to last them for 
years … they departed and a long 
time passed before anyone came 
back. Then one ship returned and 
we asked the captain what news 
they brought. He said, “Yes, O 
Sultan [Abubakar], we travelled for 
a long time until there appeared 
in the open sea a river with a 
powerful current … the other ships 
went on ahead, but when they 
reached that place, they did not 
return and no more was seen of 
them … As for me, I went about 
at once and did not enter the 
river.” The Sultan got ready 2,000 
ships, 1,000 for himself and the 
men whom he took with him, and 
1,000 for water and provisions. 
He left me to deputise for him and 
embarked on the Atlantic Ocean 
with his men. That was the last we 
saw of him and all those who were 
with him. And so, I became king in 
my own right.23
Mansa Musa, ruler of Mali,  
circa 1310
SCHOLARSHIP
The oldest existing and continually 
operating university in the world is 
the University of Al-Qarawiyyin in 
Fes, which was established alongside 
its associated mosque in 859 AD.24 
Fes was not the only historical seat 
of knowledge in Africa, but many 
others no longer exist. Of these, 
the most notable were the 16th 
Century University of Timbuktu, a 
medieval complex comprising three 
schools with an average attendance 
of more than 25,000 students 
studying science, mathematics, logic, 
history, astronomy and medicine.25 
Jenne was another famous centre 
of learning, a “humble town on a 
tributary of the great River Niger … 
that grew and prospered across ten 
centuries” as “the vital market centre 
for the trade in gold and kola and 
other goods from the southern forest 
lands”.26
fields and trade routes opened up 
beyond the control of the Ghanaians.
GLOBAL OUTREACH
Contact between the East African 
coast, and Arabia, Persia and China 
goes back to the 8th Century. 
Chinese explorer Tuan Ch’eng-Shih 
described the East African coast in 
his Compendium of Knowledge in 
863 AD, and about 300 years later 
another Chinese explorer described 
Kouen-Louen ts’eng-k’I, the “land of 
the blacks”.22
Perhaps one of the most famous 
African voyages of discovery – 
though we are ignorant as to the 
eventual outcome – was that of 
Mali’s ruler, Mansa Abubakar II. 
When he first sent an exploratory 
expedition across the Atlantic, only 
one boat returned. So Abubakar 
abdicated and set sail with his fleet 
across the Atlantic Ocean, never 
to be seen again. Mansa Musa, his 
successor, described the events to a 
contemporary Syrian scholar, Al-
Umari, in 1310:
the North, and the gold and ivory 
producers of the South. Africa 
has few natural harbours; its great 
empires therefore developed inland 
at the crossroads of trade routes. 
Their success rested on the ability 
of their rulers to exert control over 
the flow of goods across the Sahara 
Desert and tropical jungle to ocean 
ports.20
In 1067 AD, Andalusian scholar 
al-Bakri described the Ghanaian 
king Tunka Manin from eyewitness 
accounts, as well as the economic 
system that enabled the Ghanaian 
kings to live so magnificently. The 
economy was based on import and 
export taxes on all goods passing 
through Ghana, as well as monopoly 
ownership of the most precious 
resource of all, gold. “The king of 
Ghana places a tax of one dinar of 
gold on each donkey-load of salt that 
comes into his country,” and he “also 
places a tax of two dinars of gold on 
each load of salt that goes out.”21 This 
lucrative taxation enabled the king 
to regulate and control distribution 
and production – until new gold 
“The land is situated in the sea of the south east. … It is there that the big bird p’eng lives [now extinct], in its flight it momentarily obscures the sun. If the big p’eng meets a wild camel it eats it. If you happen to find a feather of the bird, you can use its quills to fashion a waterjar. In this country also are found the camel-crane [ostriches] whose 
necks are six or seven feet long. They can fly but not to any height. They 
eat all kinds of things, even burning fire. Sometimes [people] give them 
red-hot copper or iron to eat. The products of the land are elephant tusks 
and rhino horns.
Chou Ch’u-fei in 1178 AD
Above:
Arrival in 
Timbuktu, old 
illustration. 
Created by 
Lancelot after 
Barth, published 
on Le Tour du 
Monde, Paris, 
1860
Source: Antonio 
Abrignani/Shutterstock
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Innovation systems and technology
Transport: The widespread introduction of camels in 
trans-Saharan trade routes increased the quantity of 
goods that could be transported. 
Financial administration: Innovations such as 
book-keeping enabled rulers and officials to monitor 
large groups of people and their trade, and ensure 
that taxes reached the central government.
What held particular value?
Islam: Islam became a unifying force, a shared set 
of ideas about religion, law and order, trading and 
customs. The religion formed a basis for “integrating 
immigrants into the political community, which 
was undergoing increasing differentiation with the 
expansion of permanent agriculture, manufacture, 
and commerce”.28 For many leaders, conquest took 
on a religious dimension and became jihads, or holy 
wars. Traditional religion persisted alongside the rise 
of Islam. 
Trade: Before the 15th Century, there were two 
trading networks. The Kongo traded up and 
down the West coast, and started trading with the 
Portuguese in 1482, but there was no westbound 
transatlantic trade. In contrast, Great Zimbabwe 
managed gold production and was situated at the 
centre of a complex trade network that spanned East 
across the Indian Ocean, through the Persian Gulf to 
India and China. 
Features of development
The ability of a kingdom to provide a significant 
food surplus allowed for divisions of labour and 
specialisation, with concomitant features of 
development.
“With iron tools there could be more and better farming. With more farming there began to be enough food to maintain specialists who worked at making tools, weapons and other hand-made things. This division of labour encouraged trade, 
at first local and then long-distance, by producing 
a wide range of goods. All this, together with the 
growing size of population, required more complex 
forms of political organisation. However, as the fates 
of Ghana, Mali, Kanem, Songhay and other kingdoms 
showed over time, all too often this progress and 
development was undermined by environmental 
change – resulting in widespread drought and 
disease.27
Basil Davidson in West Africa before the Colonial Era:  
A History to 1850
Power and knowledge governance
Governing power was held by religious elites, with 
small groups of ruling families benefitting from an 
increasing concentration of privilege and wealth.
Oral knowledge: A strong oral tradition exists 
across Africa, where valued knowledge is passed on 
by custodians and relies on the sharpness of their 
memories. Few others in the community are able 
to challenge the knowledge content, although all 
may have access to it through the custodians. As 
reported by oral historian Mamadou Kouyate, “Mali 
guards its secrets jealously. There are things which 
the uninitiated will never know, for the griots, their 
depositories, will never betray them”.29
Above left:
The earliest 
obtainable map 
of the whole 
continent 
of Africa by 
Sebastian 
Münster, 1554.
Photo: Princeton 
University
Above right:
Courtyard of the 
Al-Qarawiyyin 
University in Fes, 
Morocco.
Photo: Khonsali
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A treasure 
trove
Portuguese discovery of the route 
to the East via the Cape of Good 
Hope, and Spain’s discovery of the 
Americas.
These developments ushered in 
a dark chapter in Africa’s history. 
Africa’s wealth, both natural and 
human, became valuable possessions 
elsewhere in the world.
Portugal’s involvement in 
Africa serves as an example of the 
dynamics of European engagement. 
In 1482, the Portuguese established 
a foothold in Africa, with a fort – 
São Jorge da Mina – on the Gold 
Coast to take advantage of the 
gold trade that formerly passed 
across the Sahara Desert. A little 
while later, the explorer Diogo 
Cão ventured southwards into 
the Kongo kingdom. When the 
Portuguese arrived, the Kongolese 
ruler Nzinga Nkuwu (1481–1495) 
considered himself a sovereign equal 
in rank to the king of Portugal, 
and was initially treated as such. 
the gold dinar fell by six dirhams.”32 
But the very success and visibility 
of the Malian empire, characterised 
by its large population with a strong 
central government and kingship, 
led to its decline. By 1400, its capital 
Niani had been pillaged.
THE PLUNDERING OF AFRICA
Before the 18th Century, African 
economies were characterised by 
some persisting hunter-gathering, 
herding, farming, production such 
as metal tools and goods, and trade 
within the continent and outside, 
the latter including items such as 
ivory, gold, beeswax, cloth and 
beads. But two forces reshaped 
global dynamics. The first was the 
expansion of the Ottoman Empire 
into Africa, which led to growing 
Mediterranean rivalry between the 
southern European Christians and 
the Muslim Turks. The second was 
trade, which circled the world – the 
AFRICA’S WEALTH
Until the 16th Century, most in the 
Western world knew little about 
the African continent. In 1656, 
the Geographer Royal of France 
described Africa as part of Europe, a 
“peninsula so large that it comprises 
the third part, and this the most 
southerly of our continent”.30 For 
most Europeans, the continent was 
perceived to be vacant, legally terra 
nullius, a no-man’s land.31
Africa’s wealth was legendary. 
Most of the Muslim Middle East and 
Christian Europe had economies 
based on gold – and the majority 
of this gold was supplied by West 
Africa. King of Mali Mansa Musa’s 
pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324 became 
legendary: “It is said that he brought 
with him 14,000 slave girls for his 
personal service. The members of his 
entourage proceeded to buy Turkish 
and Ethiopian slave girls, singing 
girls and garments, so that the rate of 
Right:
Elmina Castle 
in Ghana was 
one of the slave 
embarkation 
points from Africa 
to the Americas.
Photo: Jeremy de Beer
Far right:
Slaves in chains, 
probably 
somewhere in 
East-Africa.
Source: Odhiambo 
Atieno, E.S., Ouso, T.I. 
and Williams, J.F.M., 1977. 
A History of East Africa. 
London: Longman 
Group Ltd.
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Africa was a 
lottery and 
a winning 
ticket might 
earn glittering 
prizes. There 
were dreams of 
El Dorado, of 
diamond mines 
and goldfields 
criss-crossing the 
Sahara. In Europe 
these were the 
drab years of the 
Great Depression 
... There might 
be new markets 
out there in this 
African Garden of 
Eden, and tropical 
groves where 
gold fruit could be 
plucked by willing 
brown hands.37
Historian Thomas 
Pakenham, in The 
Scramble for Africa
chaos. When commerce and trade 
took on this new dimension, human 
and mineral resources and firearms 
became highly valued as the means 
to maintain superior wealth and 
power.35
Slavery changed the dynamics of 
nearly all African trading relations:
“The impact of slavery was devastating. Inter-regional trade and commerce declined. Traditional systems of alliance and networks of exchange 
were irreversibly destroyed. Trust 
amongst former trading partners and 
neighbours eroded.36
Chapurukha Kusimba, archaeology 
scholar
COMMODIFICATION THROUGH 
PROPERTY
During this period, European 
empires began to assume powerful 
global positions. The acquisition and 
exchange of property rights played a 
major role in their rise.
The terra nullius concept 
was useful in order to justify the 
exploitation of Africa’s wealth 
through “discovery” instead 
of “conquest”. A conception of 
Africans as inferior underpinned the 
treatment of slaves as things.
While Africans could be 
property, legal principles lasting 
well into the 20th Century restricted 
Africans from owning property 
themselves.
While using property laws to 
Slavery was not a new 
phenomenon, but never before 
had so many people been 
displaced against their will. 
Europeans were not the first 
to treat people as property, but 
Europe’s commodification and 
commercialisation of human beings 
was of an unprecedented scale.
Most historians agree that at least 
12 million slaves left the continent 
between the 15th and the 19th 
Centuries, and up to 20% died on 
board ship. More would have died at 
the point of capture. One Portuguese 
merchant in the late 18th Century 
observed that nearly half of those 
captured inland were dead by the 
time they reached the coast.
In 1807, Britain declared all slave 
trading illegal, and in 1865, after 
the civil war, the 13th Amendment 
abolished slavery in America. In 
1873, the last slave market in Africa, 
in Zanzibar, was closed and slavery 
gradually petered out.
IMPACT ON AFRICA
Men, particularly those at the 
prime of their life, were the most 
commercially attractive to the slave 
traders. The impact of the slave trade 
on both the size and structure of the 
population is incalculable.34
The slave trade involved African 
middlemen. As European demands 
grew, enslaving enemies became 
less a consequence of war, and more 
a reason to go to war. The result 
was a vicious spiral of escalating 
conflict, pitting neighbours against 
each other and fomenting growing 
He converted to Christianity and 
his successor’s son, Henrique, was 
educated in Portugal and returned 
to become Africa’s first Roman 
Catholic bishop. As noted below, 
what began as a convenient form of 
mutual trade became the destructive 
Atlantic slave trade by the time the 
Portuguese retreated from their 
African interests.
THE SLAVE TRADE
With the arrival of Europeans, 
slaves displaced gold as the main 
commodity for trade. Within 400 
years, millions of Africans were 
forced into slavery. Most went to 
the Americas, although many were 
taken to the Middle East and North 
Africa.
The Portuguese established 
contact with the African island of 
Sao Tome, and developed a sugar 
cane plantation there in 1473.33 Its 
prosperity relied on a continuous 
supply of imported slaves from the 
African mainland. The settlers’ 
rights to this labour were established 
by edicts of 1486 and 1493. The 
financial success of the enterprises 
of slave trading and of sugar cane 
farming, given the expanding 
market for sugar in Europe, caused 
conflict among competing African 
tribes, stirred by the Portuguese. 
Such divide-and-rule tactics 
characterised colonialism. These 
processes eventually resulted in 
the colonisation of Angola, as a 
hub for the export of slaves to the 
Portuguese possessions in the New 
World.
New York
New Orleans
Recife
Rio de Janeiro
Bueonos Aires
Lisbon
Muscat
Tripoli
TunisAlgiers
Tangier
Arguin
Negambria
Sierra Leone
Luanda
Loango
Windward Coast
Gold Coast
Bagdad
Damascus
Main sources of African 
slaves to the New World
Main areas of slave 
trade importation
Main slave 
trade routes
Cairo
Bahia
Above:
Slavery Memorial 
in Zanzibar, 
Tanzania.
Photo: redfrisbee/
Shutterstock
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Power and knowledge governance
Europe 1421: The first industrial patent was granted 
to Filippo Brunelleschi for inventing an improved 
method of transporting goods by boat.
Europe 1474: The French monarchy created the 
Parta Venizia, a royal letter granting the right to 
have a monopoly over an invention or artistic work. 
This is the first appearance of what would be termed 
“intellectual property rights” in modern terms. This 
was formalised in French law in 1791 and 1793.42
Innovation systems and technology
Maritime: Chinese naval and navigational 
innovations led to the building of large ships that 
could survive the storms of the oceans. The compass 
enabled seamen to steer their course.45 These 
innovations were adapted by the Arabs and later 
the Europeans in the 15th Century. This enabled 
Portuguese and later other European nations to 
make long ocean-going trading voyages.
Firearms: Gunpowder was invented in China in the 
9th Century, firearms by the 14th Century. Firearms 
first appeared in Africa in the late 15th Century, 
brought by Portuguese explorers. Their first use was 
in 1591, when a small Moroccan army under Judar 
Pasha managed to overthrow the powerful Songhai 
empire. Soon afterwards, the king of Bornu was 
the first to acquire a division of musketeers from 
the Ottomans, and firearms became indispensable 
weapons. A vast number of slaves were traded for 
guns.46
Sugar: Two-thirds of all slaves captured in the 18th 
Century went to work on sugar plantations. This 
reflected the enormous demand for sugar in food and 
drink at the time.
Cotton: In 1793 Eli Whitney invented the cotton 
gin, which enabled cotton to be processed on a 
large scale. Growing numbers of plantations led to a 
dramatic increase in the number of slaves.
Features of development
According to the Decree of King Louis XIV of 
France on 26 August 167038: “There is nothing which 
contributes more to the development of the colonies 
and the cultivation of their soil than the laborious 
toil of the negroes.”39
Africans’ perceptions of progress and 
development – and the role of slavery – were 
polarised:
“There are many traders in all parts of the country. They bring ruin. … Every day people are kidnapped and enslaved, even members of the King’s family.40King of Congo, Alfonso I in 1526, in a complaint letter to 
the King of Portugal João III
What held particular value?
Commerce and trade took on a new dimension and 
human and mineral resources (the treasure trove), 
and firearms (the means to access treasure) became 
highly valued as the resources to maintain superior 
wealth and power.43 The Great Rinderpest epidemic 
of the 1890s killed 95% of all cattle in many areas of 
East Africa and led to intensification of alternative 
sources of revenue, particularly the ivory trade.44
The slave trade 
is the ruling 
principle of my 
people. It is the 
source and the 
glory of their 
wealth. … the 
mother lulls the 
child to sleep 
with notes of 
triumph over an 
enemy reduced to 
slavery.41
King Gezo, ruler 
of Dahomey from 
1818 until 1858 
(Dahomey was an 
African kingdom 
in the present-day 
Republic of Benin 
which lasted from 
1600 until 1900.)
plunder Africa of human capital, 
Europeans were also creating ways to 
control knowledge through property 
rights. The first patents granting 
exclusive rights in knowledge were 
granted in Italy in the late 15th 
Century.
While not analogous by any 
means, the simultaneous trends to 
commodify both people and ideas 
through property rights – and 
the economic and philosophical 
justifications for these actions – laid 
the foundations for the period of 
colonialism to come.
“The estimation of the rights of aboriginal tribes is always inherently difficult. Some tribes are so low in the scale of social organization that their usages and conceptions 
of rights and duties are not to be 
reconciled with the institutions or the 
legal ideas of civilized society. Such 
a gulf cannot be bridged. It would be 
idle to impute to such people some 
shadow of the rights known to our 
law and then to transmute it into the 
substance of transferable rights of 
property as we know them.
Lord Sumner, writing in 1919 in the 
case of Re: Southern Rhodesia
This sword 
ornament of a 
lion dating back 
to 1874 originated 
from the Akan 
people of west 
Africa.
Photo: Gold of Africa 
Barbier-Mueller Museum
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Colonialism
“To open to civilization the only part of our globe where it has yet to penetrate, to pierce the darkness which envelops whole populations, it is, I dare to 
say, a crusade worthy of this century 
of progress. … in bringing you to 
Brussels I was in no way motivated 
by selfish designs. No gentlemen, 
if Belgium is small, she is happy 
and satisfied with her lot. My only 
ambition is to serve her.
King Leopold of Belgium at the 1876 
Brussels Geographic Conference
And a few months later in a letter to 
the Belgian ambassador in London:
“I do not want to miss a good chance of getting us a slice of this magnificent African cake.48
19TH CENTURY COLONIALISM
From the time of Napoleon’s defeat 
in 1815 to the outbreak of the 
First World War in 1914, Europe’s 
technological innovations and 
political ambitions fuelled a wave of 
colonialism across the globe. Within 
a century, most of the world’s land 
was under the control of one or 
other of Europe’s countries – and no 
continent was so impacted as Africa.
Until the 1850s, relations between 
Africans and Europeans were 
conducted at arm’s length. This 
was largely due to mutual hostility 
and the perceived harshness of the 
The history 
books say that 
Livingstone 
discovered the 
Victoria Falls. 
Stupid idea! 
When Livingstone 
came to the falls 
he was shown 
by an African. 
Livingstone didn’t 
discover: he was 
informed.47
Flavio Paradza, 
school teacher in 
Chibi, Zimbabwe, 
in 1981
The Rhodes Colossus, an 1892 caricature of Cecil Rhodes after  
announcing plans for a telegraph line from Cape Town to Cairo.
Source: For Punch by Edward Linley Sambourne
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There were growing territorial 
ambitions and the desire to find new 
markets for the growing surplus 
of European produce. Colonialism 
offered the opportunity to exploit 
raw materials and return products 
from the metropole for consumption 
by African markets.
There were some who believed 
that the growing strength and 
modernisation of indigenous 
African empires had the potential to 
challenge the status quo outside the 
continent. Some Muslim empires 
were supported by the Ottoman 
Empire and thus there was also a 
religious motivation.
PARTITIONING OF AFRICA
The result of these dynamics was the 
“scramble for Africa”, a partitioning 
of Africa at the Berlin Conference in 
1884 by Britain, France, Germany 
and Belgium. Africa became a proxy 
for political rivalry. This culminated 
Colonial rule in 
Africa in 1914
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Colonial rule in Africa in 1914.
Source: Darby and Fullard, Modern History Atlas; Robert Stock, Africa South of the Sahara
“I beg to direct your attention to Africa; I know that in a few years I shall be cut off in that country, which is now open: Do not let it be shut again! I go back to 
Africa to try to make an open path 
for commerce and Christianity; do 
you carry out the work which I have 
begun. I leave it with you!
David Livingstone, Cambridge 
University address, December 1857
His urging was heard by many in 
Europe who were motivated by 
commercial greed, political rivalry 
and territorial ambition.
When France was defeated in 
the Napoleonic Wars, it turned to 
Africa as economic consolation. 
The coalitions that had formed to 
attack Napoleon’s growing French 
empire became involved, and soon 
the major European powers started 
to claim territory in Africa and play 
proxy politics.
African environment by European 
explorers. African princes were able 
to present themselves as “lords of 
the land”, while acknowledging that 
the Europeans were “masters of the 
water”.49 In 1876, more than 90% 
of the continent was still ruled by 
Africans. Three decades later, only 
Liberia and Ethiopia had retained 
their independence.
COLONIAL MOTIVES
In 1855, David Livingstone became 
the first European to report the 
Mosi-oa-Tunya (“the smoke that 
thunders”) waterfall, which he 
renamed Victoria Falls after his 
monarch, Queen Victoria. His 
motto is inscribed on the base of 
his memorial statue at Victoria 
Falls: “Christianity, Commerce 
and Civilisation.” For Africans, the 
fourth C was Conquest.50
In November 1884, following a 
request from Portugal, German 
chancellor Otto von Bismark 
convened the Berlin Conference 
that carved out Africa. Fourteen 
countries were present. By 
1900 much of Africa had been 
colonised by seven European 
powers: Britain, France, Germany, 
Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Italy..
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a thriving medieval state. Cecil 
John Rhodes, who occupied the 
country and created the British 
colony of Rhodesia in 1888, refused 
to believe that a structure of such 
sophistication as Great Zimbabwe 
had been built by Africans. He 
employed Theodore Bent to excavate 
at the ruins, and commissioned 
research from A. Wilmot. The 
respective resultant The Ruined 
Cities of Mashonaland (1893) and 
Monomotapa (Rhodesia) (1896) 
argued that the ruins had been built 
by either Phoenicians or Arabs. Soon 
after Rhodes’ death, archaeologists 
found evidence disproving these 
views. In his book Medieval 
Rhodesia (1906), Randall-MacIver 
made the case that the ruins were 
of African origin and dated from 
approximately the 14th Century, 
research later corroborated by 
radiocarbon analysis. Nevertheless, 
the myths of mysterious origins were 
perpetuated by Rhodesian education 
until Zimbabwe’s liberation.
The colonial scramble petered 
out after World War I, when colonial 
powers started to calculate the costs 
of their colonial empires.
in the Fashoda Crisis in 1898, after a 
series of territorial disputes between 
France and Britain, which brought 
the two countries to the brink of war 
in Sudan.
Colonialism transformed the 
physical, political, cultural and 
psychological landscapes of Africa. 
It undermined and destroyed 
traditional forms of ownership, 
fractured societies and fomented 
distrust. A hallmark of colonial 
practices, particularly those of 
the British, was “decentralised 
despotism” or indirect rule. In this 
system, local rulers were co-opted 
or installed to collect taxes and 
maintain law and order. 52 Other 
colonial powers demolished or 
sidelined indigenous ruling systems 
and created their own governing 
structures staffed by their own 
citizens. Either way, this impacted 
the systems of land control, the form 
and function of urban areas, the 
organisation of work practices, and 
the very means of existence for most 
African people.53
BURYING HISTORY
Distortions of history were 
occasioned by racist mindsets and 
served the colonialist narrative. 
White rule was justified by the 
belief that blacks were not capable of 
governing or developing themselves. 
The most famous cover-up is that 
of the Zimbabwe Ruins, centre of 
Surviving Herero after the escape through the arid desert 
of Omaheke in German South West Africa (modern-day 
Namibia) (circa 1907).
Source: Ullstein Bilderdienst, Berlin
This scene from an Ethiopian painting depicts the Ethiopian triumph against 
Italian forces at the Battle of Adwa. The Italo-Ethiopian War of 1895–96 
distinguished Ethiopia as the only African state to maintain independence in 
the 19th Century with a decisive show of force.
Photo: Joshua Sherurcij
“We wanted to indicate to the average [visitor to] the ruins what the evidence was, to give them the facts of Zimbabwe’s origins, and that’s where we met opposition [from the Rhodesian government]. With our guidebook, they wanted us to omit any mention of 
radiocarbon dates, a scientific process that would give the 
lie to the other stories. Their thinking went like this: “If we 
accept blacks could do something like that then, we must 
give them majority rule now.”54
Tom Huffman, senior curator of archaeology in 1981 at the 
Queen Victoria Museum, Salisbury, Zimbabwe
Prince Eleko and council, Southern Nigeria (circa 1911).
Photo: John Hobbis Harris
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Features of development
In the 19th Century, concepts of progress and 
development were strongly linked with commerce, 
utilitarianism and the perception of technology as 
the key agent of social change. There was a marked 
change in discourse, with concepts of “polygeny” 
(that humans evolved from different ancestors) 
becoming widespread.55 There was a growing 
discourse in terms of binary extremes: black/white, 
civilized/savage,56 domination/subjugation and 
citizens/subjects. Superiority was not necessarily 
expressed explicitly in racial terms but in terms of 
notions of work, tools, weapons, legal codes and 
“sophistication”.
What held particular value?
Science and technology: With science and 
technology playing a leading role, structures 
that protected the inventors, such as formalised 
intellectual property rights, were introduced.
Geology: The first geological map was drawn in 
1815 by William Smith. It explained how geological 
strata create the conditions for certain minerals. 
This led indirectly to the scramble for Africa and its 
resources, for example, in the 1880s when diamonds 
were discovered in South Africa.58
Political strategies: As colonial powers usurped 
control, traditional rulers either learned new 
adaptive or subversive strategies or fell from 
power. This depended on their ability to acquire 
new technology (primarily modern guns), to 
communicate efficiently, to mobilise armies swiftly 
and to accept indirect rule. These qualities became 
more important than ancient genealogy, ritual, 
inheritance and isolation.
Innovation and technology
Quinine: Before the discovery of quinine, derived 
from the bark of a Peruvian plant, Africa was 
known as the “white man’s grave”. Later, Europeans 
were able to travel through Africa using quinine as 
protection from malaria.
Railways: In 1825, Stevenson designed the first steam 
engine that could pull carriages. In 1853, the first 
railway track on the continent was opened in Egypt. 
Steamboats similarly acted as the key to “civilizing” 
the interior of West Africa.
Gun design: In the 1830s, Africans and Europeans 
had equivalent firepower. Early muskets took some 
time to load, and were unreliable. In 1866, breech-
loading rifles were invented, which used cartridges 
and shot faster, more accurately and further. This 
led to an arms race from which Africa was largely 
excluded.57
Cars: In 1886, Carl Benz patented the modern 
automobile, which soon replaced animal-drafted 
carriages. In 1890 Dunlop invented the tyre, so 
creating an insatiable market for rubber, which grew 
in the Congo. This led indirectly to the colonisation 
of the Congo by Belgium.
Telecommunications: Submarine telegraphy was 
invented in the 1880s, speeding up communications 
and improving commercial, political and military 
control of the colonies.
Power and knowledge governance
Europe 1883: Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property protects patents on industrial 
design. African signatories include Tunisia.
Europe 1886: Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works protects copyright.
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Post-independence
Often the groups placed in charge 
under policies of indirect rule 
continued to rule following 
independence.
Many leaders of the struggles for 
independence also led the transition 
from colony to independent nation. 
Personality cults sometimes grew 
in response to the need to bind 
conflicting interests and groups. 
Initial multiparty democracies 
sometimes gave way to military rule 
or authoritarian one-party states. 
This often led to weak governance, 
poor economic performance, 
and the continued exploitation of 
resources by the elite, both domestic 
and foreign.
Following the rapid 
decolonisation of African states in 
the late 1950s and throughout the 
1960s, independent states followed 
two paths – the “African socialist” 
model of Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and 
Tanzania, and the “neoliberal” 
approach of Nigeria and later 
apartheid South Africa. Cold War 
politics led to Africa becoming an 
ideological battleground for the 
Soviet Union and the United States 
and its allies – the East versus the 
West, socialism versus capitalism.
AFRICA PAYS AGAIN
In the immediate post-colonial era, 
African governments borrowed 
heavily to industrialise their 
economies and educate their people. 
Commodity prices, which African 
countries relied on, were rising and 
credit was accessible. However, 
major oil price shocks (in 1973 
“The African state since independence has been subject to two competing pressures – the push towards militarisation and the pull towards privatisation. […] 
Africa is caught between Shylock and 
Shaka, between greed and naked 
power – and the decay of the post-
colonial state is one consequence of 
that dialectic.59
Ali Mazrui, writing in The Africans:  
A Triple Heritage, 1986
GROWING NATIONALISM
By the end of the Second World War, 
there were just three independent 
African countries – Liberia, 
Ethiopia and Egypt. Inspired by the 
example of Indian independence 
in 1947 under Gandhi, there was 
growing resistance and nationalist 
sentiment across Africa. Both the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
were supportive of anti-colonial 
sentiments: the former to gain free 
trade access to African markets and 
the latter to increase its sphere of 
influence.
State by state, the continent threw 
off the yoke of the colonials. In 1963, 
the Organisation of African Unity 
was established, a forum where 
newly independent African heads of 
state could collaborate.
The borders of African countries 
were those inherited from their 
colonial past, with scant regard 
for the organic borders between 
different ethnic and linguistic 
groups or regional power bases. 
In 1960, the number of independent countries grew 
from 9 (population 95 million) to 26 (180 million).
 n Cameroon (formerly Cameroun) –  
the first day of 1960 (from France)
 n Togo (formerly French Togoland) –  
27 April (from France)
 n Mali Federation – 20 June, then split into Mali 
and Senegal – 20 August (from France)
 n Madagascar – 26 June (from France)
 n Somalia, through the unification of British 
Somaliland and the Trust Territory of Somalia – 
26 June (from United Kingdom)
 n Republic of the Congo –  
30 June (from Belgium)
 n Somali Republic, five days after unification, 
Somalia united with the Italian Trust 
Territory – 1 July (from Italy)
 n Dahomey (renamed Benin in 1975) –  
1 August (from France)
 n Niger – 3 August (from France)
 n Upper Volta (renamed Burkina Faso in 1984) – 
5 August (from France)
 n Côte d’Ivoire – 7 August (from France)
 n Chad – 11 August (from France)
 n Central African Republic –  
13 August (from France)
 n Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) –  
15 August (from France)
 n Gabon – 17 August (from France)
 n Nigeria – 1 October (from United Kingdom)
 n Mauritania – 28 November (from France)
[Africa] has come far – overcoming colonisation, 
mounting successful liberation struggles which led to 
the acquisition of independence and … coming to grips 
with democratic governance.
Ada Ordor, Director of Centre for Comparative Law in Africa, 
University of Cape Town
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term benefit in terms of capacity to 
earn foreign exchange.”60
As the debts spiralled, the World 
Bank and IMF initiated greater 
controls over African governments, 
forcing structural adjustment 
programmes in exchange for loans. 
The neoliberal agenda was designed 
to remove “excess” government 
controls, promote market 
competition and revive multiparty 
democracy. Governments had to 
privatise state-owned industries, 
including the health sector, and 
open up their economies to foreign 
competition. The impact on the 
social sector has been profound, 
diverting scarce resources and 
thereby affecting access to health 
and education for the poor.
Between 1970 and 2002, African 
countries received some $540 billion 
in loans, paid back close to $550 
billion in principal and interest, 
and still held debt of $295 billion 
at the end of 2002.61 Thanks to 
African pushback and global debt 
relief efforts, African countries 
have reduced expenditure on debt 
service payments by 2% of GDP. 
Between 2000 and 2008, African 
countries reduced the percentage 
amount of their export earnings 
dedicated to servicing their external 
debt from approximately 27% to 
12%.62 However, the challenges of 
managing debt and development still 
remain.
and 1974 when Organization Of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) raised the oil price, and in 
1979 and 1980 when the Shah of Iran 
was deposed) sent interest rates sky-
high and led to the global recession 
of 1981 to 1982. Commodity prices 
dropped precipitously, leaving 
African countries with spiralling 
debt.
New borrowing was not always 
productive, and was sometimes used 
simply to service existing borrowing. 
“[P]oor public sector management, 
including, at times, poor project 
selection by donors, meant the 
loan funds which were designed to 
increase productivity and generate 
exports failed to produce the 
expected yields and brought no long-
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Barricades set up in the streets of Algier during the 
Algerian War of Independence, January 1960.
Photo: Michel Marcheux/Christophe Marcheux
While colonial powers ceased to govern South Africa in 1961, it took a 
protracted liberation struggle to achieve democracy with universal suffrage.
Photo: Eric Miller
Egypt´s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, addresses the 
1964 OAU Summit in Cairo, during his term as Secretary 
General. The OAU was disbanded in 2002 and replaced 
by the African Union.
Source: Al-Ahram Weekly online
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Features of development
Notions of progress were informed by “predominant 
development thinking that low-income countries 
should invest in industry, particularly import-
substitution industrialisation and infrastructure”, 
and the “prevailing view was that governments 
should play a leading role in this industrialisation”.63 
The backbone of the development strategy 
pursued by the IMF, World Bank and US Treasury 
Department was the Washington Consensus, which 
emphasised liberalisation, privatisation, fiscal 
discipline, openness to trade, protection of property 
rights, market-determined exchange and interest 
rates, and redirection of public spending toward 
education, health and public infrastructure.64
What held particular value?
“Since the 1950s, the debates had become intense and polarised. The issues changed: Economic reconstruction, the building of a social welfare state and the emancipation of new nations in the 1950s; the Cold War, democratisation and 
development in the 1960s; concluding decolonisation, 
a New International Economic Order and the provision 
of basic human needs in the 1970s; the primacy of 
the market, the defrosting of the Cold War and the 
sharpening of economic dualism within and between 
countries in the 1980s. All of these debates came 
together in the last decade of the previous century. 
It was the decade of neo-liberalism in economic 
as well as development policymaking, the decade 
during which the phenomenon of economic and 
technological globalisation reached maturity, the 
decade also of wide escalation of violent conflicts.68
Professor Jan Pronk, Dutch Minister for Development, 
1973–2002
Innovation systems and technology
Weapons: The Cold War initiated a nuclear arms 
race between the Soviet Union and the United States, 
and also lead to the stockpiling of illegal biological 
and chemical weapons. In early 2010, the total 
declared stockpile of the world was about 30,308 
tonnes.65
Radio: Radio, being cheap, flexible and oral, has 
been a predominant form of communication across 
Africa. The first radio stations in the 1930s were used 
as part of colonial administrations’ public service. 
By the 1960s most independent countries had 
established their own radio broadcasting services. 
Television: As with radio, domestic TV was 
primarily state-run in Africa until the 1990s – 
the decade when widespread access to satellite 
technology allowed for market entry by numerous 
domestic and international private TV operators. 
African TV consumption was until the mid-1990s 
primarily an activity for urban, wealthy elites.66 
Over the past two decades, private media have 
brought a measure of political independence and 
access to news. With the increasing adoption of 
mobile technology there has been rapid growth in 
terms of the number of media outlets and the size of 
audiences.67
Power and knowledge governance
1945: United Nations founded after World War II, 
aiming to keep peace, develop friendly relations, help 
nations work together to improve the lives of poor 
people, to conquer hunger, disease and illiteracy, 
and to encourage respect for each other’s rights and 
freedoms.69
1948: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).
1963: African Copyright Meeting in Brazzaville, 
followed by the Stockholm Conference in 1967, 
for revision of the Berne Convention. A “protocol 
regarding developing countries” known as the 
Stockholm Protocol was added.
1976: The Lusaka Agreement  – an Agreement on the 
Creation of the Industrial Property Organization for 
English-speaking Africa (ESARIPO) – was adopted 
in Zambia, with assistance from the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
1994: Signed in Marrakech, Morocco, the Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS), set down minimum standards for 
intellectual property rights and linking intellectual 
property to trade for the first time on a global scale.
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expectations for some onlookers, 
with among the world’s fastest 
growing economies and the 
explosion of mobile networks 
leading to new innovations. This 
progress has been widely celebrated. 
What is often overlooked is that 
countries that have grown most 
rapidly are those engaged in the 
production of new technologies 
rather than simply being users of, 
and at best service providers to, the 
technology of others.71
For some Africans, the result 
of the mobile revolution has 
been horizontal power, growing 
individualism and a new climate 
of optimism. The Arab 
Spring started in Tunisia 
with the self-immolation of 
Mohamed Bouazizi at the 
end of 2010, and it spread 
like wildfire to Egypt, 
Libya, Yemen, Morocco, 
Western Sahara and Syria. 
People everywhere are 
demanding transparency, 
an end to corruption and 
cronyism, and employment 
for the ballooning youth 
population.
A HARSHER SEASON
Other Africans experience 
a cycle of weak governance, 
poverty and violence. 
There are four “failed 
states” and several on the 
alert list. The problems of 
fragile states spread easily.
these interactions are standardised, 
so that there is a powerful dynamic 
between heterogeneity and 
homogeneity. Geopolitics and 
geo-economics are fundamentally 
intertwined and there is constant 
flux. The paradigm of today is 
always-on, constant adaptation. 
Amidst the high unpredictability at 
environmental, social, economic and 
political levels, there is one certainty: 
there is no monopoly on wisdom.
AFRICA’S SPRING?
A decade into the 21st Century, 
Africa has confounded global 
CHANGE AND COMPLEXITY
The global euphoria and stability 
at the start of the new millennium 
has given way to a new dynamic. 
Constant disruptive change and 
complexity characterise the 21st 
Century as globalising forces 
multiply interconnections, linking 
more and more people and systems 
across growing numbers of 
interfaces.
This has led to a growing 
cacophony of opinions and voices, 
and divergent interests. Although 
we have multitudes of competing 
stakeholders, interests and mind-
sets, many of the systems underlying 
Current 
paradigm
The Arab Spring started in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and spread like wildfire to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, 
Morocco, Western Sahara and Syria.
Photo: Wael Abed Revolution Archive
What the 
discovery of 
African writers 
did for me is this: 
it saved me from 
having a single 
story …70
Chimamanda 
Ngozi Adichie, 
writer
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Features of development
The framework of the Beijing Consensus72 sees 
development as involving constant experimentation, 
described as “groping for stones to cross the river”. 
The key is self-determination defined by, and the 
product of, a specific society. Power means change, 
newness and innovation. Sustainability and equality 
have been adopted as key measures alongside GDP 
per capita.
Another version is the World Bank’s 
Comprehensive Development Framework, which 
integrates both economic and social aspects of 
development based on four principles:
 n a long-term, holistic vision of a country’s needs
 n focusing on macroeconomic aspects but also on 
social and structural aspects
 n a focus on results rather than inputs
 n country-owned strategies and collaborative 
partnerships.73
What holds particular value?
“Governance is about managing this place. … It’s a mess. There is a need to enshrine the rule of law. That is the first step toward building an advanced society. Transparency. Lack of corruption. Human rights of individuals. Building infrastructure. 
Taking care of education. Health. All these things are 
pillars of a civil society. [What prevents these is] lack of 
good governance.74
Mo Ibrahim, quoted in an interview in The New Yorker
“Justice and equity are certainly not new concepts. Here we use them in their broadest sense. By looking at the triangle of jobs, justice and equity, we underline the role of empowerment and equality of opportunity as indispensable for 
progress and thus particularly powerful focal points 
for domestic policy initiatives and international 
development assistance. We highlight jobs because it 
is through their livelihoods that people achieve social 
progress, for themselves and for others, and because 
the need to create jobs for the continent’s rapidly 
growing youth population stands out as among the 
most pertinent challenges for Africa’s policymakers.75
Kofi Anan, seventh Secretary-General of the United 
Nations
Innovation and technology
Mobile telephony: Cellphone access and usage began 
to spread rapidly in Africa in the late 1990s, a trend 
resulting in the ubiquitous mobile usage that is a 
feature of 21st Century Africa. There were fewer than 
4 million mobile phones in Africa in 1998. There are 
more than 400 million today.
Internet: The growth of internet usage in the late 
1990s is less strong than that of mobile telephony, 
due to internet’s then reliance on fixed-line 
infrastructure (which was and is weak in most of 
Africa). It is only with the arrival of widespread 
access to wireless mobile internet, in the 2000s, that 
the internet has become a strong technological factor 
throughout Africa.76
Cutting-edge technologies: We can hardly imagine 
the future implications of technologies such as 
3D printing and nano-technologies. Even less can 
we predict how emerging technologies will synergise 
or clash with each other, and the feedback loops. 
3D printing side steps the need for major centralised 
manufacturing machinery and infrastructure. 
It takes a digital version of an object and creates 
the physical object by laying down thin layers of 
a material such as plastic to form the shape. The 
prototype is distributed electronically and the 
object can be manufactured anywhere where there 
is a 3D printer. Nano-technologies manipulate 
the building blocks of matter at the nanoscale of 
atoms and molecules. Convergence of four major 
technologies (nano-bio-info-cogno) could radically 
alter society and human lives.77
Power and knowledge governance
Multiple and conflicting perspectives between:
 n different donors, and increased South-South co-
operation and trade between developing nations 
following models such as the Beijing Consensus;
 n different systems: open source, copy left and 
intellectual property rights.
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I have felt 
my strongest 
artistic emotions 
when suddenly 
confronted with 
the sublime 
beauty of 
sculptures 
executed by the 
anonymous 
artists of Africa. 
These works 
of a religious, 
passionate, and 
rigorously logical 
art are the most 
beautiful things 
the human 
imagination has 
ever produced.78
Pablo Picasso, 
artist
no longer dominates, its impacts 
remain embedded in culture, ways 
of working, social interactions and 
economic organisation.
Just when you thought ...
The preservation and transmission 
of knowledge are vulnerable and 
tenuous.
Much knowledge in Africa was 
handed down orally and through 
intergenerational experiential 
learning. Somalian oral and written 
practices make for an interesting 
case. The Somalis have been 
described as a nation of bards, with 
poetry preserved orally by poets who 
were accorded high social status. 
Somali is spoken throughout the 
eastern Horn of Africa, in Somalia, 
eastern Ethiopia, northeast Kenya 
and southeast Djibouti, and by a 
large global Somali diaspora. The 
Somali language only acquired an 
official writing system based on the 
Latin alphabet in October 1972, 
bringing to an end the “alphabet 
wars” between factions promoting 
several possible scripts – Latin, 
Arabic or Osmaniya.
Many repositories and centres of 
knowledge have disappeared, prey 
to the vicissitudes of history, such 
as the Great Library of Alexandria, 
the University of Timbuktu, and the 
ancient city of Jenne. In contrast, 
Al-Qarawiyyin in Fes is the oldest 
educational institution in the world, 
continually operating since it was 
established in 859 AD.
Knowledge transmitted orally 
can degrade, or be embroidered 
aeons of time illustrates that 
different economic and political 
systems give rise to different 
knowledge governance paradigms 
and regimes. A deeper look into the 
anthropological, archaeological and 
historical evidence and scholarship 
that abounds is warranted.
“African innovation outside the global process will be a most uncharitable concept if not an exercise in intellectual fraud … You may be suggesting that African 
innovation can be isolated from 
the innovation and development of 
Europe and America. No, Africans 
were true participants and architects 
in those regions and cannot be 
excluded from the global narrative of 
innovation.
Charles Okafor, Nollywood actor, Lagos 
(Open A.I.R. interview)
However, two points are 
immediately apparent. First, 
knowledge is transitory and its 
preservation contingent. Disruptors 
include technological innovation, 
but also the natural environment, 
political forces, social norms, 
and cultural values. Important 
knowledge for one society or 
grouping, or at a particular time, can 
lose value as contexts or perspectives 
change. Knowledge useful in one 
context or society can be disastrous 
to another society, or under different 
circumstances. Second, yesterday’s 
understandings have shaped 
our current reality. Even when 
previously unquestioned knowledge 
The previous pages touch on 
examples of African visioning and 
scholarship, ingenuity and creativity, 
and innovative technologies and 
governance. African creativity 
and innovation have long inspired 
those from outside. Over the past 
century, the dominant, regimented 
bureaucratic-industrial knowledge 
has not straightjacketed African 
innovation and creativity to the 
extent that it has in the developed 
world. This may give Africa a unique 
edge in the knowledge society of  
the future.
CONTEXT MATTERS
When the Open A.I.R. research 
network started scenario building 
three years ago, we spent countless 
hours consulting and discussing the 
links between valuable knowledge, 
its governance (i.e. the way it is 
owned, shared and protected), 
information communications 
networks, innovation systems, and 
human development or socio-
economic progress. Research 
reveals not only that these topics are 
interrelated, but also that they are 
time-bound. Together, they form the 
particular context of the time, shape 
societies and cultures, and are in 
turn shaped by them – until there is 
a disruption that tips the balance, or 
an accretion of changes that ratchets 
these interconnected factors into a 
new paradigm.
Despite being airbrushed out 
of the story of human progress 
held in the popular consciousness, 
Africa’s historical tapestry across 
Lessons from 
history
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Similarly, environmental changes 
can disrupt established ways of 
life. The desertification of the 
Sahara appears to have commenced 
abruptly about 5,440 years ago 
due to subtle changes in the title 
of the earth’s axis.79 The result 
was a change from a well-watered 
lush environment covered by 
annual grasses and pollens suitable 
for farming and pastures to an 
extremely arid, inhospitable desert – 
with major changes for the human 
beings dependent on it.
A population can reach its 
growth limit and be threatened 
with collapse. This occurred in 
Africa several times, as a society’s 
requirements for food and water 
exceeded the environmental 
capacity of a region. For example, 
Great Zimbabwe existed for over 
three centuries and was home to 
a population of more than 10,000 
people, but the demand on the 
hinterland required to support this 
level of society was not sustainable.
WHERE DO WE STAND?
The road of industrialisation that 
humankind has taken over the past 
three centuries has been uneven. 
Some people benefitted from great 
leaps of progress, but at the cost of 
the environment and human equity. 
Humankind’s ability to 
innovate has been the impetus for 
development since we first emerged 
on the African plains. The growth 
of new technologies, and the 
complexity of their interaction, has 
been exponential.
nutrients and hence soil fertility; 
adverse changes in salinity; acidity 
or alkalinity; death or disruption of 
soil microbes and other organisms 
such as earthworms and bees; soil 
erosion; and loss of topsoil. A return 
to indigenous forms of knowledge 
may hold a key to more sustainable 
agriculture, and since labour, fuel, 
irrigation and machinery costs 
are reduced, greater surpluses can 
potentially be realised.
The future of the past
Examples abound of how our 
thinking today is still shaped by 
implicit understandings from our 
past. Oral traditions continue to 
influence what knowledge is valued 
and how it is governed. The era of 
colonial racism is in most respects 
officially over in Africa, yet it still 
patterns thoughts and behaviours. 
The rhetoric of independence 
struggles persists, even though it 
often has little relevance for the 
economies and politics of today.
The disruptors
Slavery and colonialism – economic 
drivers of change – caused the 
greatest disruptions experienced on 
the continent.
Technological disruption of an 
existing order is seen in the Assyrian 
overthrow of the Nubian Dynasty 
of Egypt due to superior military 
technologies; the arrival of guns 
on the continent with the Ottoman 
Empire; and the dissemination of 
information technology.
in the telling over time; written 
information can be destroyed or 
damaged; information transmitted 
digitally is easy to duplicate and can 
be subtly altered without the changes 
being easily visible.
Knowledge can be lost. We have 
seen how the ability to innovate and 
build a canal in the 13th Century 
BC to link the Nile and the Red Sea 
disappeared until the need arose 
centuries later when the shipping 
route was “reopened” as the Suez 
Canal in 1869. Romans in the 1st 
Century AD had all the makings of 
steam engines, yet this technology 
was only put to use in industrial 
production many centuries later.
The lion and the hunter
Periods of slavery and colonialism 
provide clear examples of knowledge 
regimes and innovations which 
nourished some while poisoning 
others. Knowledge can be distorted 
through the lens of an interest 
group – as Achebe says, the hunter 
describes it differently from the lion.
Traditional African practices of 
farming include no-till agriculture, 
the use of planting sticks and 
rotating a mixture of crops. With 
colonialism came cash crops and 
later industrial agricultural methods 
with pesticides and artificial 
fertilisers, seen to increase yield. 
However, the drawbacks of these 
methods have subsequently become 
apparent: release of carbon held 
in the soil; greater evaporation of 
water; compacting and degradation 
of soil; loss of organic matter and 
The most 
powerful weapon 
in the hands of 
the oppressor is 
the mind of the 
oppressed.
Steve Biko, South 
African Black 
Consciousness 
activist
Photo: Mikael Damkier/
Shutterstock
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The conundrum today is how 
African countries can participate 
in the global model yet also craft a 
successful economic model that they 
can claim ownership over. China, 
Brazil and Japan are examples of 
nations that have forged their own 
paths. If African states play in the 
capitalist game according to rules set 
by others, they may get left behind 
and exploited just as they have 
over the last few centuries. African 
countries could seek to merely get 
stronger footholds in the capitalist 
dispensation and gladly participate.
Or might African nations be able 
to draw on their current positions 
in the global order to lead in a new 
direction? What role for Africa? 
Do its history and diversity offer 
unique potential for innovation 
and new ways of thinking? Might 
emerging global contexts – contexts 
shaping what knowledge has value, 
knowledge governance, and what 
constitutes worthwhile innovation – 
be tilting in favour of African 
countries? Will African progress, 
development and innovation benefit 
the few,or the many?
Seeking answers to these 
questions, we turn now to the 
driving forces of change that are at 
present pushing Africa and the rest 
of the world into uncertain futures. 
After that, three scenarios are set 
out: three possible contexts in which 
Africans might have to operate in 20 
years’ time, around the year 2035.
There is no map of the world 
that truly portrays the globe, 
due to its curvature. The 
graphic overlays three attempts. 
The most familiar map is the 
Mercator projection, which 
was developed in 1569 for use 
on voyages by ship. It used 
a rectangular grid, based on 
the shape of the countries, as 
this was useful to navigators 
who needed straight lines 
representing longitude in 
order to be able to calculate 
their position at sea. However, 
this caused the land masses 
to become distorted, inflating 
the size of North American 
and Eurasian countries, which 
are nearer to the North Pole, 
and shrinking the continents 
of Africa and South America 
in the process. In 1973, Arno 
Peters launched an alternative 
depiction of the world map, 
which was based on true land 
masses throughout the world, 
claiming that it more fairly 
displayed third world countries. 
The Robinson map, first devised 
in 1963, sought a compromise. 
It is neither equal-area nor 
conformal.
The map shapes our 
conception of reality.
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Drivers 
of 
change
Through three years of work, dozens of Open A.I.R. 
researchers have together distilled the insights of 
hundreds of interviewees and thousands of survey 
respondents to identify the key drivers of Africa’s 
futures.
The process involved exploring issues such as 
elements already in the pipeline, cause and effect 
relationships, key patterns and trends. These issues 
were then ranked in terms of degree of importance, 
uncertainty and level of ignorance. In each case the 
objective was to determine the tectonic force that would 
shape the trajectory of the future.
Five drivers have been distilled. Each of the five 
drivers could not only evolve in many different ways, 
but also interact with the other equally uncertain 
drivers of change (and others not considered here), with 
feedback loops, knock-on effects and trade-offs. In this 
section, we try to tease them out, look at trends and 
explore how they might play out.
The five drivers are:
 n Global relationships: the countless interconnections 
and interdependencies that span the globe to unite 
its people – or distance them.
 n Statehood and governance: the role of the state in 
relation to residents, balancing the innate tension 
between individual rights and freedoms, and state 
power. 
 n Identities and differences: the values that evolve in 
the face of social, political and economic changes 
taking place at global, local and personal levels.
 n Infrastructure and technology: disruptive enablers 
to leapfrog conventional structures and methods 
to create new economic, social and political 
development and disrupt the status quo. 
 n Employment and livelihoods: the ability to create 
opportunities for a growing workforce, so providing 
the means to reduce poverty and create economic 
growth, social empowerment or even social 
cohesion.
After centuries of continuities, modern rates of change 
have shown that it is often that which no one imagined 
or expected that drives history – the wildcards and 
shocks. We have tried to imagine such possibilities that 
might rupture any road map.
There are forces driving the futures of 
Africa – indeed the entire world – in different 
directions. These forces can be unpredictable, 
complex, or uncontrollable. What are they?
Global 
relationships
Will these relationships be collaborative, competitive or 
coercive – and who benefits?
Africa and China: handshakes or handcuffs?6
Official and unofficial data indicates that from 
2000 to 2006, China quintupled in terms of the 
number of projects in Africa. At the end of 2011, 
Chinese investment stock in Africa stood at $16 
billion, with Sub-Saharan Africa the focus and 
South Africa its leading recipient.7
African responses strike different notes. 
Some dub Chinese interests in the continent as 
neo-colonial – designed to expropriate African 
resources to fuel Chinese growth. Others welcome 
Chinese investment, citing economic growth and 
development as the overarching priority in terms 
of international partnerships.
“The Chinese must come to Africa on African terms. The terms that will allow the Chinese to make money but the terms that will also allow Africa to develop, win-win.Arthur Mutambara, former Deputy Prime Minister  
of Zimbabwe
“Why when we have relations with the others there is no problem? But when we have relations with China, oh boy! So many questions! Tanzania looks for investments, technology, markets and development assistance. 
This is all we are getting from China. Our 
relationship with China is about that. With the US is 
about that, with Europe is about that, with Japan is 
about that, with India is about that. So if the issue is 
neocolonialism then it is with everybody.
Jakaya Kikwete, President of Tanzania
AFRICA’S CENTURY?
Home to among the world’s poorest 
and hampered by its historical 
position in the global economic and 
power relations, Africa has been 
caricatured as the world’s economic 
basket case. Over the last decade, 
Africa has rebounded greatly in 
terms of economic reality and global 
perception. Continental economic 
growth has trebled since 2002 with 
the continent averaging 5% GDP 
growth annually over that period. 
In 2012, Africa’s GDP grew 6.6%, up 
from 3.5% in 2011.1
Over the period 2001 to 2010, 6 
of the 10 fastest growing economies 
in the world were in Africa. The 
IMF forecasts that by 2017, 11 of the 
world’s 20 fastest growing economies 
will be in Africa.2 Countries as 
diverse as Botswana, Nigeria, 
Zambia and Sudan have transitioned 
into middle-income nations in 
two short decades. Pundits have 
highlighted the parallels between the 
growth of Africa’s “Lion Economies” 
over the last decade and the rise of 
the “Asian Tigers” in the 1990s. (The 
Lions are Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, 
Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, South 
Africa and Tunisia, whose combined 
GDP per capita exceeds that of the 
BRIC nations.3) Will this optimistic 
economic growth trajectory persist 
throughout the 21st Century and 
change Africa’s position in the  
global economy?
GLOBAL REALIGNMENTS
African countries’ roles in the 
interplay between the various 
global economic players will frame 
economic and political pathways 
on the continent. During the Cold 
War, the United States and its allies 
simplistically categorised African 
states as either capitalist/Western, 
or socialist/communist and aligned 
with the Soviet Union. The demise of 
the Soviet Union and then the 2008 
global economic crisis (which called 
unbridled capitalism into question) 
disrupted 20th Century notions of 
“progress”.
The United States sees its agenda 
in Sub-Saharan Africa as being to 
“strengthen democratic institutions; 
spur economic growth, trade, and 
investment; advance peace and 
security; and promote opportunity 
and development”.4 In contrast, 
China’s stated goal is to establish 
relationships by seeking “mutual 
benefit for China and African 
nations and by following a policy 
of non-interference in countries’ 
domestic affairs”. 5 Much as it did 
with regard to Soviet actions, the 
West has sought to caution African 
nations about Chinese advancement 
on the continent, while African 
engagement with China has posited 
alternative thinking in terms of 
economic and cultural development. 
Meanwhile, Africa’s traditional  
aid and trade relations with 
European countries are beset  
by economic woes.
Cutting across geopolitical poles, 
transnational corporations make 
up 51 of the 100 largest economies 
in the world, and their behaviour 
and relations are of fundamental 
importance.
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TRADE PARTNER PATTERNS
The economic fortunes of other 
countries play out in trade with 
Africa. Previously Africa’s largest 
trading partner, the European 
Union’s share of African trade is 
down to 30%, from 50% in 2000.6 
From 1990 to 2008, Western 
Europe’s trade with Africa shrank 
from 51% to 28%. Although China’s 
interests in Africa have received 
much attention lately, reports 
suggest India is not far behind.7 
African trade with the BRICS 
countries is calculated to have 
increased more than tenfold over the 
course of a decade (to $340 billion 
in 2012).8
Growth in trade based on the 
current patterns of globalised 
relations presupposes that new forms 
of protectionism will not be put in 
place. Historically, many countries 
have resorted to high tariffs, non-
tariff barriers, import substitution or 
legislation and regulations to restrict 
unfavourable trade.9 A new element 
entering the picture is that of “eco-
protectionism”, as countries seek 
to avoid importing the water and 
carbon intensity, and environmental 
damage, of other countries’ outputs 
in the face of consumer pressure and 
national carbon emission reduction 
targets.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT SHIFTS
In 1970 FDI from three countries – 
France, United States, United 
Kingdom – accounted for 99% of 
Africa’s input, but by 2000 it had 
slipped to 89%, and just a decade 
later to 79% of the total – still 
dominant, but dropping. By 2010, 
BRICS represented 25% of FDI 
flows and 14% of stock investments 
in Africa.10 BRICS investments in 
greenfield projects look to surpass 
those of developed countries as the 
top investors in Africa by the end of 
the decade.
Looking at the picture from the 
side of the investors, Africa’s share 
of investment outflows from the EU, 
US and now BRICS has increased 
sharply in recent years.
EMERGING INVESTMENT 
MUSCLE
Two new kinds of public investors 
are becoming increasingly important 
as FDI players.
State-owned enterprises: In 2010 
there were 650 of these, operating 
about 8,500 foreign affiliates.11 Two 
years later, their numbers had risen 
to 845 and the FDI flows they were 
responsible for amounted to $145 
billion, reaching almost 11% of 
global FDI.12 The majority of their 
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POLICY ISSUES REGARDING GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
POTENTIAL BENEFITS POTENTIAL PITFALLS
 nProvides capital.
 nContributes and disseminates 
technology and innovation, 
increasing domestic 
technological sophistication.
 nBuilds productive capacity.
 nLocal firms can move up the 
value chain.
 nCreates jobs and incomes.
 nBuilds skills.
 nOver the longer term, 
industrial upgrading of the 
domestic economy, from 
resource-based exports to 
manufactures and services 
of increasing degrees of 
complexity, and greater 
domestic value-added.
 nUnhealthy alliances between 
the interests and actions of 
the political elite, transnational 
corporations and international 
banks, especially in weak 
states where there is little 
transparency.
 nTransitory and insecure 
employment.
 nPoor working conditions, with 
attendant occupational safety 
and health concerns.
 n Increased volatility that 
accompanies this fragmentation 
of trade and international 
dispersal of production 
processes. Many poorer 
countries strongly depend on 
inward direct investment, which 
makes them vulnerable.
Source: James K. Boyce and Leonce Ndikumana15
assets were acquired in developing 
countries, usually motivated by 
the search for strategic assets (e.g. 
technology, intellectual property, 
brand names) or natural resources. 
In Africa, their search has usually 
been for the latter.
Sovereign wealth funds: Their 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
2012 amounted to $20 billion, double 
that of the previous year, bringing 
the total value of their stock to $127 
billion. Geographically, over 70% of 
their investment has been targeted 
at developed economies, most of it 
in finance, real estate, construction 
and utilities, but with total assets 
valued at $4–5 trillion,13 there 
is tremendous scope for further 
investment elsewhere.
AFRICA INVESTING IN ITSELF
Intra-African investment has grown 
at a 32.5% compound rate since 
2007. South Africa is leading in this 
regard and in 2012 was the single 
largest investor in FDI projects 
in Africa outside of South Africa 
itself.14 Forecasts estimate that in the 
future, intra-African investment will 
surpass external investment on the 
continent.15
MULTINATIONALS AND THEIR 
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
Globalised value chains characterise 
today’s global economy and account 
for approximately 80% of global 
trade.16 Such value chains comprise 
intermediate goods and services 
with cross-border trade of inputs 
and outputs taking place through 
multinational corporations’ 
networks of affiliates, contractual 
partners and suppliers. According to 
UNCTAD, these global value chains 
currently contribute nearly 30% to 
the GDP of developing countries.17 
Co-ordination of the chains 
by multinationals can take on 
many different guises, from direct 
ownership of foreign affiliates, 
to contractual relationships 
(from contract manufacturing or 
production, to services outsourcing, 
licensing, franchising or contract 
farming), to arm’s-length dealings. 
The investment decisions create 
different relationships between the 
foreign company and domestic 
business partners that will 
have significant bearing on the 
distribution of economic gains and 
on development impacts.
How African countries and 
companies leverage the nature of 
the value chain, the power dynamics 
with the corporation, as well as the 
local business and institutional 
environment for doing business, will 
determine the benefits they derive.18
Multinationals have been 
able to move relations and 
operations to take best advantage 
of conditions, supplies and the 
labour market. A new trend to 
watch is that of “reshoring” (also 
called homeshoring, onshoring, 
backshoring, insourcing, and 
repatriating) back to the company’s 
original home country. Motivations 
vary from customer pressure for 
local procurement, higher and 
volatile transportation and fuel 
costs, and rising wage rates and 
higher reject rates in developing 
countries.
CAPITAL FLIGHT AND TAX 
AVOIDANCE
If Africa’s GDP continues to 
grow, and trade and foreign direct 
investment increases, where and 
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The time has 
come to end 
this charade. 
The debts are 
unaffordable. 
If they won’t 
cancel the debts, 
I would suggest 
obstruction; 
[Africa] you do 
it, yourselves. 
Africa should say: 
“Thank you very 
much, but we 
need this mon y 
to meet the 
needs of children 
who are dying, 
right now, so, 
we will put the 
debt-servicing 
payments into 
urgent social 
investment in 
health, education, 
drinking water, 
the control of 
AIDS, and other 
needs.31
Prof. Jeffrey Sachs, 
Director of The 
Earth Institute and 
Special Economic 
Advisor to UN 
Secretary, General 
Kofi Annan
in whose interests will the income 
be used? Are regulatory changes 
required, or deeper systemic 
changes?
The increased African per capita 
income has had no discernible 
effect on poverty levels across 
the continent, and inequality 
gaps remain severe. The African 
Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights recognised in 
April 2013 that capital flight is a 
major concern for African nations, 
noting that “illicit capital flight 
undermines the capacity of State 
Parties to implement the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and to attain the Millennium 
Development Goals”.19 It is estimated 
that Sub-Saharan African countries 
lost $202.4 billion in capital flight 
from 2005 to 2010.20 In countries 
dependent on oil exports (Gabon, 
Angola, Republic of the Congo, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria), capital flight 
per capita is nearly twice per capita 
income.21
Illicit capital flows are due to 
corruption, criminal activities 
and commercial tax evasion, 
and estimates are that the latter 
constitute about 60%. Multinational 
corporations are able to use their 
global presence and influence to 
double count trade, so evading 
taxes in developing countries 
and thus seriously undermining 
development.22 According to 
UNECA, Africa lost about $854 
billion in illicit financial flows over 
the 39-year period from 1970 to 
2008; corresponding to a yearly 
average of about $22 billion.23 
Much of this has been exported by 
multinationals, according to the 
African Development Bank.24
AID FLOWS
In 2010, 20 out of 28 low-income 
countries (52% of Africa’s 
population) relied on aid as 
the largest external resource.25 
In 2012, Official Development 
Assistance equalled 64% of total 
external inflows of capital for these 
countries.26 Is there a way out of 
this continuing dependence, and 
what will happen to aid flows when 
donors feel the economic pinch? 
And what exactly are the conditions 
attached to aid? 
DEBT
The shadow side of a picture of 
Africa’s growing assertiveness 
and collaboration in trade and 
investment is the crushing burden 
imposed by interest on debt ($340 
billion by 199527). The interest 
payments to public and private 
lenders in the developed world 
are often at the expense of social 
spending. In 2005 the group 
of eight leading industrialised 
countries (G8), World Bank and 
IMF announced the Multilateral 
Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) 
for 18 Highly Impoverished Poor 
Countries (HIPC), 14 of which were 
in Africa. The initiative provides 
for 100% relief on eligible debt from 
three multilateral institutions. The 
total cost to the IMF of MDRI debt 
relief was estimated at about $3.4 
billion by 28 February 2013 (being 
0.03% of the IMF’s about $12 trillion 
international reserves shown in its 
latest available annual report28). The 
deal still requires the majority of 
African countries to meet economic 
conditions that are harmful to their 
development as a condition for 
future debt relief or cancellation.29
Africa-debtudoewa.blogspot.com_2008-07_africa-and-debt_html, accessed 25 August 2013
WHERE TO?
The new optimism about 
Africa’s future growth assumes 
that globalisation in its current 
form will continue apace, and 
that new dynamics such as 
reshoring or protectionism 
will not rupture the rules of 
the game. Understood against 
a backdrop of imperialism and 
its sister, global capitalism, 
the internationalisation of 
the global economy has led 
to a change in the ownership 
structure of existing assets, 
rather than redistribution of 
the geography of economic 
activity.30 More recently, 
Africa’s global relationships 
are becoming increasingly 
collaborative thanks in large 
part to the development 
of commodities and 
manufacturing sectors on the 
continent, spurred by FDI from 
BRICS. Each of the Open A.I.R. 
scenarios explores different 
trajectories and interplays of 
these relationships between and 
within countries – collaborative, 
competitive or coercive.
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Statehood and 
governance
Will African governance be cohesive, challenging or communal – and whose 
interests will it serve?
this continuum there is on the one 
hand reliance on formal rules and 
forms of policing these, and on the 
other reliance on custom, tradition 
and the value of consensus not 
only within families and clans, but 
also externally between groups. 
International institutions such as 
the World Bank and IMF perceive 
multi-party democracy as the most 
effective vehicle for achieving good 
SHADES OF DEMOCRACY AND 
DICTATORSHIP
Notions of what constitutes 
democracy and good governance 
are open to interpretation. African 
political formations have historically 
ranged from states with elaborate 
centralised structures of authority 
to stateless societies with diffused 
decentralised authority. Along 
governance.
Despite waves of post-colonial 
democratic transition in Africa, 
many states still have political 
systems dominated by a single party 
or personal autocracy. Of the 52 
countries evaluated in 2011 by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit and 
the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, only 
Mauritius was considered a fully 
fledged democracy while nine were 
considered flawed democracies. 
At the other end of the spectrum, 
23 were classified as authoritarian 
regimes. Of these, six have had the 
same ruler in power for more than 
a quarter century.32 In many states, 
political interaction continues to 
be marked by the marginalisation 
of opposition parties, or political 
alliances defined by ethnic 
allegiances.33
Whether persisting as a 
colonial legacy, emerging through 
rural-urban migration trends, 
or coalescing around family and 
community relationships of support, 
ethnic identities may become a 
focus for mobilisation to bridge 
lacks in democratic participation or 
developmental delivery, or to capture 
access to resources, as has happened 
in Ghana, Uganda and Nigeria. This 
holds the potential for a divergent 
trajectory for African statehood.34
NEW EXPECTATIONS
In today’s globally interconnected 
world, governments are faced 
with citizens that expect a breadth 
and depth of economic and social 
development, and civil and political The Economist from Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Mo Ibrahim Foundation
African democracy 
ratings, 2011
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rights that are not mediated through 
traditional structures. Women are 
increasingly challenging their status, 
and a capable and less deferential 
growing youth population poses 
new expectations. Many of Africa’s 
emerging generation of youth 
are politically engaged and lack 
historical affiliation to the parties of 
colonial liberation.
A CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY
“[Civil society encompasses]  a constellation of human and associational activities operating in the public sphere outside the market and the state.37
African Development Bank
There is a significant trend in 
Africa toward a greater role of 
civil society in increasing state 
accountability and capacity.38 
Over the past decade, civil society 
has effectively “[contributed] to 
public participation, clamoured for 
more transparent and accountable 
governance; lobbied for women and 
children’s rights to be understood 
and respected, and demanded better 
basic public services. African civil 
society has been an integral part of 
the real change that has swept over 
the continent in the last decade”.39
WIELDING STATE POWER, 
IN WHOSE INTEREST
Challenges remain of ensuring a 
concept of civil society that the 
state develops in a way that benefits 
the whole of society. In some cases, 
control of the apparatus of the 
state is competed for as a tool for 
self-enrichment – through access to 
foreign inflows, the means to extract 
rents from natural resources, jobs 
and other social benefits – exploited 
through corruption and patronage. 
The exclusion or marginalisation 
of any sector of society can have 
significant implications for their 
interests and welfare. When 
state resources are continually 
used for the benefit of minority 
interests within society, increased 
fragmentation, volatility and conflict 
are likely, as groupings seek to gain 
access to state apparatus.
Organisations of civil society in 
themselves are interest groups and 
may co-opt the state at the expense 
of the interests of others. The role 
of civil society in driving change 
will largely be influenced by the 
way in which the state responds 
to the accretion of such interests 
and power.40 Besides contestation 
of the electoral political process, 
the pursuit and retention of power 
has sometimes led to repression or 
outright violence.
REPRESSION OR FREEDOMS
Where violence or challenge to state 
authority surrounds the political 
process, some governments have 
resorted to cracking down on 
dissent, limiting or reversing the 
progress achieved for citizens’ 
political freedoms through the 
democratic process. Freedom 
Africa Progress Panel (www.africaprogresspanel.org), using data and ratings from the Institute for Social Studies’ Freedom House Report and Transparency International Report of 2011 
(www.indsocdev.org)
Corruption perception index
In the diagram, “civic activism” is rated using a range of 
items such as surveyed levels of participation in boycotts, 
demonstrations and petitions; newspaper circulation; and 
membership of international NGOs. Countries marked “free” 
have high levels of civic activism, democratic institutions 
and protection of civil liberties.
The diagram indicates a signicant correlation between levels 
of corruption and civic activism. States with perceived high 
levels of corruption were more likely to have low levels of civic 
engagement.35 Where space for active citizenship is closed o 
and rights marginalised, personal freedoms and concomitant 
development have stagnated.36 
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Africa’s continental rating is 48 
where the maximum positive 
score is 100. The highest score is 
Botswana (97), the lowest score 
Somalia (0), the highest regional 
average Southern Africa (63) and 
the lowest regional average Central 
Africa (36).
House’s 2013 annual report on 
Freedom in the World highlights 
that Sub-Saharan Africa ranked 
as the most politically volatile 
region in the world, and including 
North Africa does not improve the 
picture.41 Two countries seen as 
having relatively strong democratic 
governance institutions, South 
Africa and Uganda, were among 
countries noted as seeing a decline 
in freedom. Where gains have been 
made in “freedoms” as understood 
by Freedom House, the challenge is 
to stabilise such.42
POLITICAL VIOLENCE OR 
PEACEFUL ELECTIONS
Equally concerning are the levels 
of political violence that surround 
the electoral process. In 2010, it was 
estimated that between 19 and 25% 
of elections in Africa were affected 
by violence.43 Between 2000 and 
2012 there were 10 successful coups 
on the continent.44 Although a 
decline from 20 per decade between 
1960 and 2000, this is still high 
relative to the rest of the world.
RULE OF LAW
Strong alignment between the 
intentions of government to effect 
change, and the actual ability to 
do so provides a clear and reliable 
environment for social actors. 
Current indicators are that the rule 
of law continues to show overall 
positive gains, which is a source 
of optimism.45 States that have the 
capacity to implement and enforce 
laws will have a greater influence 
on how their countries develop, and 
enjoy greater social stability. Where 
states are weak, other forces such 
as corruption or ethnic affiliations 
may co-opt the state or dominate 
domestic change. Failure of the 
rule of law and delivery of services 
has the potential to cause people 
to lose trust in the institutions 
of governance, driving sectors of 
society toward more parochial, 
closed approaches to meeting their 
needs and interests.46
DELIVERING DEVELOPMENT
Promises envisioned at the end of 
colonialism have failed to materialise 
entirely or evenly. Many states 
struggle to deliver, with capacity 
and a lack of resources being among 
the reasons. Governance features 
a tension between the exercise of 
state power and expenditure of 
resources, and the meaningful 
participation of sectors of society in 
the processes of decision-making 
and implementation.
Civil society can be viewed by the 
state as challenging government’s 
vision of progress, its authority and 
its capacity to “get things done”. A 
robust civil society in the face of a 
weak state could further undermine 
the capacity and relevance of the 
state, as the state loses legitimacy 
in the eyes of citizens when it is no 
longer able to deliver education, 
health, a functioning banking 
system, security, and so on.
The involvement of civil 
society organisations can increase 
state capacity, as noted by the 
African Development Bank in 
projects ranging from sanitation 
to rural development.47 Informal 
or organised social networks are 
sometimes better able to provide 
services such as health care or social 
assistance,48 allowing the state to 
focus resources more intensely on 
other areas. Civil society can be a 
reservoir of co-operative values, 
caring, cultural life and intellectual 
innovation. Social capital, added 
to governance, brings down the 
transactional costs of implementing 
policies, and enhances the ability of 
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“The rise in technocratic leadership in Africa is directly related to the emphasis that the continent is placing on economic transformation. But more important, 
there is growing preference for 
blending democratic change with 
managerial competence in running 
public affairs. This suggests a 
different type of governance system 
that combines western party politics 
and eastern technocracy.52
Calestous Juma, Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University
the state to achieve its objectives.49 
It appears that civil society is 
consistently trusted more than 
government or business50 and its 
involvement can increase confidence 
in the accountability of the state.
EMPOWERING WOMEN
As women have become more of an 
economic force, they have paved 
the way for more women in politics. 
In some countries, quota systems 
aiming to ensure a gender balance 
are being applied until the barriers 
to women’s entry into politics have 
been removed. The presence of these 
female trailblazers in positions of 
power at local and national levels 
has had real impact where they 
have instituted policies that benefit 
women.51
SKILLS IN THE STATE
A rise in technocratic leadership in 
Africa is one of the most significant 
recent shifts. As of 2012, at least nine 
countries were headed by scientists 
or engineers.
WHERE TO?
A key issue in the role 
governance will play in driving 
change is the interaction 
of the state with society in 
determining how the resources 
and energy of society will be 
guided and deployed. Will the 
state become a site of cohesion 
and inclusion, or will cleavages 
and exclusion characterise 
governance? How will the 
state balance the demands of 
legitimacy, effective delivery 
and authority? How responsive 
will the state be to which 
socio-economic interests? The 
scenarios explore different 
dynamics of the state’s overt 
and intentional involvement 
or groups’ establishment 
of alternative avenues of 
governance.
Above:
A electoral worker in South Africa 
scans the barcode on the identification 
document of a resident registering as a 
voter in the general elections.
Photo: Eric Miller
Rwanda’s Institute 
of Science and 
Technology. 
Governments 
have a 
responsibility to 
cater for formal 
education.
Photo: Eric Miller
“Recent and ongoing disturbances in northern Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia, Mali, Ivory Coast, the Great Lakes, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, and Central African 
Republic are flashpoints of both 
Africa’s political vulnerability and the 
continent’s political renewal. As Africa 
engages its current positive, albeit, 
controversial economic transition, 
the tail of its political contradictions 
within a hypocritical world order 
continues to wag the continent.55
Chidi Oguamanam
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Identities and 
differences
Will multiplicity, fluidity or stability hold sway as Africans’ identities and 
values evolve?
THE OTHER
In Africa, with its extraordinary 
diversity of people, language, 
customs, and beliefs, navigating 
identity is complex.
“Occidental conceptions of itself and the rest of us have damaged and constrained, distorted and inferiorised “the African Mind” [while] our sense of the West 
distorts our sense of ourselves and 
of our traditions. … In depression 
and distress and always on the verge 
of the tragic, our engagement with 
the West becomes susceptible, and 
in fact readily transposes itself to the 
realm of the radically mythical: the 
West is against us, yet the West is our 
saviour.53
Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze,  
in Postcolonial African Philosophy:  
A Critical Reader
Any unitary “African identity” 
attributed by the imagination of 
the West is formulated in terms of 
its opposite relation to the Western 
world. The West’s narrative of 
contemporary Sub-Saharan African 
identity begins with Islamic and 
Portuguese merchants and slave 
traders in the 16th Century: the 
moment of encounter was when 
identities were formed in relation 
to difference.54 Stereotypical views 
spread with such encounters around 
the world via (mainly) European 
exploration and trade, through 
a process termed “othering” by 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas 
and later deepened by Edward Said 
and Franz Fanon. This involves 
understanding one’s own identity by 
using another culture as a reflective 
mirror, and is largely derived from 
18th Century liberal philosophy, 
global capitalism and an unfettered 
belief in civilisational and social 
progress. The “other” internalises 
the self-image projected by the 
more powerful. Discarding such 
“mental slavery” has been part 
of the task of African resistance 
and independence. Do notions of 
“African pride” and a return to our 
“roots” advance this cause, or still 
reflect the mirror?
THE LENS OF LANGUAGE
Culture and mother tongue 
are intertwined identities, and 
every language provides unique 
windows on the world and reflects 
embedded power relations. There 
are six major language families 
globally, four of which are spoken 
in Africa, a greater diversity than 
on any other continent.55 There are 
2,146 living languages in Africa, 
30% of the world’s linguistic total, 
disproportionate to Africa’s 12.7% 
share of the world’s population.56
Language is the means by 
which cultures develop and 
transmit accumulated data and 
tacit knowledge. A multi-edged 
sword, missionary education led to 
codifying written languages, with 
knowledge filtered by the colonisers 
yet available to all who can read. 
The coloniser’s worldview and 
language became the currency of 
public life and the world of work. As 
the written form opens up access, 
so knowledge embedded in the 
indigenous spoken word is lost. As 
print dissolves into internet media, 
visual and cyber-literacy come to the 
fore. Urbanised dialects and slang 
such as sms language tussle with 
the “pure” form of the language. 
Will younger generations abandon, 
reclaim or creolise languages and 
identities – and which ones?
OLD AND MODERN
Sharper discontinuities with the past 
that may be found in developing 
countries can heighten constructions 
of inter-generational and urban-
rural dynamics that could be 
found anywhere. In Africa, this 
might typically be framed through 
notions of “traditional” or “old”, and 
“modern”.
The older generation are seen as 
mired in the traditional past with 
little relevance or understanding 
of today’s lifestyles. Conversely 
the youth are seen as abandoning 
respect for elders and moral values 
and ways which have stood the test 
of time.
With urban centres having a 
greater concentration of work, 
infrastructure and services and 
rapid urbanisation, urbanites are 
identified with that which is modern, 
and rural dwellers with ways that are 
outdated.
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FACING OUTWARD AND INWARD
We all have the right, if not the 
opportunity, to exercise our global 
citizenship and international 
identities as the world opens up. 
Yet there are contradictory trends. 
The dissemination of Western 
culture, facilitated by ubiquitous 
Western media, has led some to close 
themselves off to protect what they 
experience as a cultural identity 
being devalued. Under economic or 
social stress, many people turn to 
their group identity and networks 
for support, and some become 
insular. Turning away from public 
life, some find solace in the comforts 
of home, shutting out what is 
experienced as a harsh wide world.
SOCIAL CULTURE
Culture is an integral part of 
identity. It comprises:
“… the totality of socially transmitted behaviour patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions and all other products of human work and thought.62
Kwame Anthony Appiah, philosopher 
and cultural theorist
THE GENDER GAP
One of the key differences in terms 
of African identity is that of gender. 
Women make up about half of the 
population, although this ratio 
varies: in Southern, Middle and 
Eastern Africa there are more 
FROM “WE” TO “ME”
Laurenti Magesa refers to two 
conceptions of identity: the 
communitarian theory “claims 
that there are social attachments 
which determine the self and thus 
individuals are constituted by the 
community of which they are a part 
… The individualist approach, on 
the other hand, prioritises the self, 
placing almost exclusive importance 
on the individual and his/her ability 
and freedom to act.”
Communitarian identities 
inherited from traditional African 
societies are interpolated with 
increasing individualism of 
post-independence economies. 
This dynamic can be seen when 
individual success is both admired 
and resented because it is not 
communally shared.61 People’s forms 
of organising and actions in creating 
change will be fundamentally 
based in their communitarian or 
individualist orientation.
A related determinant is the 
strength of identification with a 
group relative to differentiation and 
independence. Group membership 
can provide social and economic 
resilience and a sense of belonging 
and solidarity. However, group 
identities such as nationalism, 
ethnicity or religion can harden 
into forms of xenophobia and 
intolerance.
RELIGIOUS COHESION OR 
CRUSADE?
Religious beliefs explain the world 
and the believers’ place in it. Most 
indigenous African religions have 
a multifaceted and decentralised 
concept of divinity, with ancestors 
playing an important role. Some 
traditional religions also have 
animistic tendencies, blurring the 
distinction between the divine or 
supernatural, and humans and 
nature. In contrast to indigenous 
religious practices, Judaism, Islam 
and Christianity are monotheistic 
and more centralised.57 With the 
advent of missionaries, forerunners 
and agents of colonialism, 40% of 
Africans converted to Christianity 
in little over a century, and 
millions more converted to Islam.58 
Christianity, and to a lesser extent 
Islam, led to the erosion of African 
religion.59
A survey across Sub-Saharan 
Africa by the Pew Forum on Religion 
and Public Life found that one-
quarter of the respondents worried 
that religion would lead to conflict in 
their country.60 There are signals of 
growing tensions between sections of 
Islam and Christianity. Charismatic 
churches are proliferating and 
dismissing more established 
Christian denominations.
However, many Africans practise 
multiple faith systems and hybrids 
of religions have been created. Will 
the contradictions hold or crystallise 
into conflict?
Africans practice 
faiths from Islam 
to charismatic 
Christianity, 
sometimes 
concurrently 
maintaining 
indigenous 
practices.
Photos: Eric Miller,  
taken in Mbale, Uganda
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42.8%, and South Africa in eighth 
place with 42.3%.70 Information 
technologies also have the potential 
to redefine gender relations.
“It may, for the majority of African women, still be a long walk to freedom, to the type of self-determination that women in Africa want to have, a self-
determination that only they can 
define, using ICTs to enhance their 
lives and the lives of those they love.71 
Ineke Buskens and Anne Webb, in 
African Women and ICTs: Investigating 
Technology, Gender and Empowermentspecific and qualitative African 
Gender and Development Index 
(AGDI), which measures gender 
differences in terms of social power, 
or “capabilities”, economic power or 
opportunities, and political power, 
the ability to have a political voice.68 
Despite growing awareness of 
inequalities, there are still many 
parts of African society that are 
divisive and sometimes even abusive 
along gender lines. A recent WHO 
report concluded that whilst gender-
based violence was widespread 
globally, both Sub-Saharan and 
North Africa have close to the 
highest prevalence rates of physical 
and/or sexual gender-based violence: 
36.6% and 37.0% respectively.69 The 
adverse consequences to society are 
incalculable. 
There are positive signs regarding 
gender parity. For example, Rwanda 
has the highest number of women 
parliamentarians in the world: 63.8% 
female representation in the lower 
house, 38.5% in the upper house. 
Senegal follows in sixth place with 
women than men, in western and 
northern Africa the reverse.66
All too often women’s role 
is subordinate, with their value 
unrealised and their status 
questioned. Gender discrimination 
remains a real and persistent source 
of inequality. Despite movements 
to close the gender gap in respect 
to primary education enrolment, 
life expectancy and labour force 
participation, women still face 
an unequal access to economic 
opportunities, less control and 
decision-making power in their 
homes.
In the Human Development 
Report of 1995, the UN Development 
Programme, concluded that “human 
development if not engendered is 
endangered”.67 They developed two 
metrics that attempt to capture 
gender dynamics: the Gender-related 
Development Index (GDI) and the 
Gender Empowerment Measure 
(GEM), which focus primarily on 
quantitative data. Subsequently, 
UNECA have developed the more 
Framing the concept of identity
The concept can refer to individual or group identity, and also 
encompasses relationships formed internally and externally. Identity 
may be derived from nationality, ethnicity, social class, community, 
gender and sexuality, religion and place. There are no absolutes in 
identity – one negotiates multiple identities and can be part of multiple 
communities simultaneously.
“If at the very bottom of things identity implies a personal commitment or offer of loyalty to a group, and since loyalty can be withdrawn, there is a component of choice in human identification.63Laurenti Magesa, author of African Religion in the Dialogue Debate: From Intolerance to Co-existence
Starting with radio, communication technologies have exposed 
people to identities and value systems in the virtual space that can 
challenge, reinforce or homogenise their understanding of themselves 
formed from family and community relationships. In some regions, 
this exposure had little impact upon the norms and values of society, 
while in others it eroded previously accepted conventions. Some 
African philosophers speak of the “dilemma of modernity”, where 
identity “involves the reclamation of a cultural and spiritual heritage 
considered to be imperilled”.64
A challenge arises when different identities are forced into stark 
contrast through circumstance, and this can lead to inner and intra-
group conflict. Sometimes, particularly in contexts of a conflict of 
interest, a group is defined in terms of its difference to other identities, 
creating a caricatured “us” versus “them” opposition. Historically, 
identities of power have often been structured around “racial” and 
“ethnic” categories,65 with gender constructions running throughout.
WHERE TO?
Unfolding identities are in flux 
to a greater or lesser extent, 
forming, overlapping, cohering, 
dissolving, hardening. Each 
scenario adopts different 
takes on how we and others 
understand ourselves and 
relationships as an individual, 
group or nation – and as 
“African”.
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Infrastructure 
and technology
Will infrastructure and technology investment be inclusive, strained  
or reconceived? 
INFRASTRUCTURE
Infrastructure development under 
colonialism was largely designed 
to support natural resource 
extraction,72 and slowed to a trickle 
following independence.73 Africa 
was left with a weak infrastructural 
endowment.74
To make up the shortfall would 
require about $93 billion annually or 
15% of Africa’s GDP, of which over 
67% relates to capital expenditure 
and the rest to operation and 
maintenance.75 Many small 
countries do not have the ability to 
achieve economies of scale without 
regional co-ordination. Different 
responses about questions of 
financing, prioritisation and trade-
offs, phasing, climate-proofing and 
regional collaboration have different 
implications for a country’s future 
development.
There is the potential for 
disruptive technologies to bridge 
aspects of these gaps – famously, 
cellphones having leapfrogged the 
need for landline rollout. However, 
certain traditional infrastructure 
is seen as a foundation for 
development: people need basic 
services like sanitation and water, 
and people must move and goods 
have to reach markets. But different 
choices for developmental paths 
could imply different infrastructure 
needs, for example, integrated 
transport networks with a web of 
railways rather than a dependence 
upon roads for logistics.
RURAL ACCESS OR EXCLUSION
The usual focus of a traditional 
development model is on growing 
urban areas and trade routes, to 
the exclusion of rural areas. The 
lack of energy infrastructure in 
rural areas widens the digital 
divide. A contradiction is set up 
as rural areas increasingly become 
virtually interconnected via mobile 
phones while being physically 
isolated. Constrained by a lack of 
infrastructure, rural economies may 
not appear to warrant infrastructure 
investment, a chicken-and-egg 
dilemma.
CO-ORDINATED DISARRAY?
The biggest challenge to 
infrastructure and technology 
investment is making different 
aspects function in concert 
using a systemic approach and 
thinking – not simply in terms of the 
infrastructure but also the social, 
institutional and economic systems 
that support, operate, legislate and 
maintain it. 
In addition, there is a risk that 
the rate and speed of technological 
change may lead to obsolete 
infrastructure and technology. 
Disconnected ad hoc responses are 
inefficient and expensive. What 
yields the best outcomes: centralised 
planning, investment decisions 
dominated by financial criteria, 
or patronage and party-political 
pressure?
ENERGY EMPOWERMENT
The most underdeveloped 
infrastructure service is electricity 
coverage. Despite growing numbers 
of people living close to the 
power grid in urban centres, most 
Africans remain unconnected.76 
At least 30 countries face regular 
power shortages. Surveys indicate 
that firms consider electricity – 
availability and access to reliable, 
affordable supplies – one of the most 
limiting factors in doing business.77 
The 10 most costly places in the 
world to get electricity are all in 
Africa. Every round of technological 
innovation demands ever more 
electricity, which is a barrier to 
uptake. Currently, the power 
required to run server centres is too 
great in relation to current supply 
levels for this to be a viable sector for 
industrial and service expansion.78
Without infrastructural “lock-in” 
to large fossil fuel power stations and 
electricity distribution networks, 
Africa has the opportunity to 
leapfrog to renewable energy 
provision – and the resource blessing 
of ample solar and wind supplies, 
which come free. This could provide 
for greater energy security, allow 
for distributed supply in remote 
areas and avoid costly and wasted 
investment in fossil fuel assets.
The rate of uptake and diffusion 
of renewables and decentralised 
micro-generators is in question. 
Some African countries’ economies 
are dependent on their fossil fuel 
exports, and vested interests resist 
a transition. With the prices of 
renewable energy technologies 
Providing 
sustainable 
energy for 
all could be 
the biggest 
opportunity of 
the 21st Century 
… Sustainable 
energy is the 
golden thread 
that connects 
economic growth, 
social equity, and 
a climate and 
environment that 
enables the world 
to thrive.76
Ban Ki-moon, 
United Nations 
Secretary-General
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falling, will Africa and its 
entrepreneurs find ways to stretch 
limited resources during initial 
implementation to expand access 
beyond expectations, and will this 
overcome existing disparities?
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
In the context of historical inequity 
and the subsidies provided to 
developed countries by their 
colonies, developing countries are 
raising issues of technology transfer 
or sharing at international forums. 
Issues of transfer between developed 
and developing countries, and 
between public and private sectors, 
are being debated.
“I foresee a positive future in which technology will help Africa to exploit [its] resources. When I was working in Mozambique, I was involved in Technology Innovation 
Support Centres, which had resulted 
in a pool of about 100 active 
innovators. Such initiatives will, in the 
long term, lead to a highly innovative 
and productive Africa.
Fernando dos Santos, Director-
General, African Regional Intellectual 
Property Organisation, Open A.I.R. 
workshop, Cape Town
APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY
There have been many cases of 
technologies transferred that were 
not suitable for African contexts. 
In order to be effective, some 
technologies require a foundation 
of other technologies, which may 
not be available in a country. 
Factors affecting diffusion of a 
technology in a particular context 
may not be taken into consideration, 
including support required. There 
are instances where Africans have 
adapted imported technology for 
local conditions.
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY
The widespread development and 
deployment of information and 
communication technology (ICT) 
has had a profound impact on many 
aspects of Africans’ lives. Although 
Africa still lags far behind most 
of the rest of the world, available 
bandwidth and the number of 
internet users rises and accelerates 
year over year.79
The innovations of cheap 
and portable cellphone solutions 
filled the opportunities left by a 
lack of older telecommunications 
infrastructure, and the cost of 
personal computers and broadband 
access in contexts of poverty and 
limited education. Africa is the first 
continent where most people will be 
introduced to the internet in mobile 
form. Access to and the transfer of 
information is being used to bridge 
existing infrastructural gaps in 
banking, health, market information 
and more, creating new forms of 
interaction that circumvent the 
traditional less flexible institutional 
structures and frameworks of the 
developed world.
“ICTs have transformed the landscape of developing countries and opened up new opportunities for advancing human development. The increasing 
presence of these technologies is 
shifting developing countries toward 
a more highly networked society, 
where social structures and activities 
evolve around networks through 
ICTs. …  
 Although changes brought on 
by a networked society can open 
up opportunities for development, 
they might also lead to certain 
development problems. For instance, 
if “going digital” is increasingly the 
norm to access social services or 
to gain competitive advantage, 
those without access will be further 
excluded from such benefits. In many 
developing countries, women are 
underrepresented in the production 
and consumption of digital products.  
 Moreover, power, gendered and 
social relationships within societies 
are often replicated and reflected in 
the virtual world, which could create 
new forms of exclusion.80
Laurent Elder, International 
Development Research Centre, in 
Into the Future: New Opportunities and 
Threats in a Global Networked Society.
There may be unintended 
consequences of public investments 
in ICT infrastructure. The most 
serious may be to create centralised 
monopolies with anti-competitive 
pricing. Powerful incumbents can 
be more likely to stifle innovation 
than to encourage it. Moreover, 
Other low income countries
Sub-Saharan low income countries  
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We don’t want 
technology 
dumping under 
the guise of 
“technology 
transfer”, nor 
foreign private 
sector investment 
which does 
not meet our 
country’s needs, 
driven purely 
by their market 
expansion 
agenda. We can’t 
really divorce 
these technology 
transfer issues 
from WTO and 
IPR issues.
Sisa Njikelana, 
Chairperson: 
Energy Portfolio 
Committee, 
Parliament of the 
Republic of South 
Africa
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crises that can only be addressed 
through changes in human 
behaviours.
reliance on mobile platforms could 
impede the introduction of other 
technologies, such as personal 
computers offering different 
functionality.
Whether transferred or 
home-grown, technology is not 
a solution if it does not meet the 
challenges faced by developing 
countries.81 Similarly, unsustainable 
technologies ultimately exacerbate 
rather than solve challenges. 
Given the unimaginable options 
brought about by technology since 
industrialisation, there is a risk that 
we may imagine that some new 
miracle technology can solve coming 
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WHERE TO?
The nature of technology and the relationships between different forms 
of technology make it difficult to envision how future development 
trends might unfold: their implementation changes the scope of 
possible horizons for future technological developments.
This is true of sustaining technologies that provide innovative 
efficiencies for solutions provided by existing technology, and even 
more so for disruptive technologies that provide entirely new solutions 
to existing or emerging challenges. 
Understanding technology as broader than machinery, and 
including processes, data and skills, our scenarios imagine 
technology’s role in enabling human potential.
Africa's undersea 
connections to 
the rest of the 
world (2014)2
By Steve Song
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Employment 
and livelihoods
Will African economies diversify, informalise or reconfigure to meet the 
needs of the increasingly youthful population?
YOUTH BULGE
The “youth bulge” is one of the most 
significant issues that will influence 
employment and productivity in 
Africa. The African workforce grows 
at an annual rate of 2.8%,82 the 
highest growth rate in the world. 
This represents about 13.8 million 
new entrants a year, presenting a 
challenge and an opportunity for 
increased productivity. Trends that 
could further increase the size of the 
labour force83 include more women 
coming into the labour market84 and 
fewer chronic absences from work 
due to improvements in health care.
Historically, in many countries, 
a large pool of youth created 
rapid economic growth. With a 
large employed youth population 
growing faster than the dependent 
population, the dividend enabled 
governments to expend resources 
in other areas such as health and 
pensions. However, when youths 
remain without employment, the 
risks are social tensions,85 along 
with a decline in growth, standard 
of living and productivity. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, youth comprise 30% 
of the workforce (higher than any 
other region),86 but youth have a rate 
of unemployment close to double 
that of adult unemployment. The 
growing youthfulness of the labour 
force poses the risk of increasing 
rates of unemployment overall.
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA
In African countries with formalised 
labour markets, unemployment 
tends to be high.87 Conversely, 
countries with large informal sectors 
have lower levels of unemployment.88 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, non-wage 
work accounts for around 80% of 
employment.89 This is mainly a 
reflection of the small-hold agrarian 
structure of the economies. Sub-
Saharan Africa is the only region in 
the world where a large majority of 
workers – 62% – are still employed 
in the agricultural sector.90 Of these 
workers, 90% own small farms 
averaging 1.8 hectares. The structure 
of large, family-based agrarian and 
informal service sector employment 
makes the economy adept at 
absorbing increases in the size of the 
labour force.
The abundant supply of labour 
primarily reflects the vulnerability 
of workers; they cannot afford to exit 
the labour market as they have no 
alternative means of survival in the 
absence of adequate social security 
and safety net programmes in the 
region.
The challenge in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is therefore not so much to get 
more people integrated in the labour 
market, but far more to improve 
labour productivity, conditions of 
work, and the returns and benefits 
people derive from their work.
Employment only plays its 
intermediary role between growth 
and poverty reduction if it is 
productive.91
Women fish 
processors in 
Ghana, West 
Africa.
Photo: WorldFish
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urbanisation and the migration 
of labour from rural to urban 
areas did not happen in Africa, so 
the growth driver in Africa has 
been almost entirely structural 
changes in the economy.95 
 n Workers often migrate to where 
the jobs are, so generating 
pockets of growth. However, 
migration presents a challenge 
in the form of brain drain, as 
many of the most educated 
and productive workers take 
opportunities outside the 
continent, and in countries 
and cities that offer better 
opportunities.96 Migration can 
generate xenophobia as local 
workers face competition and 
feel threatened by hard-working 
foreigners.97
 n The decline in agricultural 
employment has almost 
exclusively led to increased 
TRENDS IN PRODUCTIVITY
A trend since the 1990s is Africa’s 
shift from higher- to lower-
productivity employment.94 
Domestic economies will need 
to absorb (or export, through 
emigration) the increase in 
workers to ensure that the ratio 
of employment to working-age 
population remains constant if 
they are to prevent an increase 
in unemployment or a decline in 
productivity.
Several trends are significant in 
Africa’s productivity trajectory:
 n The shift towards urbanisation in 
most of Africa has been relatively 
slow. The convergence of people 
in urban centres tends to create 
the critical mass necessary to 
foster increased productivity 
and value. Therefore, the 
wave of industrialisation that 
often follows in the wake of 
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS IN 
NORTH AFRICA
Levels of youth unemployment 
are higher in North Africa than 
Sub-Saharan Africa (as indicated in 
the graph above). In North Africa, 
the state has long been a leading 
employer, but as public finances 
have deteriorated, public sector 
jobs are fewer and there is growing 
unemployment, underemployment 
and labour productivity stagnation.92
The increasing size and youth of 
the labour market is likely to place 
pressure on the need to generate 
more formal sector jobs. The balance 
of available labour not captured 
by increases in the formalised 
sector is likely to be absorbed 
by a robust network of informal 
employment. The informal sector 
is defined by networks of familial 
connections and vulnerability, 
and also by creativity and micro-
entrepreneurship.93
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it may also facilitate a decline in 
employment as fewer workers are 
required to continue driving growth. 
Increasing productivity of some 
parts of the economy, with declining 
overall employment is a recipe for 
facilitating increased inequality.
The gradual emergence of a 
consumer middle class is likely to 
encourage demand-driven increases 
in economic productivity.104
foundation within which 
entrepreneurial investment can 
be leveraged to stimulate the type 
of industrialisation required for 
structural transformation and 
development”.101 It also needs 
structures that support and 
encourage innovation.
In a study of nine Sub-Saharan 
African countries, most non-farm 
jobs were generated by households 
starting businesses, rather than 
entering the rapidly expanding 
private wage sector. These jobs were 
driven by entrepreneurs, whose 
dynamism and innovation offers 
a potential solution for increasing 
productivity and employment.
TECHNOLOGY AS A 
PRODUCTIVITY DRIVER
The micro-entrepreneurial nature 
of Africa’s informal sector is 
well positioned to adopt and 
incorporate low-cost and easy-to-use 
technologies. The incorporation of 
mobile technology to provide more 
efficient services and gain market 
information is just one example. The 
use of 3D printing may be another.102
Such technology may permit 
growth of a decentralised 
industrialisation labour model, 
whereby co-ordinated networks of 
entrepreneurs overcome some of 
the obstacles to more centralised 
models of increasing productivity.103 
A decentralised model of 
manufacturing production may 
dissipate the risks of technological 
innovation, driving increases in 
productivity and growth. However, 
participation in the informal 
urban service sector, leaving 
the manufacturing industry 
stagnant.98 On other continents, 
industrialisation was responsible 
for increases in productivity.
Africa’s productivity relative to its 
population is starting from such a 
low base that the growth of secure, 
formal sector jobs in the service and 
manufacturing sectors will struggle 
to keep pace with the growth of new 
entrants into the workforce. For 
example, “in Uganda, waged jobs 
grew at 13% a year between 2003 
and 2006, but this absorbed less 
than one in five new labour-market 
entrants.”99 However, there are 
trade-offs to be made between 
higher productivity, numbers of jobs 
available and salaries.
While education has progressed 
across the continent, building the 
skills necessary for tomorrow’s 
future is difficult. Africa’s growth in 
skills might not attract or create the 
large numbers of jobs, which provide 
economic and social development.100 
There are many other reasons why 
jobs might not materialise, such as 
lack of finance, infrastructure and 
institutional certainty.
IS ENTREPRENEURSHIP KEY?
There is a growing belief that 
entrepreneurship offers the 
key to economic development 
in today’s global marketplace. 
Entrepreneurship flourishes 
and can foster a sustainable 
employment economy when it is 
supported by a “solid institutional 
Progress and productivity
Normative narratives about development and 
growth posit an ideal: expansion of the formal 
private sector drives GDP growth which spurs 
higher increases in employment, and employment 
is high relative to growth. However, many 
outcomes for employment and productivity do not 
fall within this dominant narrative of “progress”. 
Higher productivity creates economic growth, 
but it is often linked to downsizing and job losses. 
Global value chains have improved livelihoods in 
some fragile states, but whether this translates into 
sustained and decent employment remains to be 
seen. Even if so, the global recession demonstrated 
that economic downturns can wipe out years of 
formal sector employment growth in a single 
crisis. Some African countries have experienced 
“jobless growth”; explainable either by productivity 
increases due to automation or the migration of 
workers between industries and economic sectors.
WHERE TO?
Currently the natural resources sector is 
unsurprisingly the most economically productive, 
measured by value of output per worker.105 If 
revenues from finite natural resources falter, 
governments may have a greater incentive to 
formalise economies and collect revenue from 
informal sectors.
Above:
Workers in a 
coffee bean 
processing facility 
in Ethiopia.
Photo: Chidi 
Oguamanam
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Wild cards 
and shocks
What shocks or ruptures could radically alter Africa’s future?
THINKING WILDLY
Wildcards are singular or 
interconnected events with such 
dramatic consequences that, despite 
their low probability of occurrence, 
must be considered. Some things are 
more certain to happen, but will still 
cause shocks that radically disrupt 
the future. While we cannot possibly 
consider everything that might 
happen, here are a few wild ideas:
United States of Africa: Africa as 
one unitary formation, either by 
governance with quick and easy 
movement of people, goods and 
services and no requirement for 
visas; or economically integrated, 
with all trade barriers between 
African countries removed.
Back to Timbuktu: Western states 
increase surveillance of inhabitants 
to the extent there is little personal 
privacy and freedom of thought, and 
Africa remains one of few centres of 
free intellectual enquiry.
Radical technology: Emergence and 
dissemination of a game-changing 
technology currently thought 
impossible. What about a small 
flying machine that enables access to 
remote communities?
A new religion: A new spiritual 
leader or prophet figure from Africa; 
religion as the major determinant of 
policy and economic decisions.
Major societal change: People 
establish underwater living hubs, 
so national land boundaries get 
redefined.
Climate change: A not-so-wild 
idea, but likely to cause shocks. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change assesses that Africa is the 
continent most vulnerable to climate 
change and its extreme weather 
events. Regional effects will vary.107
Pandemics: With free movement of 
goods and people, deadly bacteria 
and viruses spread very quickly.
Refugee displacement: 
Displacement of undocumented 
migrants, asylum seekers 
and refugees on a presently 
unimaginable scale.
Rapid destabilisation: Military 
intervention, terrorism, or other 
forces throw entire regions into 
chaos.
Vulnerability
Wildcards and shocks can be the tipping point into degradation of 
the existing social, economic and ecological systems, bringing social 
insecurity and conflict in their wake.
Degree of physical exposure: The more people that depend on a 
particular resource, the more vulnerable the entire population is 
to threats to that resource. For example, a regional famine has a 
more devastating impact than a localised hazard, destabilising and 
displacing far more people.
Community resilience: There are large variations in the levels of 
resilience of communities living in adversity. Resilience depends on 
income levels, education and health, food and water security, social 
cohesion, and the ability to access support.
Quality of governance: Governments vary in their effectiveness, 
their levels of accountability, their political stability and their access 
to international assistance. Consistently weak governance is often 
combined with cycles of poverty and violence. In a climate of violence, 
normal functioning of society and communities is not possible. Local 
violence can spill across borders to create regional instability. 
Dadaab refugee 
camp in Somalia, 
in 2011.
Photo: Sadik Gulec/
Shutterstock
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West Africa
 n Forestry and fisheries 
ecosystem changes affect 
livelihoods.
 n Health burden: changes  
in vector-borne diseases.
 n Sea level rise and coastal 
floods impact coastline 
economies, e.g. Cotonou, 
Lagos. North Africa
 n Reduced water availability.
 n Agriculture: reduced yields 
and rising irrigation costs.
 n Higher energy use and costs 
for cooling in summer.
 n Health effects of heatwaves.
 n Sea level rise and coastal 
floods create economic 
damages, rising costs of 
coastal protection, possible 
long-term risks and 
migration, e.g. Nile delta.
Central Africa
 n Forestry and fisheries 
ecosystem changes affect 
livelihoods.
 n Health burden: changes in 
vector-borne diseases.
East Africa
 n Changes in water availability, 
with implications for 
livelihoods and services  
from lakes, hydropower.
 n Changes in frequency and 
magnitude of floods and 
droughts.
 n Reductions in agricultural 
production.
 n Tourism and livelihoods 
suffer loss of forest and coastal 
ecosystems, affecting wildlife 
and corals.
 n Health burden: spread of 
malaria to highlands.
 n Sea level rise and coastal 
floods impact particularly  
Dar es Salaam and Mombasa.
Southern Africa
 n Reduced water availability.
 n Effects on agriculture, 
including costs of irrigation.
 n Tourism and livelihoods suffer 
loss of ecosystems and natural 
resources.
 n Increased risk of forest fires.
 n Health burden: changes in 
vector-borne diseases.
 n Sea level rise, coastal floods, 
coastal erosion create 
economic damages and  
rising costs.
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Africa pawned
Inclusive government
Who do you know?
Back to basics
The “cheetah” generation
Social networks
Community bonds
Technology for all
Creaking infrastructure
Sustainable technology
Diversification of economy
Informalisation
Unexplored 
futures
Wildcards and 
shocks
• Violent conflicts
• Overthrow of the state
• Criminal economy
• Extreme weather events
• Collapse of natural resource base
• Pandemics
What makes for resilience?
Africa interconnected and collaborating on 
equal terms on the global stage
Africa as global proxy for remote-controlled 
geopolitical power dynamics
Covert and overt resource and land-grabbing 
takes place across the continent
Strong national governments kept in check by 
participatory networked public sphere
Formal and informal spheres operate as symbiotic 
parallel universes
Resource constraints and external pressures 
lead societies to draw together 
The rise of an educated digitally interconnected 
and culturally homogenised middle class
New forms of social organisation based on 
shared interests or needs
Community-centred collectives based on shared 
values and knowledge
Increasing connectivity and investment in 
physical, telecoms and economic infrastructure
Access is ad hoc and disorganised, with frequent 
brownouts as systems overload
New technologies appropriate to context, 
which are low carbon, low cost and low impact
Africa’s youthful entrepreneurs become a source of 
competitive advantage tapped into global markets
The youth bulge and global economic pressures 
leave many outside the formal sector
Africa sets its own rules for sustainable 
development and growthSustainable development
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We arrive at our set of three Open A.I.R. 
scenarios: Wireless engagement,  
Informal – the new normal and  
Sincerely Africa.
Sweeping statements about a whole 
continent cannot reflect its realities. For every 
commonality one might endeavour to identify, 
there is another perspective on it, and many 
exceptions. Hence, the scenarios are broad 
brushstrokes which may have greater or lesser 
relevance according to one’s context. Within 
every scenario, the range of options vary on 
a continuum from mild to extreme, and their 
usefulness will depend on the magnification  
of focus and analytical enquiry. 
WIRELESS 
ENGAGEMENT
W
IRELESS ENGAGEM
ENT
WIRELESS 
ENGAGEMENT
This is a world where … 
African enterprise is interconnected 
with the global service-oriented 
economy, young business leaders form 
a vocal middle class, and citizens hold 
governments accountable.
Except for … 
uneducated or under-resourced  
individuals who cannot conform to 
homogenous technical, legal and  
socio-economic standards.
Call me Lucky! Lucky by name, lucky by nature. 
For me, life is good, and the world seems to be made 
for me.
Waiter! Over here! Another round of drinks – 
Black and Red for everyone!
You know, I made it out from a humble 
background. Even though I grew up in a small 
village, and attended the local school, we were 
given an opportunity and I made the most of it. Our 
school was chosen as a test case in using the new 
resources, so we got more attention than the others 
in the area. The teaching was better too – it was 
my teacher who helped me to apply for the special 
international programme financed by the Helping 
Hand Foundation. I was lucky, they chose me. They 
paid for my studies and my living costs to leave the 
village and go to boarding school in the city.
I found it very hard at first. I was shy and was 
teased because I came from a different world, a 
different class. I was the only one in my class who 
had to work all the time. But this made me stronger. 
I could always find new ways to make a bit of extra 
money, and I often worked nights to earn extra. It 
was hard to be the only one without all the cool 
stuff others had. But I knew that education could 
bring the success I wanted. I was driven and hungry 
to show how I could be a success too. I could have a 
better life, a future, and I was determined to succeed. 
I really struggled back then, I was just surviving, but 
now I’m really living. I laugh about it all now.
When people know what you can do, they come 
to you. Just last week one of the students from the 
village school came and asked me for a job, but I 
said no. Rather not look backwards – what matters 
is tomorrow. People should make it happen for 
themselves. If you try hard enough, you can get or 
do anything.
I learned a lot about people and I made  
some very good connections. My friends now are 
everywhere: online, across the city, and all over the 
world. Some of them I met when the first Innovation 
Centre opened. We thought we were the smartest 
youth in town, and maybe we were. Together, we 
make things happen. We live wherever we like or 
wherever the work takes us, and we are all always 
on the move. We work hard and play hard, round 
the clock. Next week I am off to Santiago and 
Shanghai, maybe stopping off in Seoul. It is time 
to catch up, do a little business, find a new product 
that I can put together.
People come to me when they want to get things 
done. When they want things to be cool, stylish and 
profitable. I know how to make things happen and 
good business is good for everyone. It provides jobs, 
pays taxes and helps people get what they need. 
Africa is the continent of abundance: abundant 
resources, land, sunshine and people. Everybody 
wants to do business here. For us, life is in the fast 
lane. We are enjoying the fastest growth rate in our 
history. The number of households with money in 
their pockets has been rising and we all want to 
flaunt it. If you have it, show it off. Africa is the place 
where it’s all happening, and global investment is 
flowing.
These are good times, but we all know being an 
entrepreneur is a tough game. It’s high-risk. I have 
watched others come and go, many times, and I 
know this life is for the brave and the fast. To make 
it, you have to set trends, keep one step ahead in 
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I’ve lived in this village all my life. Others 
have left, but I have been left behind. My 
parents didn’t have money to send me to 
school: I had to stay at home and work in 
the fields. Now they are old and I am the 
one who must look after them, even though 
I have nothing – not like my older brother, 
who is the one who succeeded in our family. 
He went to school, left here, and now he is 
too rich and important to come and visit us. 
Sometimes he sends us money, but we don’t 
hear from him much. He doesn’t visit often 
and we don’t get to meet the people in his 
life, not even his girlfriend.
Once he gave me a new phone. It was 
so smart and shiny, everyone came to look 
at it. I didn’t know how to use most of the 
things and didn’t want to ask my brother; he 
always seems to be in a rush and he thinks 
I’m too stupid. It’s true that I had to teach 
myself to read with my friend and I don’t 
understand many of the words on the phone. 
And you know, even though the phone is so 
smart, it always needs to be recharged. So 
it is difficult. We don’t have a generator and 
I have to ask the neighbours to charge it for 
me. They complain and ask for money.
My brother said I could go on the internet 
with the phone. He said I just need to save 
money and then I can go and see. He says we 
can learn about stuff, but there is not much 
in my language and it is all confusing. What 
is the internet really? Will it help my life? 
My future? My life is so far from them. Also, 
I can only do that a few times each year.
fashion and in technology. Everyone wants to be 
different, so what is cool today is lame tomorrow. 
We have to stay two steps ahead of the competitors, 
and they are in the race too. Most people can’t 
keep up with the pace of change. The game keeps 
changing, and we, as global players, have to try to 
find new business opportunities. If you don’t have 
your finger on the pulse, or you make the wrong 
bet, you’re dead meat. You are either at the table, or 
on the menu. When you are sitting at the table and 
lucky, it is the ultimate high.
Sorry, I have to take this call. It’s international,  
so I will probably be a while …
This life I have is just surviving. I feel 
like I am stuck in a world without hope … 
everyone else is moving into a new future, 
and I am left behind. My brother has 
everything, he can understand all these 
things that are meant to connect us, but 
we are alone and struggling. My parents 
complain. They say that when a child has 
success, that child should share with the 
whole family, so everyone is part of the 
success and could have a better life. Today, 
things are different. It seems this new way 
has no interest in the community, everyone 
just takes for themselves.
We often joke 
that in Nairobi 
people don’t think 
you have a job 
unless you wear 
a suit and tie 
and head to the 
city centre each 
day. In a world 
where suits and 
ties are expected, 
who provides 
the space for the 
next generation 
to work, build 
companies and 
be taken seriously 
as start-up 
coders wearing 
ripped jeans 
and a T-shirt? 
… Innovation 
comes from the 
edges, so it comes 
as no surprise 
that innovators 
are found in the 
margins. They are 
the misfits among 
us, the ones who 
see and do things 
differently.1
Erik Hersman, 
founder of iHub 
in Nairobi and 
co-founder of 
mapping website 
Ushahidi
Africa. From time to time, the 
United States has amended its 
African Growth and Opportunity 
Act of 2000 (which had allowed for 
preferential trade arrangements 
with selected Sub-Saharan African 
countries) to expand the number of 
products granted duty-free access, 
eliminate quota restrictions, and 
require gradual reciprocal duty-free 
treatment for American exports – 
laying the basis for a free trade 
agreement with Africa.4
In many cases, Africa is able 
to respond to the global scramble 
for resources by adopting legal 
provisions defining the conditions 
for foreign presence so as to benefit 
domestic needs. These conditions 
variously apply to technology 
transfer, sharing of economic 
returns, local content, employment 
quotas with agreed remuneration 
and working conditions, and 
commitments to social investments.
Not all countries are in a position 
A NEW GLOBAL ORDER IN AN 
INTERCONNECTED WORLD
Africa’s strong and attractive 
economic position strengthens 
its negotiating position in the 
WTO to achieve temporary trade 
protection, subsidised credit 
and publicly supported research 
and development. The Forum on 
India-China-Africa Co-operation 
has broadened from its origins as 
a platform for Chinese business to 
engage African governments, and 
enables a united political bloc where 
interests intersect.3 All in all, Africa 
has a substantial voice in global 
decision-making processes, such as 
in the expanded successor to the UN 
Security Council.
In a bid to secure supplies 
and access to markets, and 
counterbalance stagnating 
economies within Europe, the 
European Union has opened its 
membership to its strategically 
important trading partners in 
UP AND RUNNING
Having pioneered cellphone-based 
applications to circumvent the lack 
of fixed-wire telecommunications 
and other “concrete and steel” 
infrastructure, Africa has developed 
extensive ICT networks and 
capabilities. Proximity no longer 
serves as a barrier in daily life or 
business. Wireless engagement 
allows users to problem-solve 
and innovate from any location, 
providing opportunities for 
entrepreneurs to flourish. Start-ups 
use crowdfunding and businesses 
carve out new niches. For example, 
it is commonplace for small-scale 
farmers in isolated rural areas to 
access the internet through mobiles 
to price their goods, trade, source 
supplies, manage finances, exchange 
knowledge and stay informed about 
best practices.
Underpinned by its ICT 
infrastructure, Africa is able to 
navigate and adapt nimbly to global 
and regional market dynamics. 
Many African countries are 
accelerating their development 
and growth. FDI continues to rise, 
having early in the century exceeded 
an earlier UNCTAD projection of 
up to $100 billion by 2014.2 BRICS 
countries are strongly investing, 
including diversifying into 
manufacturing and service sectors, 
and coupling their investments with 
developmental projects.
The internet is the 
most powerful 
infrastructure 
known to 
mankind. The 
internet is the 
platform for 
creation of 
ideas, exchange 
of ideas, and 
implementation 
of ideas. It 
empowers both 
individuals and 
people who want 
to collaborate. 
The opportunity 
in Africa is that 
there are almost 
700 million 
people that could 
join this world 
of the internet 
and become 
connected.
Wael Fakharany, 
Google Regional 
Manager for 
Egypt and North 
Africa (Open A.I.R. 
interview)
https://africahubs.crowdmap.com
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during the Arab Spring period in 
2011,11 are a distant memory, but 
remain a possibility.
Civic organisation and 
involvement benefit from the 
information access afforded by 
ICTs, citizen journalism, the ability 
to aggregate data from voluntary 
public online inputs12 and people’s 
opinions (crowdvoting) regarding 
government action, and the use of 
social media to make voices heard 
and to mobilise. Citizens have 
been able to demand and monitor 
improved democratic processes, 
governance, transparency and 
delivery from their governments. 
Watchdog pressure from civil 
society and international players 
serves as a barrier to corruption. 
In turn, good governance builds 
citizens’ trust in elected leaders. 
This environment attracts investors 
who feel more comfortable with 
recognisable features of Western 
liberal democracies.
FROM RESOURCE CURSE TO 
BLESSING
A few resource-rich countries 
remain rentier states13 dependent 
on primary natural resource 
exports, with associated jobless 
growth and negative developmental 
outcomes,14 and often corruption 
and authoritarianism.15 Their 
extractive sector is still an economic 
enclave, with little attachment to 
other production processes of the 
economy.16 They remain captive 
to long-term contracts giving 
an unequal share of revenue to 
Within the major economic 
community blocs, tariff barriers 
are reduced or dropped, customs 
procedures simplified, and countries 
tackle other non-tariff barriers to 
intra-regional trade. This allows for 
economies of scale and facilitates 
the transfer of technology and 
knowledge via spillover effects. 
Landlocked countries or those 
without well-equipped ports 
that previously faced challenges 
in trading internationally can 
particularly benefit.
With increased interdependence 
among national economies, a new 
trend is emerging where economic 
advantages are concentrated.10 
Underneath the wireless economy 
still runs a physical one. Certain 
regions on the continent offer 
competitive advantages for 
particular industries, such as 
access to undersea cables, natural 
resources, transport corridors, 
perceived stability and efficiency, 
and human capital, and core 
economies are coalescing there. 
These industries are dominated 
by a few regions populated by 
oligopolistic firms that make the 
most of the economies of scale, and 
lower transport and transaction 
costs.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
GOVERNANCE
The largely stable regulatory and 
political environments in Africa are 
key to attracting investment, and 
FDI can be flighty. Setbacks such as 
when inflows to North Africa halved 
to negotiate such terms, leaving 
them open to unfettered foreign 
investment and exploitation of local 
resources. They are at risk of having 
their interests sidelined as others 
play “Africa’s” global role.
INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE 
INTERDEPENDENCY
In addition to greater muscle 
on the international stage, 
African countries are multiply 
interconnected among themselves 
and with other rapidly leapfrogging 
countries.6 The African Union has 
driven a “minimum integration 
programme” of projects and 
programmes identified as priorities 
to foster regional and continental 
integration,7 and still hopes to 
realise a continental free trade 
area.8 A plethora of regional 
economic communities – AEC, 
GZALE, UMA, CEN-SAD, IGAD, 
ECCAS, ECOWAS, WAEMU, EAC, 
COMESA, SADC, SACU9 – has been 
rationalised to a few major blocs 
based on common economic features 
and business culture affinities rather 
than geography.
Problems arise when a country 
jockeys for advantage by negotiating 
within two separate customs unions, 
or when overlaps between economic 
communities create a tangle of 
trade and IP regimes. Businesses 
rely on wirelessly connected legal 
and logistics consultants to find a 
way through. Some countries opt 
to align with their major offshore 
trading partner, rather than their 
continental competitors.
“The idea of economic catch-up has changed …Just as inequality in income and wealth has been rising in the United States, newly growing nations find themselves in a more stratified world, without developing their own strong egalitarian histories to undergird political institutions or economic expectations. In some countries, there may be a 
de facto “rule by consent” from abroad if, for instance, you are an African 
working in a Chinese-owned mine and living in a company town, while 
receiving your vaccines from a Western non-profit organisation. … [T]he 
future path of developing countries could be much different from that of 
recent, high-growth success stories. The next set of emerging-market winners, 
for example, may retain very large pockets of poverty. And as the expectation 
of a single, common path for economic development fades, governments 
may need to rethink what they can accomplish – and how.5
Tyler Cowen, American professor of economics and co-author of the economics 
blog Marginal Revolution
Above: 
Students of the 
Kigali Institute 
of Science and 
Technology (KIST) 
in Rwanda in 
class, learning to 
dismantle and 
put together 
computer 
equipment.
Photo: Eric Miller
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revenues, a ban on borrowing, and 
transparency.21 A few use informed 
consultations to make optimal 
expenditure choices.22
NEW ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
Ultimately, it is those countries 
with explicit measures to capitalise 
on wireless infrastructure, develop 
local industries and businesses, 
and diversify their economies that 
can be held up as beacons of real 
development.
that increased state revenues are 
redistributed to benefit society 
more broadly.19 Shifts in previous 
asymmetries between extractive 
companies, the state and civil 
society have created conditions in 
certain countries for turning their 
resource curse into a blessing.20 
This is underpinned by efficient and 
effective institutions, policies and 
laws. A couple of countries have 
counter-rentier policies, such as a 
low exchange rate, a stabilisation 
fund, careful investment of resource 
foreign shareholders and a limited 
number of domestic actors. Indeed, 
vested interests in the state resist 
relinquishing their personally 
lucrative position and have little 
motivation to shift the status quo.
However, certain resources are 
becoming scarcer in relation to 
demand, or have high or volatile 
prices, and countries endowed with 
them are in a position to command 
terms from foreign companies 
that are more favourable to the 
host country.17 Competitive and 
transparent auctions have proven to 
generate more revenues than one-
on-one deals. Some countries tax 
windfall profits.
Most African countries early 
on realised that Africa had a 
comparative advantage when it 
came to renewable energy resources 
and avoided the “resource curse” in 
relation to these. Using the Green 
Climate Fund for capital, and 
working at regional levels, they made 
the provision of renewable energy a 
cornerstone of their developmental 
agenda. Not only did they enhance 
their own energy security, they are 
also able to export surplus power. 
By leapfrogging to low-carbon 
energy supply they also escape 
import barriers to carbon-intensive 
products put up by the developed 
countries seeking to lower their own 
emissions accounts. Countries where 
vested interests clung on to fossil fuel 
extraction were not so fortunate. The 
carbon price reflected in emissions 
trading schemes has long exceeded 
$55 per tonne.18
It is not a foregone conclusion 
NATURAL RESOURCE 
POTENTIAL
SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT
Steps
Ecient 
awarding of 
contracts and 
licences
Eective 
regulation and 
monitoring of 
operations
Collection of taxes 
and royalties
Revenue 
distribution 
and 
management
Sound and 
sustainable 
policies
State 
capacity
Comprehensive 
and transparent 
regulatory 
framework
Functioning 
enforcement 
measures
Assessment and collection 
capabilities, with administrative 
and audit capacities
Adherance to internationally 
accepted accounting and reporting 
standards and procedures
Transparency, 
to hamper any 
corruption 
attempts 
Investment 
of the excess 
capital in 
sustainable 
development
One model for realising the potential of natural resources: the “natural resource management value chain”. It requires 
that different government entities be clearly aware of their responsibilities and have the necessary institutional 
capacities to carry them out. Source: Mayorga-Alba, 2009
We also believe 
that other 
avenues of 
investment, 
in addition to 
infrastructure 
should be 
explored, such 
as invention 
and innovation, 
research and 
development, 
and especially 
the training of 
the men who 
constitute the 
“grey oil”, to use 
an expression of 
our head of state.
Malem Tidzani, 
Director General 
of the Agency for 
Standardisation 
and Technology 
Transfer, Gabon 
(Open A.I.R. 
interview)
A worker at an international call centre of Ambition 24, a British company 
based in South Africa.  Photo: Eric Miller
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Loss of state capacity to deliver 
services may be a longer-term 
disadvantage.
New middle-class entrants 
grapple with redefining the “good 
life”. There is lingering resentment 
that what were previously considered 
basic middle-class entitlements 
cannot be had. Some of the wealthier 
have recourse to an enclave of 
privatised services that they can 
afford to provide to themselves.24
THE CHEETAH GENERATION
Within the expanding middle 
class is a core group, the “cheetah 
generation”, who have overtaken the 
old guard as business and political 
leaders.
previously gained wealth from rent 
seeking or corruption, dropping 
them down into the middle class. 
The gap between rich and poor 
narrows, but there is no guarantee of 
improvement in the lot of the poor.
In other cases, poorer people’s 
incomes improve, whether due 
to government-led employment 
creation, more labour-intensive 
foreign investment ventures, or 
proliferating small local businesses. 
The middle class grows not only 
by working in better paid jobs, 
but through better education and 
innovative initiatives.
There is some recycling into 
and out of the middle class: first 
generation middle-class entrants are 
expected to uplift extended families, 
have little cushioning against shocks 
and are at risk of dropping back into 
poverty.
A bigger middle class has greater 
expectations of government and 
services, and provides impetus for 
improved social policy on health 
and education, accountability and 
governance, and respect for the rule 
of law. A virtuous cycle is set up.
In an effort to service a middle 
class demanding a higher standard 
of living, some countries privatise 
infrastructure or service provision, 
using concessions, outsourcing 
or setting up public-private 
partnerships. The jury is still out 
on whether this will adequately 
serve the interests of the majority as 
companies see value in the “bottom 
of the pyramid”, or whether the 
wealthier will disproportionately 
benefit as they yield better returns. 
Many different business models 
operate, both horizontal and 
vertical, faltering or forging ahead. 
The services sector plays a bigger 
role, creating jobs, diversifying 
exports and providing public 
services.23 Global businesses also 
outsource part of their operations 
to local ventures run by savvy 
African entrepreneurs. Those with 
the abilities to develop solutions to 
domestic challenges, and to adopt 
and adapt imported knowledge and 
technology to solve local problems 
(absorptive capacity), perform best.
Parallel to the formal economy 
is another globally networked one – 
that of organised crime. The wireless 
world facilitates communication 
between organisations operating 
outside of the law, white collar crime, 
bribery, scams by impersonators 
on the internet, identity theft, 
and money laundering through 
electronic transfers. Cyber crime is 
far less easy to police. To some savvy 
entrepreneurs, the criminal economy 
offers lucrative opportunities with 
no regulatory or taxation strings 
attached. The extent to which this is 
eating into the legitimate economy is 
not known and depends on quality 
of governance.
MORE MIDDLE CLASS
Contributing to economic and 
political stability, and domestic 
demand, the growing middle 
class is a marked, albeit patchy, 
phenomenon.
In some cases, good governance 
has dislodged the elites who 
The Millennium Villages Project: 
In Ghana’s Amansie West District, 
Nathan Ayonke on one of the 
computers in the solar powered, 
mobile phone connected, “internet 
cafe in the bush”.
Photo: Eric Miller
Self-service by clubbing together
Consistent 
energy supply
Buy a generator
Consistent, 
clean water 
supply
Dig a borehole
Contract for regular private 
water tanker supplies
Education Private institutions
Security Employ private security 
guards
Health care Private practitioners and 
clinics
Parks and 
recreation
In gated suburbs, or private 
clubs
Consumer credit Mutual banks
Investment Offshore
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self-learn, even in the absence of 
good teachers, and are exposed to 
a wider world. Children quickly 
teach themselves to use computers, 
without any instruction.
Governments have tackled the 
challenge of creating an education 
system, which develops the 
knowledge and skills to engage 
in a global wireless environment. 
Many curricula have been geared 
to developing skills needed for the 
new economy, stimulating creativity 
and initiative. A culture of lifelong 
learning is applied in all domains of 
professional and social life.28
The historic brain drain is 
turning into the brain train, 
drawing on Africa’s diaspora to 
share their education and skills 
generate a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Girls’ participation in mathematics 
and science drops off in high school, 
families favour sons when money for 
higher education and ICT devices 
has to be prioritised, young women 
find fewer role models in top levels 
of government and business, men 
appoint and mentor men, and 
mothers are still presumed to be the 
primary parent. Even though girls 
utilise technology to gain relatively 
better status than before, the cheetah 
generation is still mostly male.
EDUCATION AND LEARNING
The new technologies can be 
harnessed to provide education. 
Children and youth are able to 
“The Cheetah Generation refers to the … generation of young African graduates and professionals, who look at African issues and problems from a totally 
different and unique perspective. 
They are dynamic, intellectually 
agile and pragmatic. … They brook 
no nonsense about corruption, 
inefficiency, ineptitude, incompetence 
or buffoonery. They understand and 
stress transparency, accountability, 
human rights and good governance. 
They also know that many of their 
current leaders are hopelessly 
corrupt and that their governments 
are dysfunctional and commit 
flagrant human rights violations. 
The Cheetahs do not look for excuses 
for government failure by wailing 
over the legacies of the slave trade, 
Western colonialism, imperialism, the 
World Bank or an unjust international 
economic system.26
George Ayittey, Ghanaian economist 
and president of the Free Africa 
Foundation in Washington DC
WHO IS UP-AND-COMING?
The technology innovation hubs 
established across Africa have borne 
fruit.27 Despite the inherent risks of 
entrepreneurship, the 20-somethings 
whose ideas and creativity were 
incubated are now middle-aged 
and running their own enterprises, 
opening the way for the next 
generation.
While educational opportunities 
are open to both boys and girls, 
patriarchal gender patterns still 
Young 
“techproneurs” 
emerging from 
innovation 
hubs in Nairobi, 
Nigeria and other 
parts of Africa will 
drive innovation. 
They will depend 
on an open 
society concept 
and the quality 
of education and 
opportunities for 
learning. They will 
depend on cheap 
infrastructure. 
For the internet 
generation, the 
cost of devices 
and electricity 
and connectivity 
is very important 
and is likely to be 
more affordable.
Wolfgang Fengler, 
lead economist 
in the World 
Bank’s Nairobi 
office (Open A.I.R. 
interview)
Pupils of Kimisagara Primary School in Kigali using laptops during a lesson. 
Rwanda is among the top 10 African countries in ICT usage. 
Photo: The New Times/T. Kisambira frank.kanyesigye@newtimes.co.rw
Top ten languages used on the internet (June 2010)25 
English
Chinese
Spanish
Portuguese
German
Arabic
Japanese
All the rest
French
Russian
Korean
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this open world, but there are both 
tangible and unspoken barriers. The 
wireless environment disadvantages 
large portions of the population that 
are less educated, have no spare cash, 
and are unfamiliar with a digital 
culture. There remain those who are 
unconnected, on the other side of 
the digital divide. Some countries 
neglect the marginalised, which 
causes economic hardship, finding 
expression in political and religious 
tension.
gained internationally. Thanks to 
technology, businesses are created 
by Africans in the diaspora with 
branches housed and run by 
the educated in Africa. Many of 
these are involved in outsourced 
businesses from the developed 
world. Some are attracted back home 
by the vibrant milieu and incentives 
in some cities; others share and train 
virtually.
WHO IS LEFT BEHIND?
Success in this world is predicated 
on access to and fitting into a 
globalised network. Those who 
qualify tend to be the relatively 
privileged, with a better level of 
education and disposable income. 
Access involves energy supply, being 
able to afford the technology devices 
and pay for downloads, and some 
facility with the languages used on 
the internet, let alone basic literacy. 
Global interoperability depends on 
standardisation, and the corollary 
is loss of diversity. Not so long ago, 
Africans were at least bilingual, if 
not multilingual, speaking both a 
mother tongue and the language 
inherited from colonialism. Now 
the cheetah cubs have almost lost 
their vernacular. Fitting in requires 
compatibility with the hardware, 
software and computing standards 
that are globally recognised and 
legal, complying with standard 
licensing terms or open source 
conventions.
Without command of the rules of 
the game, it is difficult to participate. 
No one is explicitly locked out of 
Children in Ethiopia using computers supplied by One Laptop Per Child.
Source: www.dvice.com/archives/2012/10/ethiopian_kids.php
The potential 
for transforming 
the continent’s 
dysfunctional 
educational 
system is 
immense, as 
mobile phones – 
cheaper to own 
and easier to run 
than PCs – gain 
ground as tools 
for delivering 
teaching content 
… It offers ways 
to fill this gap 
by exposing 
scientists 
and students 
to modern 
instruments in 
many fields of 
science while 
integrating 
potential 
strategies for 
mobilising 
[Africa’s] 
diaspora.
Yacouba Diawara, 
Head of the 
Nuclear Spectrum 
Laboratory, 
International 
Agency for Atomic 
Energy, Republic 
of Mali (Open 
A.I.R. interview)
“We left the boxes in the village [in Ethiopia]. Closed. Taped shut. No instruction, no human being. I thought, the kids will play with the boxes! Within four minutes, one kid not only opened the box, but found the on/off switch. He’d never seen an on/off 
switch. He powered it up. Within five days, they were 
using 47 apps per child per day. Within two weeks, 
they were singing ABC songs [in English] in the village. 
And within five months, they had hacked Android. 
Some idiot in our organisation or in the Media Lab 
had disabled the camera. And they figured out it had a 
camera, and they hacked Android.29
Nicholas Negroponte, founder of One Laptop Per Child,  
at a MIT conference in 2012
The story of Tolika
“So here I was asking myself a question “What is a squirrel in isiZulu, mhhh?” Aha! I know, I’ll Google it. Squirrel in isiZulu, tell me Google, tell me. After 30 minutes of searching and searching, I found nothing. Maybe there are no squirrels in Africa. Yeah, it’s an American animal, so I convinced myself. 
 I decided to call great great grandmother to confirm. “What is a 
squirrel great great grand Gogo?” “It’s a nsindane my son.” “No! Are you for 
real, Gogo?” “Hehehe, you township kids know nothing,” said great Gogo. 
Eish! So great Gogo revealed how moronius I was. I can’t accept that, let 
me ask my fellow people what a squirrel is. Ha! None of them know what 
nsindane is either and the sad part is they are not even ashamed of it. 
Nsindane is one of many. What is a spider, an apple or an orange? Better 
yet, what are they in Xhosa, Ndebele, Swati, Afrikaans, Sotho, Pedi, 
Tswana, Tsonga, Venda or even Sign Language? That is why tolika.co.za 
had to be created.
Mdu Ntuli, co-creator with Gaoretelelwe Molebalwa of an online word translator
Gogo means grandmother, tolika means translate. South Africa has 11 
official languages, named in this quotation. People may use their mother 
tongue when communicating via ICTs, there are academic works about 
the linguistics and literature of the African languages, and online 
courses to learn them. But no one computes, transacts or codes in them.
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A key challenge for policymakers 
is how best to mediate between these 
commercial constituencies that base 
business models on different legal 
strategies, for which a single public 
policy framework is difficult to 
fabricate.
FDI and technology transfer
When policymakers had to choose 
one approach over another, the 
preference was to adopt whichever 
policy promoted the most FDI and 
technology transfer, as these are 
key priorities in this interconnected 
world.
“Many high-income developing countries are now approaching a crossover point at which they switch over to the more promising side of the intellectual 
property divide – the proverbial gap 
between those who benefit from 
the existing intellectual property 
system and those who do not. This 
crossover process is likely to have 
significant implications for the future 
development of the intellectual 
property system.
Peter Yu, Director of the Intellectual 
Property Law Center, Drake University 
Law School33
Unfortunately, it is always difficult 
to determine empirically whether 
a proposed policy intervention 
will have the intended economic 
effects, or whether it comes with 
unwelcome consequences. Some 
officials wanting to encourage FDI 
INNOVATION AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IMPLICATIONS
Return on R&D investment
Previously, IP regimes were designed 
to protect innovators, creators 
and the firms that invest in them. 
It seemed obvious that strong IP 
rights were necessary to encourage 
trade and investment. International 
corporations doing business in 
Africa needed to be satisfied that 
their intellectual assets would not 
be misappropriated.30 International 
treaties and trade agreements 
are still aligned largely with this 
historical outlook, with relatively 
few exceptions.
Today, both domestic and foreign 
firms still insist on satisfactory 
financial returns on their R&D, 
but there are many different ways 
of achieving this. An increasing 
number of medium-sized local 
enterprises and African-based 
multinational companies have 
built successful businesses based 
on open innovation. They rely on 
open-source platform technologies, 
and encourage their suppliers and 
consumers to engage with and 
improve their products and services. 
For these particular firms, too much 
IP protection in the marketplace 
causes economic gridlock and 
impedes returns on investment.31 
However, there is still some 
uncertainty as to whether platform 
providers become free-riders on user 
innovation, or help to create shared 
value.32
Above:
News anchor in the newsroom at  
eTV, an independent media company 
in South Africa.
Photo: Eric Miller/iAfrika Photos
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The internet is not 
going to save the 
world, whatever 
… Silicon Valley’s 
tech billionaires 
believe. But 
eradicating 
disease just might 
… “Innovation 
is a good thing. 
The human 
condition –  
put aside 
bioterrorism and 
a few footnotes – 
is improving 
because of 
innovation.  
[T]echnology’s 
amazing, [but] it 
doesn’t get down 
to the people 
most in need in 
anything near 
the timeframe 
we should want 
it to.”38
Bill Gates, in an 
interview in the 
Financial Times
 
Business strategies and policy 
frameworks
Some businesses practise open 
innovation while others prefer 
tight control over their creative 
ideas. But often strategic tensions 
exist within the same medium-
sized or multinational firm. The 
“innovator’s dilemma” is whether to 
supportive of and supported by 
key business interests. Offshore 
companies now deal with Africa’s 
officials and professionals on an 
equal basis and can no longer dictate 
IP terms. A highly globalised Africa 
has learned and plays well by the 
global rules.
and technology transfer presume a 
necessary causality between such 
protection and positive economic 
outcomes. This belief has persisted 
despite substantial evidence from 
academic research that challenges 
such assumptions.34 In fact, IP rights 
protection has been shown to be 
only one of many factors influencing 
FDI decisions, and in some 
circumstances also raises the cost of 
technology transfer.35
Beyond IP rights protection, 
both FDI and technology transfer 
have been found to be influenced 
by a host of “push” and “pull” 
factors, covering many economic, 
political and institutional factors 
in the industrial and host country. 
The interplay of these factors varies 
depending on the circumstances 
of each country, the industry 
in question, and the nature of 
technology and type of investment.
IP training and education
African policymakers generally 
emphasise IPR protection and 
enforcement based on the training 
and education they received early 
in their careers, during the first 
decades of the 21st Century, often 
from foreign governments and 
international organisations. Because 
the majority, though not all, of these 
capacity-building programmes have 
been initiated to promote strong 
IP protection, officials in powerful 
positions implement policies that 
now reflect such beliefs.
Thanks to good education in 
general, Africa now has better 
equipped international negotiators, 
The links between copyright and access to education
In the world of Wireless Engagement, the best places to be are the 
countries where the digital divide is a key policy concern. In order 
to address this, copyright policymakers will have to strike a balance 
between IP protection and access to knowledge. Perhaps nowhere 
is this balance more important than in the area of copyright in 
textbooks, articles and other learning materials. Education is a 
fundamental prerequisite to participation in this world, and copyright 
licensing terms dictate the terms of access.
In 2010, empirical research on the relationship between copyright 
and access to learning materials in eight African countries – Egypt, 
Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa and 
Uganda – found that copyright law in Africa was widely ignored, 
and far removed from the everyday realities of many Africans. In the 
2030s, this gap has narrowed substantially for globally interconnected 
individuals, but many people are still left behind.
“When copyright enforcement begins in earnest (as research indicates it will), then, without mechanisms in place to secure non-infringing channels of access to knowledge, many learners, particularly at the tertiary level, will be in a precarious position. Entire systems of education will be vulnerable. Thus, maintaining the status 
quo is not a sustainable policy option.36
African Copyright and Access to Knowledge Project (ACA2K)
Access to Knowledge in Africa: The Role of Copyright37 looks at the 
legal and practical issues posed by copyright for access to learning 
materials in Africa, and identifies the best policies and practices that 
could broaden and deepen this access. Africans with the necessary 
skills and bandwidth now have the global knowledge commons at their 
fingertips – will copyright facilitate or frustrate this potential?
Tanzania, Arusha. Entrepreneur and 
tanzanite mine owner Papaking in 
his city office, housed in the same 
building as the disco club he owns.
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standardisation and people who are 
unable or unwilling to conform. 
But unless licensing terms and 
conditions are relatively stable 
and people adapt to new rules, 
endless permutations of possible 
contractual arrangements would 
add to transaction costs and cause 
the gridlock that open licensing is 
intended to avoid.
business models, therefore, do so 
using legal strategies that exploit 
rather than undermine IP policy 
frameworks for copyrights, 
patents and other formal modes of 
protection. They create their own 
kinds of licensing agreements, like 
the Creative Commons for creative 
content or the General Public 
Licence (GPL) for software.
If a relatively small collection 
of standard-form “open” licences 
dominates the digital environment, 
the divide is exacerbated between 
people who embrace such 
move beyond previous and present 
successes to seize new opportunities, 
even though those opportunities 
may disrupt a comfortable status 
quo.40 That is one reason firms are 
still reluctant to fully let go of the 
proprietary models that worked well 
for many industries in the past.
The policymaker’s dilemma has 
been similar: why reform IP rules 
just after African businesses have 
learned them and begun to succeed 
in the global game, just for the 
sake of those excluded? Companies 
continuing to promote disruptive 
Students in computer class at the Rand Afrikaans University, South Africa.
Photo: Eric Miller
 n How to narrow the digital divide, ensuring that better governance translates into inclusive 
development?
 n How to design education systems that teach standard skills but also encourage 
experimentation and critical thinking?
 n Is a “silicon savannah” simply modelled on geographic clusters in the developed world, or are 
African innovation hubs distinct?
 n Can tensions between proprietary and open business models and associated policy 
frameworks be resolved in Africa’s favour?
Key uncertainties
[S]ubsidising 
even basic 
[connectivity] 
services for free 
would exceed 
many people’s 
income and 
it would be 
difficult for the 
industry to build a 
profitable model. 
[We] expect the 
efficiency of 
delivering data 
to increase by 
100x in the next 
5–10 years … 
from two types 
of innovation: 
bringing down 
the costs of 
delivering data, 
and using less 
data by building 
more efficient 
apps … then 
it becomes 
economically 
reasonable to 
offer free basic 
services to those 
who cannot 
afford them and 
start to deliver 
on the promise of 
connectivity as a 
human right.39
Mark Zuckerberg
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Valuable knowledge
W
IRELESS ENGAGEM
ENT
Value is ascribed to knowledge that is globally 
generalisable. The type of knowledge required is 
widely applicable, with an emphasis on efficiency. Such 
knowledge can be commoditised and more easily lends 
itself to social and commercial applications. Codified 
knowledge is valued over tacit knowledge, because the 
former is much easier to acquire or distribute online. 
Successful African-based businesses will be those that 
know what to do in order to exploit opportunities in a 
global marketplace.
Digital learning resources are among the most 
valuable sources of codified acontexual knowledge. 
Access to this knowledge is what enables participation 
in the world of Wireless Engagement. But like any 
valuable resource, conflicts over control and access 
abound. The best online courses could create 
educational opportunities for the world at large, or 
become open only to those willing and able to pay for 
access. Similarly, e-books and scholarly articles could 
be freely accessible to Africans, or publishers could 
continue to use legal and technological measures to 
control this body of knowledge.
As FDI in Africa grows and the emphasis on 
innovation continues, there is growing convergence 
between local and imported knowledge. Consequently, 
Africa runs higher in formal global metrics for 
measuring knowledge and innovation, such as the 
World Bank’s Knowledge Assessment Matrix (KAM) 
and the WIPO/INSEAD Global Innovation Index (GII).
Across Africa, there has been growing emphasis on 
creating an enabling environment for innovation. 
Innovation hubs abound, and African universities 
provide science and technology laboratories, 
increasingly supported by industry investment into 
R&D. Excellent training and opportunities exist for 
innovation within the framework of standardised  
global ICT platforms. The emphasis is on finding 
commercially viable outputs. Such innovations will be 
primarily “plug and play”: adding new ideas and value 
into existing products and systems, invariably with 
an online component. Opportunities exist for online 
innovation in professional and other services, linked  
to a global rather than local innovation system.
Africans are not only importers but also exporters  
of innovation, developing technologies and creating new 
applications and inventing things that have applicability 
beyond the continent. Multinational business ventures 
based on African cultural output are particularly 
successful. African movie and music industries 
have succeeded in selling cultural output bundled 
in packages with other products such as telephones, 
activities such as performances or subscription services. 
These are taken to global markets, targeting diaspora 
especially, and carve a niche in world cultural trade. 
Domestically, entrepreneurs have succeeded in bundling 
products of cultural output in packages selling other 
services, for example performances and television or 
phone subscriptions, or simply products such as phones.
The emphasis is on lucrative global markets, so 
innovative and cultural output has not ensured free 
access for all. Those without resources will be denied 
access – digitally locked out of the world of Wireless 
Engagement. Some technophiles can circumvent these 
barriers, but break the law by doing so.
The adversarial dynamic between proprietary and open 
business models is still prevalent in many countries. The 
majority of businesses play by the mainstream rules, 
and are still controlled by the standards and rules of a 
few long-established incumbents, monopolising patents, 
copyrights and production capacity. Most innovations 
tend to build on pre-existing proprietary hardware and 
software, rather than being completely independent 
creations. However, there is a trend of proprietary 
models moving to incorporate limited collaborative 
open source components within novel hybrid models.41
Conflicting strategic perspectives continue to be a 
focus of policy debates, intergovernment negotiations 
and lobbying by the private sector, special interest 
groups and consumer advocates. The stakes are high. 
The companies that control the standards wield 
control and reap the benefits that come with enforced 
licensing, but the costs are passed on to the consumer. 
Those who seek to make a profitable return on their 
knowledge, innovation and R&D investments are 
well served by internationally accepted IP protections. 
Standard licensing contracts with pre-set options make 
for convenience and easier policing. Exceptions can be 
agreed via lawyers.
There are also attempts to promote public domain 
content that is free to anyone without restriction, but 
as global competition grows, it becomes a struggle 
to maintain financial sustainability. There is an 
unacknowledged and illegitimate underground of those 
who ignore the rules of IP, don’t know how to navigate 
permission or licences, cannot afford to pay for the use 
of IP, or don’t respect the concept. When discovered, 
they are penalised as a deterrent to others.
Intellectual property
Innovation and creativity
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This is a world where …
dynamic informalities cross every aspect of African societies and ideas constantly 
recombine within communities built upon interpersonal trust, triggering 
innovations adapted to relentless change.
Except for …
those people unable to establish local grassroots relationships, who fail to build 
thriving businesses or wield social influence.
Can I help you? Yes, you are right. You won’t find 
these designs anywhere else in the market. Each 
one is unique. I produce my fashions from home, 
and my mother and two cousins sew my designs 
for me. I get the materials from Italy and China, 
some also from America. The buttons I usually get 
from a friend on the coast, but I always look out for 
different styles. The jewellery mostly comes from 
South Africa and the shoes are all best Nigerian 
leather. Everything comes from someone I know. 
We know each other, trust each other and help each 
other, so I can guarantee you top quality.
Don’t worry, if it doesn’t fit, we can make 
something up for you by tomorrow or the next 
day. Otherwise, I can show you something similar 
from my sister’s stall. She is just around the corner, 
but I will take you, it’s not easy to find things now 
because we’re just starting again.
Some big shots, so-called developers, they put 
money in government pockets and then think they 
can do what they like. They had these big graders… 
trucks… and came to break down 
our stalls.1 They said we 
all had to go 
because they have “official papers” from the 
government and we were trespassing. Trespassing! 
When my family has had a stall here for years! We 
paid our rents every week – just ask the head of our 
Traders’ Association. We lost everything, but we 
could fight back, we know where to get help and 
our customers fight for us.
We told them they could not do this… we traders 
and our customers. We must all live and we don’t 
know these developers with their big centres. You 
don’t even know who supplies their products. No, 
they are expensive and they don’t know the people. 
We know the people and we can do things to keep 
prices that our customers can pay. We can teach 
those others, but they don’t listen. We made them 
listen and now because everyone said they would 
not let them come here, we are back.
With the market, we can make a living for 
ourselves and our families. We can do it ourselves, 
find the best deals and work together so everyone 
can afford to come to our shops. We all help each 
other.
The men in suits were back yesterday, and they 
were talking about health and safety and 
new planning regulations. But do you 
think they will provide us with cheaper 
water and electricity? That costs me 
almost 20% of the money I make! 
And then government wants us 
to pay them – for what? We 
take care of ourselves. They 
just give us paper. But I 
am talking too much. 
You want to buy the 
original. You can 
see my work in the 
papers … stars, 
they wear my 
designs. They all 
come to me and 
you can too, my 
sister.
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Now we don’t really have borders between 
our countries, all the rules have changed. 
Nothing is stable any more. It’s even the 
same at work. I hear talk about us merging 
with the other countries in this region, so  
I might also not have a job tomorrow!
I thought I could help to change things  
for the better. But now, I just work, because 
I must work. The government seems to be a 
joke that others are laughing at.  
I am now part of that joke.
I work in the Ministry of Finance. It 
is a job, it pays the bills, and I must not 
complain. But this job is a burden: a heavy 
weight on my life.
I pay my taxes, even though they take 
more and more every year. Everybody 
wants more from the government, and they 
complain because they don’t like what they 
see, but where are those who put their hands 
in their pocket and pay the taxes?
I have been doing this job for 15 years 
now. Every year we give the international 
people all this information so that they can 
rank our country about what they call “the 
cost of doing business”. Our minister says 
we are doing the right thing to increase 
efficiency and meet global standards. I used 
to be proud of our ranking, but now I look 
around me, and it seems that no one takes 
notice. On the news, they argue that the 
costs of regulations and tax are too much 
and too complicated – that the only thing 
that matters is jobs.
My children say that education is 
pointless, that you only need to know the 
right people to get anywhere. I have spent 
my life trying to push for change, but the 
world I imagined doesn’t exist.
Informal - the new normal
Historically, the informal 
economy was seen as an undesirable 
element of developing country 
economies that would gradually fade 
away.8 In the 2030s, notwithstanding 
efforts to re-establish the primacy 
of the formal sector, with greater or 
lesser success in different contexts 
and countries, the informal economy 
is a “permanent feature” in Africa.9
In general, this world has 
resilience and an internal order, 
but there are pockets of chaos in 
some countries. Where overseas 
development aid has shrunk, the 
impacts on the formal sector have 
been profound. Even in countries 
not plagued by warfare or overt 
formal sector breakdown, there are 
those in government and business, 
or in the informal sector itself, 
who see rising informality as a 
convenient cover for corruption and 
criminality.
The extent of 
informality varies 
with differences 
in productivity 
across firms 
and workers, 
as well as with 
differences in 
the nature of 
regulations 
and the degree 
to which they 
are enforced. 
Whether 
informality is 
the result of exit, 
exclusion, uneven 
enforcement, 
or low firm 
productivity is 
still a matter of 
debate. 
World 
Development 
Report 2013: Jobs
INFORMALISATION  
IS HERE TO STAY
In the 2030s, government and “the 
people’s economy” seem to operate 
in different worlds.2 The key drivers 
of life in Africa lie in the informal 
economy, outside the formal, 
regulated sectors of society.3
Most people earn part or all of 
their livelihoods through informal 
activities, and get the goods and 
services they need within a social 
network “defined by norms and 
institutions that are in essence 
non-economic”.4 Africa’s labour, 
livelihood, political and social needs 
are met by informal organisations, 
businesses and supply chains, by 
informal skills transfer, by informal 
innovation approaches to intellectual 
property, and by informal provision 
of social services.
In some cases this has happened 
to fill the gaps left by a state, which 
is no longer supplying adequate 
services or an enabling environment 
for bigger business; in others, 
because regulations governing 
the licensing and registration 
of businesses are unnecessarily 
onerous.5 Citizens have turned 
towards informal mechanisms 
for meeting their needs and 
entrepreneurs are just getting on 
with doing business.6
Africa’s informalisation 
represents a form of “glocalisation.”7 
Economies and societies are 
global/local hybrids, with multiple 
identities and diverse organisational 
forms. These are in constant 
flux – organic, dynamic, explosive, 
unpredictable and improvisational.
What do we mean by “the informal sector”?
Informal economic activities are typically defined as those outside 
or beyond government regulations such as taxation, registration or 
licensing. Formal activities tend to be defined as those within the reach 
of government regulations or agencies.10
The International Labour Organisation characterises the informal 
sector as:
“consisting of units engaged in the production of goods or 
services with the primary objective of generating employment and 
incomes to the persons concerned. These units typically operate 
at a low level of organisation, with little or no division between 
labour and capital as factors of production and on a small scale. 
Labour relations – where they exist – are based mostly on casual 
employment, kinship or personal and social relations rather than 
contractual arrangements with formal guarantees.”11
Informal employment is a distinct concept. In 2003, statisticians 
agreed on a standard definition for informal employment, for inclusion 
in countries’ national accounts: “the total number of informal jobs 
[…] whether carried out in formal sector enterprises, informal sector 
enterprises, or households, during a given reference period”.12
The activities of formal sector enterprises, informal sector 
enterprises or households are variously legal, not underground, 
underground or illegal, and any combination of these. Illegal 
production activities include drug trafficking, for example. 
Underground production is concealed from public authorities and may 
contravene some laws, but can nevertheless comply with others – an 
example is the sale of legal goods or services without tax declaration.13
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efforts to preserve the fading 
function and diminishing relevance 
of the nation state, but they generally 
do not succeed. 
The informal economy is based 
on cash or barter, and microloans 
instituted within the network, 
rather than on transactions via 
a formal banking system. Small, 
electronic transactions made via 
mobile phone systems occur across 
formal/informal boundaries. Larger 
economic transactions cannot 
easily be monitored, so there is 
little ability to control inflation 
or drive monetary policy. Greater 
informalisation involves avoiding 
the reach of centralised governance 
via activities such as tax collection 
and formal business registration.
“Globalisation not only pulls upwards, but also pushes downwards, creating new pressures for local autonomy. […] [T]he nation becomes not only too small to solve 
the big problems, but also too small 
to solve the small ones.19
Anthony Giddens, sociologist
Tax revenues have shrunk to the 
point where many government 
functions have become financially 
unsustainable and are not being 
performed. In some countries, 
there is a deterioration in state 
provision of quality infrastructure 
and administration, as well as 
co-ordination of essential services. 
Government finds it difficult to 
enforce health and safety standards, 
labour standards, building 
continuum.16 Multiple forward and 
backward linkages between the 
formal and informal activities create 
interactive, symbiotic dynamics.
HOW “MUCH” INFORMALITY IS 
THERE?
In 2009, the OECD estimated that 
the informal sector17 represented 
43% of official GDP in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, almost equivalent in size 
to the formal sector.18 Since then, 
the contribution of the informal 
sector has grown across Africa, 
including in North Africa. While 
a large proportion of this remains 
informal agricultural activities, non-
agricultural informal enterprises are 
increasing their share of GDP.
WHAT IS GOING ON WITH 
GOVERNMENT?
Some national states are weakening 
to the extent of becoming sidelined 
as role players in the body politic, 
which are inadequate in providing 
governance – a self-accelerating 
spiral. There are some self-interested 
A RECOMBINANT CONTINUUM
The most formal enterprises pay 
taxes and adhere to government-
mandated standards and 
regulatory frameworks. The most 
informal entities are far removed 
from government oversight and 
regulation, and some may even 
conduct illegal or illicit activities. 
Between the two are a mix of actors 
whose characteristics are complex 
and often difficult to measure or 
place at a point along the continuum. 
Some of the most dynamic and 
sustainable are those operating 
near the middle of the continuum. 
They are properly constituted, 
organisationally and in terms of 
their business operations, but are 
still outside most government 
oversight mechanisms – and in some 
cases they vacillate between formal 
and informal status.15
A dualistic framing of the 
formal and informal sectors may 
serve an explanatory purpose, 
but the situation in different 
countries reflects permutations of 
economic production, distribution 
and employment relations on a 
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Ends of the continuum14
INFORMAL FORMAL
Labour Intensive Automated 
production
Entry Low barriers High barriers
Size of the business Small (five or fewer 
staff)
Large (over five staff)
Skills acquisition Mentors 
(apprenticeship)
Formal education
Adaptability to market Indigenous culture “Western” approach
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becoming more transitory and 
insecure, and working conditions 
and health and safety conditions are 
worsening. Lack of state enforcement 
leaves semi- or unskilled workers 
most vulnerable to exploitation or 
risks, such as the collapse of unsafe 
structures.
With formal sector 
unemployment rapidly growing, 
informal sector activities represent 
a survival strategy for the people 
involved and for their households.24 
Graduates from formal education 
turn to the informal sector either  
to seek employment or to start their 
own enterprises. “[I]nformal jobs 
can also be transformational.”25
It is not just a lack of formal 
opportunities that pushes people  
to the informal. As formal processes 
become increasingly rule-bound 
or unfulfilling, the informal sector 
becomes more appealing.  
The labour market has taken to the 
markets
“[E]mployment in the informal sector is no longer a journey, but has become the destination of many.21Donald Sparks and Stephen Barnett, 
researchers on the Sub-Saharan Africa 
informal sector
Africa’s high population growth 
rate22 has had a significant impact 
on levels of informality. The “youth 
bulge”, the growing participation 
of women in the workforce, and the 
impacts of improvements in health 
care have meant the formal sector 
cannot absorb all the available 
labour.23
With mounting cost pressures 
and little state monitoring, jobs 
within formal businesses are 
regulations, wages and working 
conditions. While regulations might 
well be on the statute books, without 
well-functioning institutions such 
as courts, collateral registries 
and credit information bureaus, 
formal sector systems cease to work 
effectively.
When people cannot see high 
levels of productive public sector 
services, they are more likely to 
try to avoid paying taxes, thus 
increasing the tax burden on the 
formal sector, ultimately leading to 
higher taxes and lower quality of 
social goods. Ad hoc legal and policy 
infrastructures are, paradoxically, an 
efficient environment for informal 
sector players who are resilient and 
adaptable.
PUSHES AND PULLS INTO 
INFORMALITY
Where foreign companies were 
attracted to the continent by 
rapid liberalisation policies and 
privatisations, they did not use 
labour-intensive methods and 
did not always employ significant 
numbers of local workers. Some 
African economies fostered African 
businesses at scales, which compete 
effectively in the formal globalised 
market with multinationals, but this 
is the exception. Globalisation thus 
reinforced the shift to small-scale, 
informal livelihoods in Africa.
In each country, different factors 
have contributed to the drift to 
a relative predominance of the 
informal sector.
The people’s 
economy exists 
not because of 
government, 
but despite 
government.20
South African 
National Traders 
Alliance
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1 to 185, with the highest being the 
least business-friendly environment. 
In 2010, the OECD average was 30, 
the Middle East and North Africa 
92, while Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
average was 139.28
Satisfaction more guaranteed
In areas of social services such 
as health care, non-state actors 
have filled the vacuum created by 
poor government delivery or co-
ordination. New forms of informal 
institutions and organisations 
have emerged not only because 
government service delivery is 
unsatisfactory, but also because 
informal services are tailored and 
closer (including literally) to what 
people want.
FEATURES OF INFORMALITY
Sourcing, production and selling 
is mostly done within families 
or other trusted social networks 
working together. These networks 
identify opportunities to supply the 
goods and services that are needed 
and wanted. The new informal 
organisations are constantly 
changing as the environments and 
needs of particular communities 
evolve. They use labour-intensive 
methods, which provide more 
employment, can absorb or shed 
labour, and are cheaper than 
capital-intensive production. The 
situation is “simultaneously a 
market for culturally defined goods, 
a pool of reliable low wage labour, 
and a potential source for start-up 
capital”.29
adapted technologies
 n run a small-scale operation 
without a lot of paperwork.
Bypassing bureaucracy
The barriers to and ease of doing 
formal business are high in many 
African countries, based on factors 
such as the time firms spend in 
meetings with tax officials, or 
informal payments to public 
officials to “get things done”. Trends 
shown in the World Bank’s Ease 
of Doing Business ranking, using 
data collected since 2003, have not 
improved. The ranking ranges from 
Its dynamism, versatility and room 
for innovation and entrepreneurship 
have made the informal sector not 
just a necessity, but an attractive 
choice for many people.
Getting going is easier
It is easy to start and run informal 
income-generating activities, 
because people can:
 n get a small amount of money to 
start from people they know
 n use skills acquired outside the 
formal school system and without 
needing a qualification
 n rely on indigenous resources and 
Government devolved to local level
Municipal governments hold the potential to be more effective 
than centralised, national governments at managing the day-to-day 
complexities of the informal world. In 2012, a study by the South 
African Local Government Association noted that “municipalities 
and city councils across the continent have started to recognise the 
importance of the informal economy and that its negation is often 
impeding economic growth and sustainable livelihoods”.26 Some cities 
in Africa have risen to the challenges posed by the informal economy, 
by:27
 n acknowledging its importance and presence
 n facilitating changes in attitude towards the informal sector
 n bridging the relationship and communication gap between it and 
local government
 n dealing with the sector’s complexity and diversity
 n having the right skills, capacity and structures within local 
government to engage with it
 n including informal economy issues in local government policies, 
regulations and planning processes, including by-law guidelines for 
the informal economy
 n actively engaging the informal economy in developing local 
economic development policies
 n “managing upwards” to get national departments to support local 
government efforts with regard to the informal economy.
“The policy 
challenge is to 
decrease the 
costs of working 
informally and 
to increase 
the benefits 
of working 
formally.30
Martha Alter Chen, 
International 
Co-ordinator 
of Women 
in Informal 
Employment: 
Globalising and 
Organising
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closed and open dynamics. The 
trust element allows some of these 
informal or semi-formal structures 
to have a national or even global 
reach, for example into the diaspora.
INFORMAL SECTOR SUCCESSES
Health provision
In some arenas, the informal 
sector is well able to provide 
services, primary health being one. 
Traditional, unlicensed medicinal 
informal organisation affiliated with 
a church.
Trust, the new currency
Group trust is a defining element of 
the functioning and maintenance 
of these informal groups. It is 
trust – and the desire to trust 
and be trusted – that sustains the 
informal rules, more than fear of 
the repercussions of breaking them. 
“Outsiders” can earn trust to gain 
entry into the informal collective, 
which gives the groups a mix of 
The position of women
With the oversupply of labour, 
women’s entry into, security within 
and working conditions in formal 
employment remain more tenuous 
than for men. Studies in the early 
2000s found that informal activities 
involving women tended to require 
lower-level skills and provide lower 
incomes when compared to men.31 
Informal employment in agriculture 
and activities linked to domestic 
life were always dominated by 
women. Now, women are present in 
a wider range of informal economic 
activities and are able to command 
earning parity with men.
Agreeing to loose rules
Informal or semi-formal economic, 
political and social bodies have 
rudimentary governance functions, 
based on unwritten or semi-
formalised rules and regulations. 
Despite the lack of formality, people 
participating in these groupings 
have a good understanding of 
the stipulations and the social 
consequences of going against them.
Multiple memberships
To meet their technical, financial 
and spiritual needs, individuals 
living and operating in these 
informal communities tend to 
belong to more than one informal 
organisation. For instance, a farmer 
might belong to the local farming 
organisation as well as a women’s 
lending or credit group. The same 
woman might belong to the local 
Telecommunications in Somalia
War in Somalia in the 1990s destroyed every phone line in the country. 
In 1994, the first private telecommunications company, Telecom 
Somalia, opened, followed by NationLink Telecom and Hormuud 
Telecom. In an environment devoid of formal regulation, these 
enterprises co-operated to create a flourishing, financially lucrative 
mobile and landline network. Despite rivalry, in 2005 the three 
companies signed an interconnectivity agreement to set prices and 
collectively expand their network access. They also co-operated to set 
up the Global Internet Company to provide internet infrastructure. 
Characterised by the World Bank as “economic enablers”, these 
operators could install a telephony landline in just three days, 
provided unlimited local calls for a monthly fee of $10, charged the 
lowest international rates on the continent, and provided 3G services. 
However, the formal-informal dynamic re-emerged, and government 
sought to reassert control over the unregulated environment.
“They made a remarkable effort to expand the country’s telecommunications, but lack of regulatory laws led to the misuse of our spectrum. Our aim is not to interfere with the telecommunications companies but to put in place regulatory laws that can uphold the interests of consumers and suppliers.
Abdullahi Ilmoge Hirsi, then-Minister of Information, Posts and 
Telecommunications, 2013
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suited for imported cars designed 
for perfect tarred roads. The cars 
often break down and spare parts are 
very expensive. In Uganda, a cadre 
of informal mechanics developed 
innovative ways to overcome 
the shortage of certain critical 
parts. These informal artisans are 
recognised as problem solvers who 
are able to improvise with new and 
used parts to create novel solutions.
CRISS-CROSSING REGIONAL 
CONTRACTS
The power of national governments 
is undermined from both above 
and below by globalisation’s 
“reinforcement of both 
supranational and subnational 
regionalism” and by the “ongoing 
flow or cascade of globalisation-
regionalism-subregionalism”.32 
Losing their grip on national 
governance, governments enter 
into ad hoc economic, trade and 
governance agreements with any 
and as many partners as possible. 
This creates a complex web of 
plurilateral and regional agreements, 
paradoxically further undermining 
the autonomy and function of nation 
states.
MOVING THROUGH POROUS 
BORDERS
Informal intra-regional trade can be:
 n unregistered businesses and 
traders that operate entirely 
outside the formal economy
 n registered companies fully 
evading official border-
practices operating at local levels are 
key providers of health care. There 
is also a second set of actors: small 
clinics operated by individual private 
medical practitioners who are not 
part of a franchise or any national 
health care system. These clinics 
are unregulated, or minimally 
regulated, and also make some use 
of traditional medicinal compounds 
and practices.
Finance
Formal banking institutions and 
systems are faltering in many 
African countries, not least because 
of knock-on effects of financial crises 
in the “declining” countries. The 
vacuum left behind is being filled 
by innovative financial systems 
and products from within the 
informal sector. Informal financial 
organisations and networks now 
dominate the management and 
transfer of funds.
Artisanal apprenticeships
Many learn their trade via informal 
apprenticeships provided on an 
unstructured and informal basis 
to “someone who knows someone” 
who needs help. Within this milieu, 
the concept of ownership of ideas 
is anathema: artisans work in close 
proximity to each other and actively 
share and collaborate.
One such example is provided by 
informal sector mechanic-engineers 
in Uganda. In many African 
countries, the roads are often rough 
and full of potholes. They are not 
If I don’t help 
relatives by 
training them 
and giving them 
hands-on skills 
to produce stuff 
or repair work, 
they will likely 
become a burden 
in future, or 
social misfits, or 
probably engage 
in criminal 
activities due to 
poverty and lack 
of skills to find 
jobs. Besides, I 
was helped by 
a relative, so it’s 
imperative that I 
do the same for 
young relatives 
and friends.35
Ugandan artisan 
(Open A.I.R. 
interview)
M-Pesa is a cellphone-based financial services 
system, which allows users with an identity 
document to deposit, withdraw, and transfer 
money, and access microfinancing.
Photo: Jeremy de Beer
Uganda’s electric vehicle
In November 2011, Uganda’s 
President Museveni launched 
the prototype KIIVA electric 
vehicle to much acclaim. The car 
was designed fit for purpose for 
Ugandan roads and future plans 
included an electric bus. The 
vehicle was developed by a team 
under Professor Tickdori at the 
Makerere University’s Centre 
for Research in Transportation 
Technologies. What is less well 
known is that both detail design 
elements and production of 
the car were the result of both 
formal and informal sector 
inputs. It was built by Gatsby 
Garage, a formal sector entity 
which is run by the university’s 
College of Engineering, Design, 
Art and Technology. The garage 
operates as a semi-formal sector 
entity as well, drawing on the 
expertise of informal artisans to 
supplement skills and solutions 
that elude formally trained 
designers as well as academic 
researchers. The manager of 
the Gatsby Garage acts as 
point of reference, introducing 
informal sector mechanics with 
particular specialities to formal 
sector researchers and students 
from the university. There are 
now efforts from the university 
researchers to proactively and 
systematically identify informal 
sector artisans and co-opt them 
into the formal research and 
innovation centres.34
Kawooya, D. Informal-formal sector 
interactions in automotive engineering, 
Kampala
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organisations are stepping into the 
breach to assume responsibility. 
While the formal sector is not 
necessarily shrinking, the informal 
sector is growing more quickly. 
Such growth comes more from the 
proliferation of micro-enterprises 
than the scaling-up of particular 
businesses.
Informal businesses are limited 
by their small size – they are 
unable to realise economies of 
scale, have less access to inputs and 
cannot leverage formal business 
relationships. These factors inhibit 
productivity and efficiency gains in 
the sector.37 Unregulated activities 
may also deter investment in some 
circumstances.38 A lack of formal 
protection for property rights – both 
of and by informal practitioners –
may be impeding scalable 
innovation in the formal sector.39
Looking at informal economies 
in that light, it is understandable 
that some economists and politicians 
hold the view that policy should 
to improve food security and poverty 
at a regional level is being realised. 
In some parts of Africa, informal 
trade links revive pre-colonial 
trading geographies, particularly 
where language groups span borders.
LIMITING OR DRIVING 
DEVELOPMENT?
Where governance of the formal 
informal economies have become 
dislocated, the formal sector is 
increasingly irrelevant. When it 
comes to humanitarian issues and 
social programmes, international 
agencies and non-governmental 
crossing posts and trade-related 
regulations and tariffs
 n registered firms partially evading 
trade-related regulations and 
tariffs by illegal practices such as 
under-invoicing
Multiple regional agreements, 
which create both economic 
integration and contradictory rules, 
make it easier for informal traders 
situated near national boundaries 
to move goods through gates and 
gaps in borders. Where national 
and regional trade strategies have 
embraced the benefits of legitimate 
informal cross-border trade rather 
than criminalising it, the potential  
African agreements are overlapping36
AEC African Economic Community
CBI Cross Border Initiative
CEMAC Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa
CILSS Permanent Interstate 
Committee on Drought Control 
in the Sahel
COMESA Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa
EAC East African Community
ECCAS Economic Community of 
Central African States
ECOWAS Economic Community of West 
African States
IGAD Inter-Governmental 
Authority for Development 
(in the Horn of Africa)
IOC Indian Ocean Commission
SACU Southern African 
Customs Union
SADC Southern African 
Development Community
UMA Union du Maghreb Arabe
WAEMU West African Economic 
and Monetary Union
* indicates membership of 
Cross Border Initiative 
regional grouping
Nile River Basin IGAD
COMESA
CEMAC
ECCAS
EAC
SACU
SADC
IOCCBI
UMA
ECOWAS
Conseil de
L’Entente
WEAMU
Mano River Union
CILSS
San Tomé & Principal
Cameroon
Central African Rep.
Gabon
Equat Guinea
Rep. congoChad
Egypt
Somalia
Djibouti
Ethiopia
Eritrea
Sudan
Kenya*
Uganda*
Burundi*
Rwanda*
DR Congo
Angola
Tanzania*
Malawi*
Zambia*
Zimbabwe*
Mauritius*
Seychelles*
Comoros*
Madagascar*
ReunionSouth Africa
Botswana
Lesotho
Namibia*
Swaziland*
Mozambique
Algeria
Libya
Morocco
Ghana
Nigeria
Benin
Togo
Côte d’Ivoire
Niger
Burkina Faso
Guinea-Bissau Mali
Senegal
Gambia
Cape Verde
Liberia
Sierra Leone
Guinea
Mauritania
Tunisia
In 2013, UNCTAD estimated that for the SADC regional economic 
zone, informal cross-border trade amounted to as much as 30–40% 
of total intra-SADC trade, which would equate to $17.6 billion 
annually.40 The value of Ugandan exports via the informal economy 
to neighbouring DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, the Sudan and Tanzania was 
estimated at $790 million in 2009 and $520 million in 2010. Trade 
barriers dismantled by or through regional agreements are bodies are 
facilitating what already happens through informal trade.
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including issues of corruption 
and white collar crime, including 
insecurity from crime, and/or 
terrorism.
The inventiveness and 
adaptability of the informal 
sector presents nation states with 
opportunities to develop novel 
means of capturing the vibrancy 
and value of the sector, perhaps 
through nurturing the links with the 
formal sector and developing new 
channels for this symbiosis. There 
are many initiatives to devise out of 
the box alternatives to mainstream 
models of taxation, registration 
and public service. While chaotic at 
times, the result potentially provides 
employment for all and is also 
inclusive, adaptable and insulated 
from global economic shocks.
Recalibrated science, technology 
and innovation policies
Around the turn of the 21st Century, 
African science, technology and 
innovation (STI) initiatives began to 
seriously consider how innovation 
could help transform the continent. 
Leading thinkers examined how the 
right innovation systems could best 
tap Africa’s indigenous resources for 
socio-economic development, while 
misguided policies merely replicated 
experienced prolonged periods of 
failed government and lawlessness 
reveal the dangers when formal 
structures break down almost 
entirely. In the absence of strong 
state security mechanisms, the 
potential exists for conflict and 
violence. Informal economic, 
political and social power can 
become concentrated in the hands 
of groups most prone to violent 
coercion and its corollaries – forced 
labour, trade in illegal goods, and 
terrorising of local populations.
INNOVATION AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IMPLICATIONS
Policy for chaos or vibrance
Throughout Africa, there are 
contrasting policy responses to the 
informality predominating on the 
continent. Is it possible to support 
informality while at the same time 
maintaining a stable nation state?
Because it cannot be 
comprehensively regulated, the 
informal sector is still perceived by 
some as a threat to the bureaucratic 
structures of the formal economy. 
There are real challenges posed 
by tilting too far into informality, 
aim for informal firms to “graduate” 
through a linear progression into the 
formal sector, as the best way to add 
to overall economic growth. Efforts 
persist to emancipate informal 
sector actors from the constraints 
perceived to repress their own 
economic potential. Formal sector 
firms are much easier to regulate and 
control. 
However, the informal economy 
has expanded beyond control 
and is now outside the influence 
of national politicians. In most 
countries, informal activities are 
playing a critical role in alleviating 
poverty, increasing employment, 
producing goods for the low-income 
majority, improving competition in 
the economy, supplying the formal 
sector, and fostering adaptation and 
innovation. Genuine engagement 
to tap the potential of informal 
economic activity is proving to be 
the better path.
CO-EXISTING INFORMAL/
FORMAL CONNECTIONS
Informal economic, political 
and social-cultural activities and 
structures far outpace the formal. 
But the formal sector still matters, 
especially at the local level, to 
provide critical government and 
business infrastructures. Countries 
that are manifesting a symbiosis 
between informal and formal sectors 
are performing best.
Many formal private companies 
maintain footholds in the informal 
economy, for example retail chain 
shops supply goods to informal 
vendors on credit without security. 
Public sector entities work with 
and support informal sector 
actors. Indeed, in some cases the 
public sector has become a major 
source of demand for the output 
of informal businesses, providing 
an engine for their growth and 
transferring skills and capital. The 
informal sector attracts and benefits 
from both formal and informal 
education systems, since both supply 
labour possessing the skills and 
competencies needed to work and 
thrive in the informal sector.
A few countries are teetering 
on the brink of collapse. African 
nations or regions that have 
Photo: Jeffrey Attaw
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economies. Paramount is the need 
to better understand how innovation 
in the informal economy happens 
(or does not happen), how informal 
sector innovation interacts with 
socio-economic development, and 
how to channel this dynamism for 
collective benefit.
outdated Western models that were 
no longer relevant to the global 
economic realities.41
By the 2030s, Africa’s STI policies 
have clearly shifted to embrace 
the informal sector – or at least to 
acknowledge its vital role alongside 
the formal sector. Changes in 
national innovation systems to give 
due attention to the informal sector 
are now key to the health of African 
 n How to avoid dysfunction while managing the “organised chaos” that exploits instead of 
suppresses the informal sector’s virtues?
 n How to determine the level of government best suited to deliver essential public goods and 
services?
 n Is there a digital or formalised equivalent to the face-to-face interpersonal networks of trust 
based on proximity?
 n Can any intellectual property protections be enforced if informal strategies don’t ensure fair 
competition?
Key uncertainties
Open A.I.R. case studies included the informal automotive sector engineers in Kampala who worked on the 
KIIVA car prototype for Makerere University, Nigerian producers of leather textile goods, and the value 
chains for Ghanaian cocoa and Ethiopian coffee. The companion volume to this Open A.I.R. scenarios 
publication, Innovation and Intellectual Property: Collaborative Dynamics in Africa, reports signs of 
movement by relatively non-formalised actors towards informal or semi-formal appropriation strategies, such 
as trade secrets and first-mover advantages (for informal automotive engineers and mechanics), and collective 
certification marks or geographic branding (for textile and agricultural producers).
Photo: Jerem
y de Beer
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Valuable knowledge
Valuable knowledge is related to interpersonal linkages 
with other networks, either formal or informal. 
Know-what and know-why are of little use without the 
trusted relationships to exploit knowledge for social or 
economic gain. This know-who is highly contextualised, 
tacit knowledge. It is acquired by informal learning 
rather than formal education; significant self-learning is 
achieved by tinkering, fiddling and mending. Literacy 
is always important, of course, but equally so are social 
and practical problem-solving skills.
The informal sector has a unique understanding 
of the needs and aspirations of those at the base of the 
pyramid, as well as of how to access local materials, 
find appropriate fabrication techniques and access local 
distribution channels. Apprenticeships, or informal 
learning systems, provide the primary avenue for 
gaining entry to the informal sector. Learning based 
on hands-on skills and improvisation is more effective 
in imparting the skills needed to effectively function 
in informal activities, be they in business or other 
spheres.42 Enterprising “graduates” whose flexibility 
enables them to navigate the informal sub-sectors they 
are trained to serve are best positioned for success. The 
fluidity of the informal sector and its activities demands 
these kinds of flexible individuals more than the 
graduates of formal education systems, whose expertise 
and trades are narrowly defined by academic disciplines. 
Many formally trained graduates are unsuited for the 
informal sector because formal institutions are not 
oriented towards training informal workers.43
Grassroots innovation is informal, rapid and highly 
competitive. It is user-generated by individuals and 
communities who solve problems. Based on symbiotic 
relations between formal and informal sectors, 
innovations in some informal spheres adapt products 
and processes from formal markets. Artisans involved 
in metal fabrications, for instance, reuse old machines 
or parts as inputs into new products. Likewise, formal 
sector innovators draw on problem-solving techniques 
improvised by their informal sector counterparts.
Informality results in a vibrant environment, but 
material constraints make it unlikely that entrepreneurs 
will move above the radar into the formal economy – 
assuming that is the goal, which often it is not. 
Innovation systems are based on the relationships 
between entrepreneurs, their customers and suppliers, 
forming clusters based on physical proximity and face-
to-face relationships. Where you are determines who 
you see, who you know and who you trust. Innovation 
systems are, therefore, local, regional or sometimes 
“glocal”, absorbing global innovations and adapting 
them to requirements.
Sharing of knowledge, expertise and innovations is a 
defining characteristic of the informal sector, so in this 
way innovation systems are “open”. However, sharing 
is restricted to trusted networks and typically based 
on face-to-face interactions. Openness comes from ad 
hoc idea sharing between groups with interpersonal 
proximity, and innovation will come from the organic 
circular flows between them. While everyone has an 
equal opportunity, those who are most adaptable are 
most likely to succeed.
Knowledge governance is based on dynamic social 
norms. Informal rules are enforced by personal 
relationships and self-interest, where the greatest risk 
is reputational. Those within interpersonal networks 
cannot afford to compromise their relationships or they 
will be ostracised by peers – a far more serious sanction 
than any IP infringement lawsuit might bring. Identity 
is tied to place and one cannot afford to be excluded.
Formal IP rights, like copyrights, patents and 
trademarks, are relatively meaningless without the 
means to register or enforce them. But IP is by no means 
irrelevant: the forms that matter are those that can be 
obtained simply and cheaply (or freely), and enforced 
by social or cultural expectations rather than by legal 
contracts. Here, the emphasis is on “appropriation” 
strategies instead of formal IP protection.
Trade secrets and confidential information 
provide valuable competitive advantages to informal 
entrepreneurs. Rapid evolutions of new ideas bestow a 
first-mover advantage. Customers are attracted to the 
fastest innovators. The most innovative entrepreneurs 
and micro-enterprises emerge from particular locales, 
providing another layer “protection”. Some formal 
modes of protection, however, do matter. Moral rights 
are relevant, as people take pride in their intellectual 
creations. Branding is also key, so groups may seek 
efficient ways of protecting reputations and retaining 
customers’ trust. Collective branding schemes work 
because individuals in the informal sector need 
not worry about registration, enforcement or other 
formalities; those functions are more efficiently 
administered by others.
Intellectual property
Innovation and creativity
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Sincerely 
Africa
This is a world where … 
African communities ensure sustainability by reinterpreting 
traditional knowledge systems, and tapping human and 
natural resource riches in response to global instabilities 
and external pressures.
Except for …
outsiders lacking community roots or shared identities, 
who lose the ability to participate socially, politically  
and economically.
When my children left for the town, I knew I 
would hardly ever see them again. That was the 
way of life for many generations. This is what 
happened … they went to the cities and looked for 
jobs. We were left behind with the small children, 
keeping the family land.
But these days things seem to be different. My 
beloved grandson lives here with me now and other 
family members, like some of his cousins, have come 
back too. They were complaining that life in the 
cities was too hard and stressful. My grandson first 
came to protect us during the drought when those 
from that other village tried to stop us getting to 
the spring – a water source we have always shared 
as our ancestors did. It was very hard for us, but the 
elders called meetings and my grandson also had 
good negotiation skills, 
because of his 
experiences in 
the city.
Life on the land has never been easy, but it is 
what I know. It has got better since the young ones 
have come, sometimes they teach us new things 
that we can use to improve the way we grow our 
crops. Hah! They are also keeping records of what 
we do to help the crops when there is little rain 
and how we protect our crops when storms come. 
Sometimes they sell this knowledge to outsiders, 
which brings us more money. We aren’t hungry here 
like they are in the cities. We don’t need all their 
expensive things, so life is good. It can be hard but 
we work together and our crops and our traditions 
survive. The ancestors are happy, they don’t turn 
away from us.
Because the land is now so dry, we have gone 
back to some of our old ways. There are things 
our parents’ grandparents did that were almost 
forgotten, but now we think about those ways 
and try to see if they can help us. We plant many 
different crops, so that whatever the weather 
conditions we have some food for everybody and 
some for market. We watch the land and do what 
we can. 
We also have the new ideas that come with the 
young people. They are always asking questions, 
experimenting and talking to other people in other 
places, sharing ideas. They always want us to try 
new ways of doing things to see if they work better 
than before.
I remember thinking there was nothing good 
that could come from hardships, but I think it 
made us a strong community. We have 10 different 
families who all work together to sell our crops, and 
one of us then works with the community up the 
road, and we can then sell our food and their food 
and get better prices. We know what to grow.
But for me, the biggest blessing is having my 
family back around me. My grandson sometimes 
complains that he is too educated to just work in 
the fields, but he says his future is here now. There 
is little work in the cities and the people are 
violent. Here is better. People aren’t thinking 
only of themselves, we work together. 
They are not welcome. This land is for 
us, and we can eat and sell what 
the land gives us.
I came back home when I realised that 
I could not get work in the city, despite my 
qualification. Everything goes to foreigners, 
and the government doesn’t care. I never 
was part of the xenophobia, but many of the 
young men were fighting and killing each 
other. I understand that they are frustrated 
like me … but that violence helps nobody. 
Since I returned home, I have made 
some good friends here and we are making 
changes to our community that everyone 
can benefit from. We use collectives to give 
us better negotiating powers and to make 
the more expensive changes that we need. 
Allowing women more power was difficult 
for the older ones, but they have always been 
the best crop farmers, and that’s what’s 
bringing in most of the profits here. 
We have tried many new things. Water 
is scarce, but we are always looking for 
new solutions. I have been able to assist my 
grandmother to combine and grow some 
amazing seeds that are doing wonders on 
the family farm already. Our community 
has realised the blessing of the resources 
we have. The biggest challenge is how to do 
more with less.
My grandmother always talks about how 
much better life is now with her family 
to help her. I am glad that I can do this, 
but sometimes I wonder what I could have 
achieved if life in the city was different. 
Would I work in an office and be able to 
afford luxury? Would I have travelled? 
When I was young, I would look at maps and 
imagine all the places my education could 
take me. Who would have guessed it would 
have just brought me home!
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whether the economic growth of the 
last 250 years has been a trend or 
a unique episodic event in human 
history. Before 1750 there was almost 
no economic growth. While the 
rate of economic growth increased, 
peaking in the middle of the 20th 
Century, it has slowed down ever 
since. Some writers have suggested 
that rather than trying to stimulate 
the economy, it is time to accept that 
we may have reached a tipping point 
in economic history. Are we are now 
in a no-growth economy?5, 6, 7
Not all citizens are happy with a 
state driving policy in the “national 
interest”. It is the current cohort 
of voters who decide the fate of 
politicians, and there have been 
policy u-turns where voters were 
dissatisfied. Some have concerns 
about social engineering, or feel 
their personal choices should 
not be shepherded by a “nanny 
state”. Others are unwilling to be 
expected to compromise lifestyles 
in the present for the sake of future 
generations’ wellbeing, for example 
in countries where more sustainable 
energy policies have led to higher 
energy prices in the short term.
THE TRADITIONAL FINDS ITS 
WAY INTO NEW POLICY GOALS
Quality of life
With industrialisation, quality of 
life became associated with material 
conditions, especially income and 
consumption; by the 21st Century 
the connection was proving tenuous. 
Now, a country’s Gross National 
Happiness Index (GNHI) shows 
where policy changes are most 
needed, at individual, community or 
country level.4
The evolution from the GDP era 
to the wellbeing era has continued, 
with evidence of the objective 
benefits of subjective wellbeing 
mounting up. Happy people are 
healthier, more productive, better 
members of society and need less 
state support. Finance ministries 
have embraced ideas that reduce 
pressure on public finances. Many 
African countries are implementing 
policies designed to increase their 
GNHI and other measures of quality 
of life.
It has long been assumed that 
economic growth is a continuous 
process that will continue 
indefinitely. However, the notion of 
a no-growth economy calls attention 
to this assumption, and questions 
TRADITIONS MAKING A 
COMEBACK
Traditional African values have 
been reclaimed, and can nurture 
collective approaches and 
sharing behaviours, rather than 
individualism and “looking out for 
number one”. This finds expression 
in policies, public life and people’s 
pursuits. For example, traditional 
African jurisprudence seeks to 
resolve the issue, redress the harm 
and prevent its reoccurence.2 
Financial rules discourage profiting 
at the expense of the poor.3
Youths have become agents for 
national political reform based on 
the strengthening of traditional 
socio-cultural and political 
institutions. Leadership skills are 
grounded, as in earlier times, in 
family and communal roots where 
priority is placed on environmental 
stewardship, accountability, 
knowledge-sharing for community 
development and rebuilding trans-
generational bonds. 
But these principles can also be 
interpreted for ulterior interests, 
whatever the motive. In some 
hands, the baggage of the past can 
come with the rhetoric of moral 
regeneration and “family values”: 
social conservatism, patriarchy, 
prejudice and discrimination, 
such as on the grounds of sexual 
orientation. “Street justice” may 
condemn someone on the basis of 
social norms, rather than on the 
rules of evidence.
Far from being 
nostalgic for 
an obsolete 
tradition, the 
invocation of the 
ubuntu human 
rights philosophy 
is a credible 
challenge to 
the deadly logic 
of the pursuit 
of profit at 
the expense 
of preserving 
human life.1
Professor Mogobe 
Ramose, Discipline 
of Philosophy, 
University of 
South Africa
“We have consistently lacked the initiative to claim what we have. We need to transcend from manual ways of doing things into mechanised ways; we are less creative in mechanisation of innovation. Americans and Europeans have since copied our braiding and weaving art and have developed 
technologies to mechanise the art. Most musical instruments owe 
their origin to Africa, because music-making is at the heart of 
African culture. But when African slaves took their choreographic 
art to Europe, the Europeans were able to capture and perfect 
not only these instruments but even dance steps in a mechanised 
system of production and reproduction that enabled them to 
assert ownership.
Hon. Justice Olaterogun-Isola, Senior Judge of the Federal High Court, 
Nigeria (Open A.I.R. interview, 19 December 2011)
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Africa being water stressed, and 
Africa’s ecological assets being 
threatened by over-exploitation from 
within and without the continent, 
many countries started taking action 
ahead of the SDGs being settled. 
Working with a principle debated 
at SDG forums, they have set 
themselves an Ecological Budget10 
and are driving policies to remain 
within budget, such as:
The 2012 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and 
Development (Rio+20) set up a 
process to develop up to 12 goals 
akin to the MDGs. The Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) process 
took much longer than expected, 
stalled by countries pursuing narrow 
national interests, postponing the 
target year to 2040. With poor 
Africans being hardest hit by  
climate change, large parts of  
Sustainable Development Goals
“Even if, by force majeure, the population levels off […] the relatively extravagant lifestyle now enjoyed by the middle classes of North America, Western Europe and 
Japan cannot be attained by most 
of the rest of the world. The reason is 
that the impact of each country on 
the environment is multiplicative. It 
is dependent, in a complex manner, 
on a formula called PAT: population 
size times per capita affluence 
times a measure of the voracity of 
the technology used in sustaining 
consumption. The magnitude of 
PAT can be usefully visualised by the 
“ecological footprint” of productive 
land needed to support each 
member of the society with existing 
technology.9
E.O. Wilson, American biologist and 
proponent of sociobiology
Production and consumption 
patterns of the last century were 
unsustainable. The world population 
is close to 9 billion, and Africa’s 
population has nearly doubled 
since the early 2000s to about 2 
billion. If people aspired to a 20th 
Century Western standard of living, 
the planet’s ability to support life 
and social systems would collapse. 
Freshwater must be carefully 
stewarded, land must be looked 
after to keep producing food, and 
fish stocks must be safeguarded in 
a manner that ensures equitable 
enjoyment of resources. Africa is 
getting it right.
Generations living 
together. 
Photo: EC/ECHO/Anouk 
Delafortrie for EU 
Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection (Ivory 
Coast)
For less than 
a few dollars, 
land-use 
certificates can 
be implemented 
to reduce 
encroachment 
and improve soil 
conservation. 
For example, 
Ethiopia’s system 
for community-
driven land 
certification has 
been one effective 
way to improve 
land practices 
and a potential 
step toward the 
much broader 
reform of land 
policy that is 
needed in many 
African countries.8
Calestous Juma
GOING BACK TO THE BASICS TO FIND KNOWLEDGE
Historically handed down orally and learned experientially, African 
traditional knowledge (TK) and its related practices were previously 
undervalued, even sometimes by practitioners – perhaps because it 
was neither privately owned nor commercially monetised. Now its 
value is recognised in both urban and rural applications, in a time 
when sustainable development is imperative. The resilience of African 
TK systems and innovation is redemptive. There is a strong push for 
protection of TK against external exploitation, and knowledge-sharing 
under customary norms is thriving.
“Examples show that urban Africa is already adapting traditional values and knowledge to practical schemes for credit, land distribution, health delivery, education, sanitation, combating HIV/AIDS and a number of other issues. The irony is that urban Africa, faced with survival strategies to cope with a milliard of 
challenges, as it moves toward sustainability, is learning from traditional 
Africa so that local authorities re-learn communal values, indigenous 
knowledge and the importance of good urban governance and 
community solidarity.11
From an African Ministerial Conference on Housing and Urban Development, 
hosted by UN-Habitat in 2008
Where there is value, there might be misappropriation. Poorer 
communities might sell their birthright to private companies, settling 
for immediate upliftment and not having been informed that others 
will profit long into the future from their knowledge, now privatised.
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[T]he US has 
substantially 
raised incomes 
over the course of 
several decades 
without raising 
subjective 
measures of 
happiness.16
Jeffrey Sachs, 
Director of the 
Earth Institute, 
Columbia 
University
 n Sustainable finance criteria: 
Financial institutions are 
required to include sustainability 
criteria in their lending and 
investment conditions, at a 
minimum the performance 
standards of the World 
Bank’s International Finance 
Corporation. Besides regulation, 
business incentives include cost 
savings from using resources 
efficiently, avoiding reputational 
and other risks, and better access 
to markets.12
 n African Land Log: All large-scale 
land deals have to be recorded on 
this online database.13
 n Rural land-use planning: 
There is growing realisation 
that resilient environments 
do not arise spontaneously 
or organically, but need to be 
robustly planned upfront. Better 
social and ecological outcomes – 
particularly water and food 
security – need a systematic 
approach, which considers 
freshwater and terrestrial 
resources, and unfolding climate 
change impacts. This requires 
integration across sectors such 
as conservation, agriculture 
and forestry, and involves co-
operation and regulation in 
managing the transition. Some 
governments have begun to plan 
and manage rural, agricultural 
and wild land use at the level of 
an environmentally coherent 
landscape (which could be a 
biome, or a water catchment area, 
or a coastal/oceanic interface).
In some cases, integrated land-use 
programmes have been bungled or 
the trade-offs proved unmanageable. 
Land-use decisions are complex 
and involve many stakeholders 
with different priorities. Land may 
be simultaneously in demand by 
communities (as homelands or 
sacred sites), or for food or biofuel 
production, forest products, 
biodiversity conservation, urban 
development or carbon storage. 
This is further complicated by 
the interdependence between the 
production and consumption of key 
resources such as food, fibre, energy 
and water. Agriculture requires land, 
water and energy; water extraction 
and distribution require energy; and 
energy production often requires 
water.14
These policies have not been 
evenly effective. Integrated planning 
requires a strong, long-term vision 
and interdisciplinary thinking. This 
is not always politically expedient.
“Africa has abundant arable land and labor which, with sound policies, could be translated into increased production, incomes, and food security. This has not 
materialized because of lack of 
consistent policies and effective 
implementation strategies arising 
from the neglect of the sector.15
Calestous Juma
POLICIES PLAYING OUT IN 
AGRICULTURE
African agricultural systems are 
vindicating analysts’ expectations 
that “[t]he only agricultural system 
that will be able to confront future 
challenges is one that will exhibit 
Photo: Jan Hoffmann
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absorb more labour. Large-scale 
commercial farms creating 
artificial environments are less 
flexible in the face of erratic 
climatic patterns, in contrast with 
generations of local farmers who 
had to come to grips with the 
vagaries of nature. Traditional 
practices include planting multiple 
crops simultaneously with deeper 
roots and different characteristics, 
so ensuring that whatever the 
conditions there would be  
some food.
Subsistence farming has fed 
humanity for centuries, and 
smallholder agriculture provides 
greater food security. Globalisation 
has resulted in “the somewhat ironic 
twist of stimulating preferences for 
locally traditional dietary items”,20 
which has expanded the internal 
markets within regions in Africa. In 
the modern context of an economic 
geography with concentrated and 
high populations which require 
production and distribution on 
a mass scale, government and 
agricultural associations support 
experiments in hybrid agricultural 
models. 
“In agriculture, commercial has become a shorthand for “big”. Commercial farmers are generally assumed to be “largeholders” – typically, the big 
estates in Egypt, Kenya, South Africa 
or Zimbabwe. This is wrong. In purely 
economic terms, medium-scale farms 
are the hardest pressed to generate 
returns on investment: they require 
mechanised farming, without scope 
for significant economies of scale. In 
contrast, smallholders who labour by 
hand can be competitive – provided 
they secure access to markets. Tens 
of thousands of smallholders, for 
example, can achieve massive 
economies of scale by coordinating 
their crops and harvests.21
Mark Ashurst and Stephen Mbithi, 
African Research Institute
COMMONS-BASED RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT
Increasingly relevant for resilience 
and sustainability are time-
honoured commons systems of 
of agricultural biotechnology. 
Genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) introduced to Africa 
accidentally or by intervention, 
such as external agriculture 
support measures or food aid, have 
proved vulnerable to even slight 
fluctuations in temperature and 
weather patterns.18 Instead, farmers 
are cultivating plants and animals 
that are more resilient. These were 
preserved by smallholders in the 
hinterlands, but in fields they are 
threatened by disease, pests, natural 
disaster and civil conflicts. Gene 
banks are designed to hold major 
African food crops in trust for 
humanity under the auspices of the 
United Nations.19
Agricultural methods based on 
African TK are more sustainable 
than industrial agriculture, and 
high levels of diversity, productivity 
and efficiency”.17
“While we busy ourselves awarding honours to city corporate captains, we have failed to recognise that a lot of creativity goes on in the villages, for example via 
food preservations using traditional 
methods, yam banks, new methods 
of farming and preservation of 
genetic diversity.
Nobert Young, Nollywood actor, Lagos 
(Open A.I.R. interview)
Africa is leveraging its resilience 
to meet the need for sustainable 
management of biodiversity for food 
and agriculture, and to mitigate the 
effects of global mismanagement 
Terrace farming 
promotes 
conservation 
techniques 
that increase 
productivity  
of key crops.
Photo: Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation 
(Rwanda)
Transporting agricultural products. Photo: Jan Hoffmann
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models of co-operatives with values 
of self-help, equality and solidarity, 
and efforts in the early independence 
era to rebuild co-operatives as part 
of “village socialism” (Senghor of 
Senegal) or “African socialism” 
(Nyerere of Tanzania) and for 
higher productivity in agriculture 
(Houphouët-Boigny of Côte 
d’Ivoire).
PUSH AND PULL TO THE 
COUNTRYSIDE
The United Nations estimated that 
by 2050, two out of every three 
people will live in a city.25 In Africa, 
there are interesting ebbs and flows 
between urban centres and rural 
communities. In most countries, 
migration to cities has slowed and 
in some even reversed, continuing a 
trend which emerged in the 2010s.26 
This is due to diverse factors in 
different countries.
EXAMPLES OF RURAL  
IN-MIGRATION
Level of urbanisation as  
% of total population
COUNTRY 2001 2010 DROP
Kenya 34% 22% 12%
Tanzania 33% 26% 7%
Mauritania 59% 41% 18%
Senegal 48% 43% 5%
Source: UN-Habitat Urban Indicators27
In some cases, municipalities are 
unable to keep pace with service 
delivery, demands for water, and 
sewage systems, all which have been 
overloaded. The city is effectively 
gridlocked and job creation is 
 n overuse by too many people 
taking more from a resource 
that is already at its limit of 
sustainability
 n free-riding and opportunism 
by some who take advantage of 
the collective for personal gain: 
“local appropriators face the risk 
that any benefits they produce 
will be reaped by others who have 
not contributed to it.”
CO-OPERATIVE OWNERSHIP
In 2013, the International Co-
operative Alliance (established in 
1895) met in Africa for the first 
time and African countries played a 
leading role. The conference adopted 
a programme to take co-operatives 
to a position of being the preferred 
model and, as a result, the fastest-
growing form of enterprise by 2020. 
This found ready synergy on the 
continent, with its many indigenous 
resource management, utilising 
collective organisational structures 
fashioned locally. Examples of 
commons resources include fishing 
grounds, grazing lands, forests, and 
groundwater basins. Management 
of these requires collective effort, for 
example managing waste, clearing 
unwanted growth and repairing 
fences. Local African communities 
with a shared history of stewardship 
of resources are proving to be well-
suited to effectively managing the 
complexities of commons systems.
In a patchwork of different 
models to govern the commons and 
distribute resources, there are cases 
where management of commons 
structures has been ineffective, due 
to several dynamics:22
 n a lack of collectively agreed 
shared rules and defined 
boundaries, so that “no one 
knows what is being managed 
and by whom”
The co-operative phenomenon
An autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations, through a 
jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise.24
Definition from International Co-operative Alliance
In the early 21st Century, approximately 7% of Africans were members 
of co-operatives, and even in countries where some collapsed, such 
as Uganda and Rwanda, the numbers continued to grow. In 1995, 
there were only 554 co-operatives registered in Uganda; in the second 
decade of the 21st Century, there were nearly 7,500. In the early 2000s, 
community organisations and producer co-operatives were at the heart 
of expansion of organic export production in East Africa. Savings and 
credit co-operatives grew in many parts of Africa, eventually serving 
almost 10% of the population. Between 2007 and 2010, savings in such 
co-operatives grew by 34% and loans grew by 37%.24
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Left:
Traditional no-till 
agriculture retains 
more soil carbon 
and moisture 
than ploughing.
Photo: UN/B. Wolff 
(Tanzania)
Far left:
A canal built by 
the community.
Photo: Kelly Ramundo/
USAID (Ethiopia)
victims of “foreign invasion”, skewed 
government FDI strategies and 
endemic corruption. They are prone 
to xenophobic and unpredictable 
ventures aimed at reclaiming what 
they perceive as their national 
entitlement. According to one 
analysis, “grievances among 
the young are more likely to be 
expressed violently”.31
INTRA-AFRICAN DYNAMICS
Some regions have good 
endowments of water, reliable 
renewable energy potential, and 
arable land; in others, people are 
increasingly water stressed, food 
insecure and reliant on wood for 
fuel, leading to further deforestation. 
People tend to leave places of 
scarcity or conflict, wanting to move 
somewhere else. Governance is 
critical to how successfully countries 
are managing the challenges. 
For example, how are encounters 
between nomadic cattle-rearing 
communities from the Sahara, 
seeking water and grazing grounds 
in the savannah, and their sedentary 
crop-farming counterparts to be 
managed?
Boundaries are needed to manage 
large-scale commons resources, but 
climate change knows no borders. 
Lines drawn during colonisation 
lacked underlying geophysical or 
social rationales. Within some 
regions, countries have adopted an 
approach of human solidarity across 
borders, planning together for the 
movement of people, dropping visa 
requirements for fellow Africans 
and working together to tackle 
passed across generations. Youths 
are agents for facilitating pragmatic, 
even if accidental, combinations 
of formal science and technology 
with TK, especially in agricultural, 
medicinal and other spheres. They 
are experimenting with adaptation 
or inversion at the interface of 
new technologies and indigenous 
knowledge insights for solutions to 
local problems. A component of this 
creativity of youth is their interest 
in local entrepreneurship.30 This is 
a modern incarnation of Africa’s 
historic innovation credentials.
However, youthful energy 
with no constructive outlet can 
turn sour, and some countries are 
witnessing the most destabilising 
and negative manifestations. The 
youth bulge entering the labour 
market means competition for 
jobs is felt particularly sharply 
amongst this demographic, and 
they do not often have capital for 
entrepreneurship initiatives. Youth 
displacement, unemployment and 
underemployment are at an historic 
high in countries with a disconnect 
between empowered youth and job 
creation, and sound governance. 
Some youth are further disgruntled 
with corruption or low-growth 
policies, which deny them the 
potential for lifestyles long enjoyed 
by the developed world. Some 
youth in such circumstances have 
become agents of social tension and 
insecurity, and political instability.
Adding appeals to tribalism, 
religious fundamentalism or 
political extremism leads to a 
dangerous mix. Segments of the 
youth readily perceive themselves as 
turgid. This can to some extent be 
attributed to structural adjustment 
programmes in Africa from the late 
1970s, which led to job losses in the 
formal sector and the removal of 
public subsidies for food, housing, 
health and education.28 The erosion 
of urban standards of living and 
livelihood opportunities, and at 
times conflict over limited resources 
or against local government, 
has pushed many people back to 
ancestral lands where one can 
more easily feed and house oneself 
without cash and enjoy the safety net 
of traditional social networks. For 
some, agrarian ethnic identity is a 
comfort in a chaotic world.
People are choosing to move 
or return to rural areas because of 
economic vibrance and unforeseen 
opportunities. The support of 
extended family and the appeal of a 
rural quality of life stand in contrast 
to the compromises of city living.
YOUTH MOBILITY
A notable feature of these migrations 
is that it is mostly youth who are 
mobile, being both less tethered 
and more responsive to the pushes 
and pulls back to the countryside. 
This has resulted in an invigoration 
of trans-generational interaction, 
with increasing adaptation and 
experimentation with TK.
In the world of the 2030s, 
the youth of Africa are at the 
intersection of multiple possibilities, 
a product of the dialogic interactions 
between their formal education29 
and the inherited knowledge being 
Youth will have 
tremendous 
impact but 
they have to be 
empowered with 
knowledge on 
how to protect 
their innovation. 
Atypical thinking 
will be required 
for them to 
succeed, for 
example, training 
and retaining 
“non-poachable” 
human resources 
in small-scale 
businesses may 
mean recruiting 
under-performing 
[school 
graduates], 
drawing out and 
developing their 
innate skills.
Ada Ordor, Centre 
for Comparative 
Law in Africa, 
University of Cape 
Town (Open A.I.R. 
interview)
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“We can do without computers, we can do without automobiles, we can, if we have to, do without underpants. But we can’t do without food.
Delegate at 2012 conference on 
Feeding the World
There are instances where “the 
resource curse” (primary resource-
rich states characterised by a toxic 
combination of poor economic 
performance and low human 
development) persists; only the 
resources being exploited have 
changed. African governments and 
elites seeing opportunities to extract 
further rents have perpetuated the 
economic model that prevailed 
for primary resource exports. 
Western governments shop for 
discriminatory alliances, choosing 
their “friends” and “foes” and pitting 
African countries against each other 
in appeasing Western patrons. These 
governments’ uncritical courting 
of FDI in natural resources, in less 
than transparent circumstances, has 
expanded the trust gap and pitted 
citizens against political elites.35 
A festering of these trends feeds 
disaffection, which may flare up 
into conflict where populists stoke 
ethnic, religious and xenophobic 
feelings. Asymmetrical economic 
and political instability threatens 
pan-Africanism.
xenophobia.32 Biocapacity trade-offs 
are negotiated through regional 
economic communities – one 
country’s water for another’s arable 
land – in the absence of which 
there is the threat of cross-border 
resource-control alliances.
A SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA AGAIN
“The resources over which we fight in the future will not be oil, gold and diamonds: the wars of the future will be fought over water, food and land.
Ali Bongo Ondimba, President of 
Gabon, at 2012 Lancaster House 
Conference on Climate and Security
The prices paid for Africa’s fossil 
fuel exports are plateauing, as 
international regimes for climate 
change mitigation impose targets 
on the long-industrialised world.33 
However, Africa also offers vast 
solar, wind, hydro and gas energy 
resources, and both traditional 
and green energy multinationals 
seek to explore and exploit them.34 
More essential, Africa has greater 
biocapacity reserves relative to 
other continents. External investors 
are scrambling to secure access 
to water catchments and rivers 
and to agricultural land for food 
production. Even if these assets 
were to be in public hands, whose 
commons are they – the nation’s or 
all of humanity’s?
An area estimated as almost 
the size of Western Europe was 
transferred in land allocation 
deals from the mid-2000s to 
the 2010s. Deals reported as 
approved or under negotiation 
worldwide amounted to a total 
of 203 million hectares: 134 
million hectares of this total in 
Africa, 43 million hectares in 
Asia and 19 million hectares 
in Latin America. Researchers 
cross-checking these reports 
confirm the unprecedented 
scale of the land rush over the 
past decade.
The best agricultural 
land is often targeted for 
this acquisition. The rural 
poor are frequently being 
dispossessed of land and water 
resources they have held under 
customary tenure. Many cases 
show how the resource base 
of rural livelihoods is being 
squeezed through the loss of 
access to grasslands, forests 
and marshlands that are 
customarily held as common 
property. The poor are bearing 
disproportionate costs, but 
reaping few benefits, largely 
because of poor governance. 
The land rush is also leading to 
extensive conversion of natural 
ecosystems, with accompanying 
losses of ecosystem services and 
biodiversity.36
Photo opposite page left: USAID Africa 
Bureau/Wikimedia Commons (Nigeria)
Photo opposite page right:  
Kirsz Marcin/Shutterstock (Senegal)
Photo left: Jeffrey Attaway
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governments for change at local 
and national levels. Environmental 
pressures too have made African 
countries question economic 
openness, and many have put FDI 
controls and trade barriers in place.
For example, companies which 
do not conform to stewardship, 
sustainability or fair trade standards 
are turned away.41 Similar criteria 
apply in awarding government 
contracts. In some cases, foreigners 
are not allowed to own land, water 
basins may not be disrupted by 
invasive and polluting activities such 
as mining, and land earmarked for 
agriculture or grazing may not be 
used for other purposes.
The effectiveness of 
environmental certification 
programmes has not been proven 
over the longer term. Some argue 
that they perpetuate exploitation 
of ecological resources, merely 
under new rules of the game, 
which are easy to observe in the 
Africa had over 1 billion people, 
yet controlled only 2% of the global 
economy, in contrast to China, the 
world’s second-largest economy 
with a population of 1.3 billion 
people.38 Economic liberalisation 
under globalisation was foisted on 
Africa “before most governments 
had moved beyond the earliest stages 
of establishing an industrial and 
manufacturing base”.39 Unlike Asia, 
Africa had lacked the industrial, 
infrastructural and human capital 
base for sustainable competitiveness 
in a globalised economy.40
Africa is no longer so receptive 
to multinationals who see Africa 
as simply an “emerging market”. 
This may be motivated by the same 
drivers of the new African policy 
regimes, or by politicians’ sensitivity 
to the negative sentiments of their 
constituencies toward foreign 
business interests. The “losers” in 
Africa, unable to make a difference 
at a global level, have pushed their 
AFRICA BECOMES MORE 
PROTECTIONIST
“If we are culturally prepared to adapt again, we must ask what opportunity we are going to give it, how we will activate a new awareness of survival, what is the 
degree of resilience that we have …37
Nuria Sanz, Co-ordinator of UNESCO’s 
HEADS Thematic World Heritage 
Programme
Under globalisation, there were 
some winners and many losers. 
Africa was not, initially, one of 
the winners and globalisation did 
not lift Africa from its sobering 
socio-economic status. Africa was, 
in the 1990s and early 2000s, still 
the continent with the most least-
developed countries, and home to 
the most vulnerable populations 
lacking basic necessities of life. 
At the start of the 21st Century, 
Photos: Eric Miller/iAfrika 
Photos (top left Sudan, 
top right and right 
South Africa)
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chosen to migrate back particularly 
to Nigeria; and Lusophone Africa 
shared experiences of Portuguese 
colonialism with Brazil.43 This 
colours the nature of Brazilian 
engagements in Africa.
In contrast, some are suspicious 
of China’s motives or modes of 
operation in Africa. Afro-Chinese 
relations lack cultural bridging, 
and the Chinese diaspora in 
Africa is segregated linguistically 
and socially, both by itself and by 
host communities.44 Are China’s 
stated intentions of an exchange 
between equals – infrastructure 
for resources – genuine or 
opportunistic? Chinese workers 
are used on construction contracts, 
not locals. Regulation aims at the 
restriction of Chinese business 
operations,45 and Chinese businesses 
are accused of various underhand 
strategies.46
GLOBALISATION SPUTTERS
“Globalisation today is not working for many of the world’s poor. It is not working for much of the environment. It is not working for the stability of the global 
economy.47
Joseph  z, 2001 recipient of the Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
Initially, the success of free market 
capitalism that accompanied 
globalisation was so dominant that 
it appeared to be the only route to 
progress and development. However, 
What about the rest of the world?
HOW ARE SOUTH-SOUTH 
RELATIONSHIPS PANNING OUT?
Does it make any difference 
whether an opportunistic investor 
is from a developed, declining or 
developing country? When is a 
helping hand a masked fist? Does 
nationality determine when business 
competition is “healthy” and when it 
is “unfair”?
Alliances, such as BRICS, 
hoped to share access to markets 
and investments, technologies and 
learnings, and to stand together 
on common interests in the 
international arena. Certainly, trade 
volumes have grown in quantum 
leaps. Advances made on the 
other goals perhaps depend upon 
where one stands, politically and 
economically.
“Barefoot” entrepreneurs 
and innovators from developing 
countries who have similarly 
solved local challenges with 
rudimentary resources may benefit 
from interaction and informal 
technology transfer. This may 
happen by accident as workers from 
different countries encounter each 
other in Africa, or through study 
tours arranged government-to-
government.
In some cases there are historical 
ties which find resonance in a world 
reclaiming roots. Afro-Brazilian 
connections provide an example – 
many Brazilians’ ancestors were of 
West African origin, shipped out as 
slaves, and large populations have 
letter. For example, allowing for 
sustainable harvesting nevertheless 
implies deforestation, which takes 
threatened species over the brink 
and ultimately destroys local 
livelihoods. There are also criticisms 
of the low standards, lack of 
regulations or penalties, and how the 
certification organisations are run.
“Africa needs to be selective in choices arising from the global network exposures. … But if we have qualitative education … we can be more discerning and 
creatively selective regarding how 
we participate in the new networked 
society. … [W]e should recognise 
that we are also vehicles for cultural 
export, capable of influencing the 
new global village.
Charles Okafor, Nollywood actor, Lagos 
(Open A.I.R. interview)
There are a few cases where it 
would seem polities have become 
so inward-looking that there is a 
re-emergence of city states, semi-
dislocated from dependence on 
national infrastructure and systems. 
Renewable energy technologies 
(including waste-to-energy) have 
allowed cities to get off the national 
energy grid. Some of the most 
successful communities in the 
new context are those previously 
insulated from outside inputs and 
subtraction. In these new “walled” 
cities, there is a shift to using non-
monetised forms of barter, such as 
the exchange of “talents”.42
The first meeting 
of the BRICS 
Business Council 
in August 2013.
Photo: Kopano Tlape/
GovernmentZA
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too far removed from the nuances 
of resources and their carrying 
capacity, and also the strategies 
used by the many people who rely 
on the resources, to be able to make 
any meaningful representation and 
enable the necessary co-operation. 
The focus here is on subsidiarity. 
This is the principle whereby the 
most local, least centralised, smallest 
or lowest authority capable of 
making policy has policymaking 
and decision-making powers, 
constrained only by the impacts of 
its decisions and policies on others. 
Conflicts require formal resolution 
through agreed conflict-resolution 
mechanisms such as negotiation, 
collaboration and consensus, and 
fairness and equity are key skill 
sets. Transformation is required 
INNOVATION AND IP 
IMPLICATIONS
Sustaining communities in a world 
of scarcity
In this Sincerely Africa world, there 
is growing acceptance of resource 
constraints and the pressing need for 
reorganisation in order to achieve 
sustainable development. This 
paradigm encourages policymakers 
to look within for novel solutions 
to re-learn communal values, tap 
into indigenous knowledge and 
explore ways to achieve community 
solidarity. The result is much 
experimentation around new forms 
of governance and decentralised 
kinds of policymaking tools and 
processes. Centralised control is 
as the 21st Century progressed, 
globalisation’s successes are no 
longer so assured. One of the main 
problems was that “capital is more 
footloose across national borders 
than products, which are in turn 
more footloose than people”.48 
The result: massive inflows and 
outflows of capital, which led to 
global financial instabilities and 
unemployment. Countervailing 
forces are at work in the 2030s, 
and we see signs of a reversal of 
globalisation and a “post-growth 
economy” in the West.49
In the ICT sphere, there are 
increasing threats to the openness 
of the internet as governments 
reassert their sovereignty, potentially 
creating new geographic boundaries 
online.50
Photo: International Rivers (D
RC
)
Photo: africa924/Shutterstock (Zam
bia)
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do not respect spiritual or cultural 
traditions. They must be coerced by 
laws that mandate prior informed 
consent to explore and exploit 
Africa’s biodiversity.
One such legal rule requires 
any patent applicant for a 
biotechnological innovation to 
provide proof of consent to use 
the genetic resources or TK, and a 
promise to equitably share benefits 
with the source community. This 
obligation becomes binding on 
foreign multinational companies 
through sustainable development 
agreements. 
Similar challenges exist 
regarding the misappropriation 
of cultural heritage. In the case of 
folklore, for example, the challenge 
is to stop community outsiders from 
taking African cultures or traditions 
and marketing them without 
permission, especially to African 
diaspora, researchers and users in 
major foreign markets. Adequate 
protection against this practice 
exists only in countries that have 
implemented the new legal rules 
governing TK.
TK and the commons
Traditional knowledge (also called 
indigenous knowledge), which 
includes traditional medicinal, 
ecological and other knowledge, 
as well as folklore and traditional 
cultural expressions (e.g. beadwork, 
music, designs), is not, as is so 
often assumed, in the public 
domain. Indigenous and local 
communities are the custodians 
of such knowledge, and have in 
Bioprospecting, cultural heritage 
and benefit sharing
Sincerely Africa sees the continent 
once again subject to resource grabs 
by foreigners. This time, it is not 
Africa’s precious natural resources 
or its people that others are after; 
it is the continent’s biodiversity. In 
a world of scarcity and ecological 
sensitivity, African biodiversity has 
become one of its biggest assets. 
African communities are able to 
leverage traditional ecological, 
agricultural and medicinal 
knowledge to build long-term 
sustainable communities. But in 
plant, animal and human genetic 
resources also lie the keys to solving 
some of the world’s most pressing 
challenges, from population health 
to food security. Companies and 
countries outside of Africa engage 
in extensive “bioprospecting” of 
African genetic resources. In some 
cases, foreigners engage in blatant 
“biopiracy”, while in other cases, 
access is provided on mutually 
agreed terms with benefit sharing.
How genetic resources and 
associated TK are controlled –
through careful stewardship or 
commercial exploitation – depends 
largely on international legal 
frameworks. While community 
customs and social norms are 
powerful sources of authority, 
only those people who share 
similar values respect these rules. 
Community values are based more 
on identity than locale, though 
the two features are often, but not 
always, intertwined. Outsiders 
who do not share the same values 
from a competitive winner-takes-
all mode to a world where humans 
acknowledge their reliance on 
others and on a single shared 
planet. Regardless of how many 
people there are on the planet, the 
earth’s capacity to meet the needs 
of its inhabitants is finite: with few 
exceptions, there is a fixed amount 
of stuff to consume and share. 
In the Sincerely Africa world, 
with its requirement for prosperity 
without growth, Africa has the 
opportunity to thrive. Lacking 
the legacy costs, obsolete systems 
and unsustainable behaviours 
of most of the rest of the world, 
Africa has the potential to leapfrog 
into an uncharted, sustainable 
future. Africa’s diaspora has a 
critical role to play here. Many 
foreign-trained graduates who have 
acquired academic knowledge and 
professional experience abroad, 
return to Africa (physically or 
virtually) to reconnect with their 
cultural and spiritual roots. What 
they have learned – particularly what 
not to do – enables them to bring 
comparative advantage and to bridge 
different worlds. This knowledge 
stands African communities in 
good stead. Combined with the 
democratic dividend provided 
by Africa’s youth at a time of 
transformational change, there are 
new opportunities for innovation 
at every level. Ultimately, Africa’s 
transition to increased sustainable 
development is led by its young 
people. 
 n How to overcome historic or emerging racial, ethnic and religious differences for co-operation 
across communities?
 n How to collectively manage shared environmental resources while avoiding a tragedy of the 
commons?
 n Is it possible to successfully create or redefine new kinds of wealth in an economic era of low  
or no growth?
 n Can commons-based systems stop outsiders from misappropriating genetic resources, cultural 
heritage and traditional knowledge?
Key uncertainties
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the Digitising Traditional Culture 
in Kenya project, as part of WIPO’s 
Creative Heritage Project.54 Similar 
initiatives spread throughout the 
continent during the two and half 
decades since 2010.
place customs to ensure that the 
transmission of knowledge is not 
freely available to all, yet that it is 
passed on from one generation to the 
next. In short, generally, most types 
of TK are “kept within the custody 
of a selected few, to the exclusion of 
all others.”51 The policy challenge is 
therefore twofold: to limit situations 
where TK commercialisation takes 
place without prior informed 
consent and benefit sharing; and to 
ensure TK is preserved for future 
generations. 
One approach to overcoming 
these challenges – a TK “commons” 
structure – has both a positive and 
defensive function, i.e. it enables 
commonly held TK to be more 
formally shared and preserved, but 
also enforced, by the indigenous 
and local community in question. 
In India, for example, the Council 
of Scientific and Industrial 
Research maintains the Traditional 
Knowledge Digital Library, a 
digital database which not only 
captures the TK information, but 
also enables it to be checked against 
patent applications.53 Based on this 
model, a successful initiative to 
document TK took off in Kenya. It 
involved trying to capture the TK 
of the Kenyan Maasai community 
in Laikipia, under the auspices of 
The Kukula Healers in South Africa
The Kukula Healers – a grouping of traditional medicinal practitioners 
in rural Bushbuckridge, South Africa – take a “commons” approach to 
their TK. The Healers have a bio-cultural community protocol (BCP), 
through which they protect their shared knowledge and regulate 
collaborations with outsiders.
“In 2011, in line with the provisions of the BCP, the Kukula Healers negotiated a non-disclosure agreement and agreed to share plant material with the South African cosmetics and bedding company Godding and Godding.52Gino Cocchiaro, Johan Lorenzen, Bernard Maister and Britta Rutert,  
Open A.I.R. researchers
Thus, the Kukula Healers are managing to look both inwards and 
outwards. They are strongly bound to their local conditions and 
customary law, but at the same time, are open to doing business, on 
their own terms, with outsiders who see untapped potential in the 
Healers’ local knowledge.
Groupings such as the Kukula Healers are ubiquitous, and 
increasingly powerful in the Sincerely Africa world.
Photo: Gino Cocchiaro, 
Natural Justice: Lawyers 
for Communities and 
the Environment
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Valuable knowledge
Sustainability in this world requires a holistic 
understanding of the complex relationships and 
interdependencies between natural systems. A key 
focus is on slow variables: long-term variations that 
take decades or centuries to evolve, and upon which 
ecosystems of all types rely – and which, unlike fast 
variables, are difficult to quantify and discern.
Solutions to sustainability challenges apply TK in 
new contexts: they depend on the physical and human 
resources available at a particular time and place. The 
knowledge must serve the community from which it 
emerges, and must be visible to the community as a 
whole. Communities are collectively, collaboratively 
organised. Intergenerational knowledge is woven 
together in novel ways, and perhaps combined with 
contributions of global knowledge from a diaspora that 
increasingly values Africa’s rich endowments.
The bases for thinking and knowledge are customary 
beliefs and world views. There is seldom a distinction 
between the individual and the collective. Collective 
values underpin individuals’ customary practices, 
traditions and stewardship of local resources and 
ecosystems, and these same collective values govern 
what can and cannot be done with local knowledge.
Innovation in this world centres on finding innovative 
ways to make do, and do more, with less – on finding 
labour-intensive, non-materials-intensive ways to 
survive and thrive on a communal, shared basis. 
Innovations tend to rely on traditional, proven methods 
and processes, or new solutions created from within the 
community to address local problems. Innovations in 
this world link knowledge from multiple sources to find 
unique community successes. There is a constant search 
and experimentation for new technologies to provide 
novel solutions to shared human problems, within the 
particular context of place and community.
The innovations in this world are context-specific: 
what matters is not what you are making but how you 
are doing it, and how sustainable what you are doing 
is in the medium to long term. Central to innovation 
is a need for reduced energy reliance coupled with 
improving productivity. African innovators’ long 
experience of low-energy-consumption livelihood 
development puts them at an advantage relative to 
innovators on other continents, but the challenge is 
where the boundaries are drawn and how to avoid free-
riding and gaming of the system.
The paradox this world presents is that while knowledge 
and ideas are abundant, natural resources are not. The 
notion of private property can be particularly alluring 
in this world of scarcity. IP and knowledge governance 
systems thus need to be driven more by moral, ethical, 
spiritual and cultural values than by economic 
principles if they are to maximise collaboration and 
shared benefit.
This world’s knowledge governance is grounded in 
specific solutions necessary to manage the commons-
based resource systems. There is a tendency to respect 
traditional values and customs, and to agree to formal 
conflict-resolution mechanism, such as adjudication or 
arbitration by a neutral party, that will be honoured by 
all parties. Sometimes these mechanisms are legal; other 
times they are cultural.
With regard to IP rights, it is clear that many 
“Western” IP laws are unsuitable in this scenario. 
Patents, based on novelty, an identifiable inventor 
and other contextually insensitive requirements, or 
copyrights, also requiring authorship and manifestation 
in material form, cannot capture the social, cultural or 
economic value of collective innovation and creativity 
in this world. Worse, patents and copyrights can be used 
as tools for community outsiders to misappropriate the 
benefits of African knowledge.
However, there are sui generis IP possibilities, 
including establishment of TK commons arrangements, 
with digital TK databases and libraries, to 
simultaneously protect communal TK and allow access 
to it on terms beneficial to the innovating community,55 
or setting up of legal trusts to manage TK locally  
while ensuring that any use by outsiders complies  
with their norms and values, and provides benefits  
to the community.
Intellectual property
Innovation and creativity
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Insights 
and 
analysis
Within each scenario, the range  
of possibilities varies on a 
continuum from mild to extreme, 
depending on the unit of analysis. 
Aspects of different scenarios 
are likely to be observable 
simultaneously in particular 
regions, countries and cities, or 
in particular sectors, industries 
and innovative activities. Certain 
features of one scenario may exist 
to a greater or lesser extent in 
others as well. It is also possible 
that these features may recombine 
in unanticipated ways, leading to 
unimagined scenarios. However, 
through our extensive research, 
wide consultation and creative 
process, we have constructed 
a set of three scenarios that we 
believe are internally coherent, 
comparatively rich, and tell the 
three dominant stories of African 
innovation and development.  
How do they compare?
SCENARIO COMPARISONS
Sincerely
Africa
Informal –
the new 
normal 
Wireless
engagement
Uncertainties about ...
A world where …
Enterprises are 
interconnected with the 
global service-oriented 
economy, young business 
leaders form a vocal 
middle class, and citizens 
hold governments 
accountable
Except for ...
Uneducated or 
under-resourced 
individuals who cannot 
conform to homogenous 
A world where ...
Building inclusive education 
systems, maintaining technological 
infrastructure, and regulating 
market competition
Measured by ...
Short-term return on investment, 
and outputs that capture eﬃciency, 
accountability, transparency and 
interoperability
Challenges are ...
How to narrow the digital divide, ensuring that better 
governance translates into inclusive development?
How to design education systems that teach standard skills 
but also encourage experimentation and critical thinking?
Is a “silicon savannah” simply modelled on geographic clusters 
in the developed world, or are African innovation hubs distinct?
Can tensions between proprietary and open business models 
and associated policy frameworks be resolved in Africa’s 
favour?
Enterprises are interconnected 
with the global, service-oriented 
economy, young business leaders 
from a vocal middle class and 
citizens hold governments 
accountable
Except for ...
Uneducated or under-resourced 
individuals who cannot conform to 
homogenous technical, legal and 
socio-economic standards
A world where …
Enterprises are 
interconnected with the 
global service-oriented 
economy, young business 
leaders form a vocal 
middle class, and citizens 
hold governments 
accountable
Except for ...
Uneducated or 
under-resourced 
individuals who cannot 
conform to homogenous 
Transparently managing revenue 
and taxation, enforcing safety and 
security standards, and supporting 
intersectoral connections 
Measured by ...
Social networks that promote both 
self-interest and collective 
opportunity, often invisible to those 
looking at output-related indicators
How to avoid dysfunction while managing the “organised 
chaos” that exploits instead of suppresses the informal 
sector’s virtues?
How to determine the level of government best suited to 
deliver essential public goods and services?
Is there a digital or formalised equivalent to the face-to-face 
interpersonal networks of trust based on proximity?
Can any intellectual property protections be enforced if 
informal strategies don’t ensure fair competition?
Dynamic informalities cross 
societies, and ideas recombine 
within social networks built on 
interpersonal trust, trigg ring 
innovations adapted to 
relentless change
Except for ...
Those people unable to establish 
local grassroots relationships, who 
fail to build thriving businesses or 
wiel  social influence
A world where …
Enterprises are 
interconnected with the 
global service-oriented 
economy, young business 
leaders form a vocal 
middle class, and citizens 
hold governments 
accountable
Except for ...
Uneducated or 
under-resourced 
individuals who cannot 
conform to homogenous 
Ensuring population health, food 
security and environmental 
sustainability in a no or low-growth 
economy
Measured by ...
Stewardship of valuable resources 
over time, considering whether an 
identified community can sustain a 
thriving self-contained unit
How to overcome historic or emerging racial, ethnic and 
religious diﬀerences for co-operation across communities?
How to collectively manage shared environmental resources 
while avoiding a tragedy of the commons?
Is it possible to successfully create or redefine new kinds of 
wealth in an economic era of low or no growth?
Can commons-based systems stop outsiders from 
misappropriating genetic resources, cultural heritage and 
traditional knowledge?
Communities r interpret 
traditional knowledge systems, 
and sustainably manage biological 
resource riches in respon e to 
global instabilities and external 
pressures
Except for ...
Outsiders lacking community roots 
or shared id ntities, who lose the 
ability to participate socially, 
politically nd ec nomically
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SCENARIO COMPARISONS
Sincerely
Africa
Informal –
the new 
normal 
Wireless
engagement
Uncertainties about ...
A world where …
Enterprises are 
interconnected with the 
global service-oriented 
economy, young business 
leaders form a vocal 
middle class, and citizens 
hold governments 
accountable
Except for ...
Uneducated or 
under-resourced 
individuals who cannot 
conform to homogenous 
A world where ...
Building inclusive education 
systems, maintaining technological 
infrastructure, and regulating 
market competition
Measured by ...
Short-term return on investment, 
and outputs that capture eﬃciency, 
accountability, transparency and 
interoperability
Challenges are ...
How to narrow the digital divide, ensuring that better 
governance translates into inclusive development?
How to design education systems that teach standard skills 
but also encourage experimentation and critical thinking?
Is a “silicon savannah” simply modelled on geographic clusters 
in the developed world, or are African innovation hubs distinct?
Can tensions between proprietary and open business models 
and associated policy frameworks be resolved in Africa’s 
favour?
Enterprises are interconnected 
with the global, service-oriented 
economy, young business leaders 
from a vocal middle class and 
citizens hold governments 
accountable
Except for ...
Uneducated or under-resourced 
individuals who cannot conform to 
homogenous technical, legal and 
socio-economic standards
A world where …
Enterprises are 
interconnected with the 
global service-oriented 
economy, young business 
leaders form a vocal 
middle class, and citizens 
hold governments 
accountable
Except for ...
Uneducated or 
under-resourced 
individuals who cannot 
conform to homogenous 
Transparently managing revenue 
and taxation, enforcing safety and 
security standards, and supporting 
intersectoral connections 
Measured by ...
Social networks that promote both 
self-interest and collective 
opportunity, often invisible to those 
looking at output-related indicators
How to avoid dysfunction while managing the “organised 
chaos” that exploits instead of suppresses the informal 
sector’s virtues?
How to determine the level of government best suited to 
deliver essential public goods and services?
Is there a digital or formalised equivalent to the face-to-face 
interpersonal networks of trust based on proximity?
Can any intellectual property protections be enforced if 
informal strategies don’t ensure fair competition?
Dynamic informalities cross 
societies, and ideas recombine 
within social networks built on 
interpersonal trust, trigg ring 
innovations adapted to 
relentless change
Except for ...
Those people unable to establish 
local grassroots relationships, who 
fail to build thriving businesses or 
wiel  social influence
A world where …
Enterprises are 
interconnected with the 
global service-oriented 
economy, young business 
leaders form a vocal 
middle class, and citizens 
hold governments 
accountable
Except for ...
Uneducated or 
under-resourced 
individuals who cannot 
conform to homogenous 
Ensuring population health, food 
security and environmental 
sustainability in a no or low-growth 
economy
Measured by ...
Stewardship of valuable resources 
over time, considering whether an 
identified community can sustain a 
thriving self-contained unit
How to overcome historic or emerging racial, ethnic and 
religious diﬀerences for co-operation across communities?
How to collectively manage shared environmental resources 
while avoiding a tragedy of the commons?
Is it possible to successfully create or redefine new kinds of 
wealth in an economic era of low or no growth?
Can commons-based systems stop outsiders from 
misappropriating genetic resources, cultural heritage and 
traditional knowledge?
Communities r interpret 
traditional knowledge systems, 
and sustainably manage biological 
resource riches in respon e to 
global instabilities and external 
pressures
Except for ...
Outsiders lacking community roots 
or shared id ntities, who lose the 
ability to participate socially, 
politically nd ec nomically
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Comparing 
scenarios
The three scenarios described in this document encapsulate many, but 
not all, of the issues facing Africa today. As there is no single Africa, there 
is no single shared future. So the key is to understand, or at least consider, 
several distinct, but equally plausible scenarios.
CONVERGING AND DIVERGING 
DRIVING FORCES
Our research has identified five 
major forces simultaneously driving 
Africa in multiple, uncertain 
directions. Driving forces will 
impact the perception of progress, 
the shape of innovation systems and 
the governance of knowledge. How 
these forces converge or diverge 
will determine which scenario will 
dominate the future in specific 
places at specific times. The five 
driving forces are:
Global relationships:  
the countless interconnections  
and interdependencies that span 
the globe to unite its people –  
or distance them.
Will these relationships be 
collaborative, competitive or 
coercive – and who benefits?
Statehood and governance:  
the role of the state in relation 
to citizens, balancing the innate 
tension between individual rights 
and freedoms and state power.
Will African governance 
be cohesive, challenging or 
communal – and to serve whose 
interests?
THE SCENARIOS
WIRELESS ENGAGEMENT INFORMAL – THE NEW NORMAL SINCERELY AFRICA 
Countries in Africa have strong 
international roles, and African 
enterprise is interconnected 
with the global service-oriented 
economy. Savvy, young, educated 
and mobile business leaders are 
forming a new and vocal middle 
class. Engaged citizens are able 
to participate both politically 
and economically, so holding 
their governments accountable. 
Uneducated or under-resourced 
individuals are excluded by their 
inability to conform to homogenous 
technical, legal and socio-economic 
standards.
Dynamic informalities cross 
every aspect of African societies – 
economically, politically and 
socially. Increasingly diverse 
regions of the continent are 
constantly changing, impacting 
and impacted by the endless ways 
in which people pursue their 
livelihoods. Ideas constantly 
recombine within communities 
built upon interpersonal trust, 
triggering innovations adapted to 
this relentless change. Who you 
know matters more than what 
you know. Those people unable 
to establish local grassroots 
relationships will fail to build 
thriving businesses or social 
influence.
Global instabilities and external 
pressures allow Africans to focus 
inward, building strength by 
exploiting for themselves valuable 
endowments including a youthful 
population and natural resource 
riches. With scarcity threatening 
the rest of the world, African 
societies ensure sustainability by re-
engaging and reinterpreting their 
traditional knowledge systems and 
socio-cultural institutions. Who 
you are matters most. Outsiders 
lacking community roots lose 
the ability to participate socially, 
politically and economically.
As you read these comparisons, 
remember, scenarios are stories 
about the future that help us 
make better decisions about the 
present. They challenge our implicit 
assumptions and beliefs to promote 
explicit strategic conversations about 
new ways of thinking. Turbulence is 
inevitable, and creates either threats 
or opportunities for those willing 
and able to anticipate and adapt – or 
not, as the case may be. Ideally, the 
scenarios will trigger a shift from a 
reactive approach to road mapping a 
path for a sustainable future.
124 Knowledge and Innovation in Africa – Scenarios for the Future
MILESTONES AND METRICS
WIRELESS ENGAGEMENT INFORMAL – THE NEW NORMAL SINCERELY AFRICA 
The rationale of the interconnected 
market economy that underpins 
this world is based on efficiency 
and return on investment. Success 
depends on a combination of 
skill and opportunity, of which 
standardised education is the key 
determinant. The metrics that 
matter here focus on outputs and 
capture efficiency, accountability, 
transparency and interoperability.
A vibrant, informal economy 
depends on networks that 
simultaneously promote 
self-interest and community 
opportunity. Many successful actors 
are likely to be invisible to observers 
looking at output-related indicators, 
although some who scale their 
activities will gain profile. Surveys 
of the formal sector, national 
statistics and financial metrics 
under-represent the richness of 
informality.
This paradigm involves stewardship 
of valuable resources by 
intergenerational communities, 
linked by space, time and identity. 
Behaviours are co-ordinated, 
collectively monitored and enforced 
by social norms that implicitly 
acknowledge the long-term nature 
of systemic interactions. Prosperity 
will be measured over time, 
considering whether an identified 
community can sustain a thriving 
yet self-contained unit.
RATIONALES
Every scenario is dominated by 
an implicit set of rationales, a 
logical basis for a course of action 
or a particular belief. This creates 
the lens through which the world 
is perceived, the definitions and 
milestones of success, and the 
metrics that are chosen to measure 
progress. What are the predominant 
paradigms underpinning each 
scenario?
Identities and differences: the 
values that evolve in the face of 
social, political and economic 
changes taking place at global, 
local and personal levels. 
Will multiplicity, fluidity or 
stability hold sway as African 
identities and values evolve?
Infrastructure and technology: 
disruptive enablers to leapfrog 
conventional structures, and 
methods to create new economic, 
social and political development 
and disrupt the status quo. 
Will infrastructure and technology 
investment be inclusive, strained or 
reconceived?
Employment and livelihoods:  
the ability to create opportunities 
for a growing workforce, so 
providing the means to reduce 
poverty and create economic 
growth, social empowerment or 
even social cohesion.
Will African economies diversify, 
informalise or reconfigure to 
meet the needs of the increasingly 
youthful population?
In addition to these driving forces, 
there are several possible wild 
cards or shocks that would catapult 
Africa into a different future at 
present entirely unforeseen. These 
include violence, military action 
and terrorism; major clashes of 
civilisations or religions; epic natural 
disasters or climate changes beyond 
predicted extremes; or human, 
animal or agricultural pandemics.
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TRUST
WIRELESS ENGAGEMENT INFORMAL – THE NEW NORMAL SINCERELY AFRICA 
In a rule-based wireless world, 
online verification provides access 
to those with the same skill sets and 
interests, so enabling the emerging 
middle class and civil society to 
create a strong government. Trust 
is impersonal and facilitated 
via digital intermediaries, most 
likely transnational corporations. 
There will be a strong drive for 
interoperability that comes with 
shared standards, and there is 
likely to be growing demand for 
open standards that are globally 
recognised. This creates an inclusive 
world, but only for a small minority 
with the potential, skills and 
networks of access. The relative size 
of this “insider” minority depends 
on the size of the middle, and 
the extent to which advancement 
is based on individual ability or 
achievement. What matters for 
society as a whole are relationships 
with the “outsiders”, i.e. the mass of 
excluded and disengaged Africans.
In an informal world based on 
interpersonal relations, trust 
is socially and economically 
determined, “because I know 
someone you know”. A handshake 
is the main method of contract, 
and for the many Africans who are 
illiterate or lack formal education, 
tacit and social norms work well.
There is no middle, and the 
formal and informal are separate, 
yet interdependent, systems. They 
exist in parallel universes until 
some mutual benefit becomes 
apparent, at which point a 
pragmatic symbiotic relationship 
materialises.
Trust is personal but also intra-
group, not interspersed across 
society at large. Reputation matters 
a great deal, as competition is 
fierce within groups and between 
groups. The size of the community 
of trust is constantly evolving in 
this world, and among the greatest 
uncertainties is whether and how 
interpersonal networks may be 
affected by impersonal ICTs.
There are no standardised responses 
in this world, as it is based on 
local context; every case is unique 
and geographically and socially 
determined. There is no “right” 
way to do things, simply ways 
that work within a given context. 
Trust here is two-way based on 
independent and interdependent 
co-operative associations of 
individuals voluntarily committed 
to meeting shared economic, social 
and cultural needs and wants. 
They will have a set of values and 
norms determined collectively and 
in common for the benefit of the 
fair sharing of resources. Where 
the group is able, there will be 
strong sanctions against those that 
flout social norms. Group size will 
depend on its ability to maintain 
a strong boundary and protect its 
assets. Where the group is large it 
is likely to have a nested structure 
of rules within rules. Stigma and 
shame are likely to be used to 
enforce co-operative behaviour.
TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL 
NORMS
Trust is both the glue that binds 
groups of people together and the 
lubricant that enables them to 
undertake collective action without 
transaction costs or a thicket of 
inflexible rules and regulations. 
It is built upon three interrelated 
components: efficiency, fairness 
and consistency. Without these 
components, coercion is required  
to get results.
Climate change
What happens in relation to climate change? The following attitudes 
could prevail:
 n Wireless engagement: Climate change is perceived as a great new 
market opportunity – those with money and ability stand to gain.
 n Informal the new normal: Responses will depend on synergies 
between the formal and informal economy and the strength of 
informal network ties.
 n Sincerely Africa: Without entrenched legacy costs and vested 
interests that hobble other continents, climate change is met with  
a new, sustainable road map.
126 Knowledge and Innovation in Africa – Scenarios for the Future
TENSIONS
WIRELESS ENGAGEMENT INFORMAL THE NEW NORMAL SINCERELY AFRICA 
In a world of wireless engagement, 
tensions exist between the silos 
of knowledge embedded in the 
hierarchical industrial-bureaucratic 
rule-based impersonal logic, 
and the faster, networked and 
interdependent knowledge-
interactive modes of social 
production.
The tensions are likely to be 
most marked along the interface 
between the individualised 
knowledge workers dealing with 
contextual specificity and the 
global, impersonal system, with 
stresses across dimensions of speed 
and geography. Multinationals may 
require interoperability to optimise 
global value chains. Knowledge-
interactive entrepreneurs may find 
ample opportunities in global value 
chains, if they can interoperate with 
dominate technological, economic 
and legal standards.
With informality being normal, 
tensions are likely to be most 
marked along the interface 
between the formal rule-based 
bureaucracy and its fluid, informal 
counterpart. Stresses lie in the 
very nature of knowledge of 
value and its governance, and the 
polarised interdependent modes 
of production, each with its own 
tools, work roles, relationships and 
organisations. For the formal sector 
workers, employment provides 
certainty, rules are known and 
knowledge is generally universally 
applicable and stable. For their 
counterparts in the informal 
sector, there is no certainty of 
employment – everything is 
dynamic and constantly changing. 
Knowledge of value is immediate 
and tacit, based on individual 
intuition and hunches shared 
between the informal networks of 
trust.
Tensions may be less dramatic, 
as both craft-independent and 
knowledge-interactive modes of 
production are more individualised, 
sharing a learned logic based on 
experimentation and experience.
This form of knowledge is likely 
to be anathema to the industrial-
bureaucrat, as it emphasises a 
holistic independent approach, 
often unstructured and fluid, 
responding to external stimuli and 
valuing independence of thought, 
rather than a discrete rules-based 
universalised solution attempting to 
command and control the situation.
Modes of knowledge 
distribution are self-organised 
and context specific, dependent 
on natural and human resources, 
the needs and organisation of the 
group, and the geographic scale in 
question.
WINNERS AND LOSERS IN EVERY SCENARIO
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Transnational standard-setting 
corporations, supported locally by 
favourable business and education 
policies, dominate the globally 
interconnected marketplace.
The winners in the world 
of wireless engagement are 
international investors, national 
policymakers, and local 
entrepreneurs with the skills and 
connections necessary to access 
opportunities that arise in this 
open, networked, digital world.
The losers are those with 
insufficient education, skills or 
access to affordable technology to 
interconnect, or those whose skills 
become obsolete overnight.
Power lies with people operating 
beyond the effective reach of 
state control. Although urban 
settings reflect the most vibrant 
kaleidoscope of relationships, 
traders circulate goods as well 
as knowledge throughout rural 
communities and across borders. 
The winners are those who can 
use interpersonal networks to 
adapt to constantly shifting 
circumstances. They are relatively 
insulated from the instability of 
the formal economy around them. 
Those people who lack trusting 
interpersonal relationships, or who 
are ejected from a shrinking formal 
sector, lose opportunities.
Community-based social and 
economic systems, often with 
strong rural ties, are where most 
opportunities for sustainable 
development lie. Winners in this 
scenario have access to natural 
and social capital, and are able to 
impose boundaries to protect and 
control their resources. 
Outsiders lacking community 
ties are marginalised. The same 
fate befalls people in communities 
without resources, perhaps due to 
the after-effects of conflict, or those 
in temporarily successful enclaves 
who cannot protect their limited 
resources against exploitation by 
outsiders.
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MODE OF PRODUCTION
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Industrial-bureaucratic
and
Knowledge-interactive 
Industrial-bureaucratic
and
Craft-independent 
Craft-independent
and
Knowledge-interactive
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION
Knowledge governance is 
intertwined with the social, 
economic, political and 
technological contexts shaping 
innovation systems, including 
dominant economic modes 
of production. Our historical 
contextual analysis reveals that for 
every period in Africa’s history, 
there is a dominant approach to 
knowledge that forms the basis of 
innovation. How this knowledge is 
governed, owned and shared impacts 
progress within that period of time. 
Conflicting and co-existing modes 
of knowledge production can be 
divided along three general themes:1
Craft-independent: Historically, 
craft production required the use 
of physical tools, apprenticeship 
training, and guild or association 
membership. While the tools 
may have changed, many modern 
industries and professions retain 
the model of knowledge production 
and transfer through practical 
skills training and interpersonal 
relationships.
Industrial-bureaucratic: Scale 
and efficiency in many contexts 
depend on hierarchical relationships 
and standardised individual 
outputs. Workers must follow rules 
in formatted roles, so productivity 
can be categorised, defined and 
measured. Valuable knowledge is 
discrete, replicable and homogenous, 
because interoperability is 
paramount.
Knowledge-interactive: 
Information and communications 
technologies have created a new 
mode of production, based on 
constant revision, reinterpretation 
and reinvention. ICTs facilitate 
continuous learning, and enable 
groups previously atomised 
to interact across disciplines 
and functions, simultaneously 
interacting, collaborating and 
co-creating with stakeholders to 
innovate and improve. Valuable 
knowledge is likely to be time- and 
context-bound.
In each of the Open A.I.R. 
scenarios, there are predominantly 
two modes of production competing 
for dominance, each characterised 
by different and conflicting tools, 
work roles, relationships and 
organisations. This competition will 
usually be very fierce, as each mode 
of production is linked to different 
interest groups, each with their own 
ethos and a firm belief in their way 
as being the only modus operandi.
However, what is of particular 
importance for this document is that 
each mode of production will have 
different attitudes to what knowledge 
has value and therefore also the 
issues of openness, development and 
intellectual property.
Gender dynamics
In the gender dynamic, both men 
and women are the poorer when 
gender and sexuality are rendered 
one-dimensional. For some, life 
itself is threatened.
As an issue for development 
and equality, there are three 
dimensions of gender imbalance, 
namely the ability to accumulate 
endowments such as education, 
health and physical assets; the 
ability to gain access to economic 
opportunities; and agency, 
the capacity to make personal 
choices. In general, women 
experience inequalities in all 
three dimensions. All too often, 
women lack formal education, 
so hampering their economic 
opportunities. In many countries, 
there are differences in terms 
of rights to land tenure, thereby 
reducing not only women’s 
economic security but also 
their ability to access credit.4 In 
Southern Africa, many countries 
have a high HIV/AIDS prevalence 
rate that increases mortality risks 
for adults, particularly for women 
who have less power over their 
reproductive rights, and in conflict 
areas the impacts on society also 
have a long reach into the future.
 n Wireless engagement: Open 
development has the potential 
to minimise gender disparities 
by giving women virtual 
access, provided they have the 
qualifications and resources.
 n Informal the new normal: 
Women could play an 
increasingly important role, in 
part because the requirements 
for formal education and the 
costs of participation are low.
 n Sincerely Africa: Reclaiming 
traditional social mores could 
lead to relationships based on 
greater respect, or reinforce the 
notion that women belong in a 
subordinate role.
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KNOWLEDGE OF VALUE
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Here, valuable knowledge is globally 
generalisable and thus removed 
from its context. The emphasis 
is on knowledge which can be 
commoditised for commercial 
applications. Codified knowledge 
is valued over tacit knowledge, 
because the former is much easier  
to acquire or distribute online. 
There is growing convergence 
between local and imported 
knowledge. Digital learning 
resources are among the most 
valuable sources of codified 
acontexual knowledge. Without 
access to this knowledge it is not 
possible to participate in this world.
Valuable knowledge is related to 
know-who – highly contextualised, 
tacit knowledge. Know-what and 
know-why are of little use without 
crucial social networks and trusted 
relationships to exploit knowledge 
for social or economic gain.
This knowledge is acquired 
by informal learning rather than 
formal education. Apprenticeships, 
or informal learning systems, are 
integral to the fabric of the informal 
sector and provide the primary 
avenue for gaining entry to that 
sector. Formal education does not 
equip graduates with appropriate 
skills, knowledge and attitudes.
The value of knowledge is judged by 
its ability to contribute to human 
social, economic and environmental 
sustainability. A key focus is on 
slow variables: long-term variations 
that are difficult to quantify and 
discern. Knowledge is context-
specific, dependent on the physical 
and human resources available 
at a particular time and place, 
and also communal, serving the 
community from which it emerges. 
Intergenerational knowledge is 
woven together in novel ways, and 
combined with contributions of 
global knowledge from a diaspora 
that values Africa’s endowments.
KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE
As we reflected on knowledge 
governance in each of our scenarios, 
we identified four dimensions 
to consider. The Knowledge 
Appropriation Matrix diagram 
illuminates the conception.
The first dynamic is the 
specificity of knowledge. Some 
knowledge is context-specific, rooted 
to a particular place or subject, while 
other knowledge is generalisable 
and therefore more easily scalable. 
A second lens is the object of 
knowledge: who, how, what,  
and why.
We can also examine the extent 
of legal formality, which can range 
anywhere from extremely informal 
to semi-formal to fully formal 
protection, the last of which is 
typically considered as intellectual 
property. Fourth and finally, there 
are variations between the more 
informal tacit knowledge on one 
hand, and formalised, codified 
knowledge on the other.
According to philosopher 
Baumann,2 living in times of change, 
such as today, means that one of 
the most important skills is that 
of forgetting knowledge no longer 
relevant – the ability to delete rather 
than simply accumulate. Forgetting 
knowledge as an individual is hard 
enough; for societies with extensive 
sunk costs and vested interests of 
stakeholders, the challenge is of a 
different order. This trait might be 
one of the deciding factors for  
the future.
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Mining is so 
19th Century, 
digging holes 
underground 
[…] The real 
gold is walking 
in the streets of 
Johannesburg. 
How do you tap 
into the human 
capital? How 
do you unleash 
it? How do 
you define the 
curriculum, the 
syllabus for them 
and our future 
circumstances?
Ravi Naidoo, 
Founder and 
Managing 
Director of Design 
Indaba in South 
Africa (Open A.I.R. 
interview)
COMPLEX COMBINATIONS – 
AND POTENTIAL
But what if the reality is a 
combination of these three 
scenarios, as so often is the 
case? The challenge will then be 
a policymaking environment 
that combines awareness and 
adaptability. There will have to 
be acceptance that in turbulent 
environments or times of disruptive 
change, the rules need to be 
regularly assessed and potentially 
recalibrated in order to find an 
acceptable balance that reflects the 
optimal outcome for the greatest 
number of stakeholders.
The scenarios set out in this 
document take an Africa-wide focus, 
a useful starting point for more 
focused scenarios dealing with more 
specific issues or regions at hand. 
Armed with foresight, it is easier 
to detect and respond to the key 
uncertainties and faint signals of 
change that the future might present.
The purpose of this set of Open 
A.I.R. scenarios is to provide a useful 
framework that enables readers to 
examine their assumptions about 
the future and to explore how the 
forces of change, both inside and 
outside Africa, might be harnessed 
to move Africa towards a brighter 
future. Our hope is that these 
scenarios, together with the research 
underpinning them, stimulate wider 
thinking about African innovation 
and creativity and that they enable 
policymakers and those interested 
to articulate a collective vision of 
innovation and creativity in Africa 
that is sustainably vibrant, properly 
valued, democratically participatory, 
collaboratively shared, widely 
accessible and justly distributed 
throughout society.
SO WHAT?
We cannot overemphasise that 
there is no single Africa and no 
single future. Let alone countries, 
even individuals and firms in the 
same geographic space may find 
their particular future different 
to that of their neighbours. Our 
analysis showed that conceptions 
of development, progress and 
knowledge are all rooted in a 
particular context.
REFLECTIONS
This project has surveyed Africa’s 
long history. Stretching back over 
several millennia, Africa has seen 
humankind both at it’s most glorious 
and abject; it has seen civilizations, 
empires and kingdoms come and 
go; it has witnessed disruptions time 
and time again. Africa’s past has 
been formed by countless different 
contexts – experiences that have 
undoubtedly shaped the continent 
and its people.
Our analysis also showed that 
conceptions of development, 
progress and knowledge are all 
rooted in a particular context. 
The world is changing, and the 
signals are evident. In rapidly 
changing contexts, Africa’s innate 
adaptability to respond to hardships 
may paradoxically position it with 
competitive advantage.
Innovation is one of the 
most fundamental processes 
underpinning economic growth and 
it is also the basis for finding new 
solutions to key economic, social 
and environmental problems for the 
future. For most African countries, 
it is important to examine local 
capacity and capabilities as well as 
past causes of underdevelopment 
before accepting well-meaning, 
but potentially obsolete, advice in 
a race to find new socio-economic 
policies and incentives to support 
innovation.
POINTERS FOR ACTION
“One cannot be prepared for something while secretly believing it will not happen.3Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s first democratically elected President
Today’s decisions create tomorrow’s 
future. So what might government 
policymakers, business leaders, 
scholarly researchers, civil society 
advocates or other innovation 
system stakeholders do in response 
to indications that one or another 
of these scenarios is becoming their 
reality?
The first insight is to be attuned 
to the faint signals of change that 
might previously have passed by 
unnoticed. Armed with awareness of 
the key drivers of change identified 
in this document – those factors 
that will inevitably push or pull the 
African continent simultaneously 
in different directions – readers are 
likely to find themselves noticing 
patterns that weren’t apparent 
before.
Photo: coloursinm
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Witnessing signals of this scenario 
should lead stakeholders to worry 
about complex and controversial 
debates over the protection of 
codified knowledge through 
copyrights, patents and similarly 
formal legal mechanisms. One 
must understand the global 
knowledge governance systems 
embedded within international law 
and administered via institutions 
such as the WTO and WIPO. 
Tensions among those seeking 
maximum IP protection and 
others arguing for greater access to 
knowledge are unlikely to subside. 
Policymakers will be pressured 
by multinational firms to address 
persistent problems like patent 
thickets dragging down efficiency 
in the ICT sector. Meanwhile, 
business interests in creative 
industries like publishing, music 
and film, and online webcasting 
will push for increasing minimum 
standards of protection, online and 
off. Many people will resist this 
paradigm, cleverly making the best 
of the situation by adopting and 
promoting open-source licensing 
protocols if they are unable to 
change the system itself.
If this sounds like the status 
quo, it isn’t. The key difference 
is that African nations will have 
learned and embraced the rules of 
the global knowledge game. Key 
countries will have shifted from 
IP importers to exporters, at least 
in certain industries – Nollywood 
is one plausible example – where 
promoting protection is or is 
perceived to be in their own 
domestic interests. Policymakers 
will need to appreciate that not 
everyone benefits equally in this 
world, and to mediate tensions 
among different interest groups. 
As the digital divide grows, 
governments that want to leave a 
positive legacy will have to find 
ways to ensure that formal IP 
systems, in particular copyright 
and patent policies, function 
for the whole of society, not just 
for those who know what they 
need to conform to the standard 
economic, legal and technological 
prerequisites for success.
In circumstances foreshadowing 
this world, stakeholders might 
seriously reconsider whether 
investing scarce resources into 
building countries’ capacity to 
process multinational patent 
applications or adjudicate formal 
copyright disputes is worthwhile. 
Formal modes of IP protection 
will be mostly irrelevant to 
local actors in innovative, 
entrepreneurial communities 
and micro-enterprises. Even 
multinational businesses will need 
local know-how and networks 
of trusted partners to succeed. 
The legal strength of formal IP 
protection will be irrelevant for 
firms focused more on adapting 
quickly to dynamic and diverse 
local opportunities.
There will, however, be 
important roles for relatively less 
formal modes of protection to play. 
Trade secrets and confidentiality 
agreements are good examples. 
Whether these appropriation 
mechanisms are formally 
enforceable by contract law 
(doubtful) or bolstered by the risk 
of being ostracised for breaching 
community norms (likely), they 
are underpinned by trust. Also, 
because tacit knowledge becomes 
far more important than codified, 
social networks are key to any IP-
related outreach and training that 
is relevant “on the ground”.
Policymakers should spend 
what little time and money 
they might have on building IP 
structures that facilitate symbiotic 
interactions. Perhaps there is a 
place for protecting utility models 
and industrial designs, which 
are easier to obtain although no 
cheaper to enforce. Moral rights, 
such as the right to attribution 
and the protection of a work’s 
“integrity”, may also be valuable. 
Branding – trusted marks that 
certify the attributes of goods and 
services – will become increasingly 
important in this scenario. In 
particular, collective forms of 
protection, such as “fair trade” or 
“organic” certification schemes or 
geographic indications of origin, 
are probably most relevant.
When signs of this reality appear, 
stakeholders should focus on 
the formalised rules that govern 
traditional knowledge. Success 
will depend on understanding and 
embracing ecological, spiritual, 
social and customary values. 
Legal frameworks, including IP 
frameworks, must reflect these 
values to be meaningful and 
legitimate.
International instruments 
like the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, and its Nagoya Protocol 
on Access and Benefit Sharing, 
will become profoundly important 
in this future. Local leaders will 
need to prioritise any potentially 
unfinished work on related issues 
of international protection for 
traditional cultural expressions 
and folklore.
Such formal instruments 
can help to prevent the 
misappropriation of traditional 
culture and knowledge by 
community outsiders seeking 
to exploit Africa’s cultural and 
biologically rich heritage without 
fairly sharing the benefits.
At the national and community 
level, policymakers will need to 
engage with traditional leaders 
around policies and programmes 
that help to codify tacit knowledge. 
The point, however, will not be to 
commodify and commercialise 
traditional knowledge, but to 
validate and preserve it.
Digitisation projects 
that identify, catalogue and 
communicate traditional 
knowledge can be useful, both 
to enhance access to a repository 
of African cultural, genetic and 
ecological heritage, and to ensure 
that financial and non-financial 
benefits that may be realised 
are shared fairly throughout the 
societies responsible for stewarding 
this knowledge into the future.
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KNOWLEDGE   governance
Potential for ...
Sustainable, resource-dependent and 
principled ideas serving communities 
with common interests
Obtained from ...
Intergenerational lessons, spiritual beliefs 
and ecological sensitivity
Depends on ...
Who you are
Skills are ...
Intergenerational awareness, ecological, spiritual 
and scientific skills to do more with less
Sincerely
Africa
Informal –
the new 
normal 
Wireless
engagement
Potential for ...
Globally generalisable, codified, and 
commodifiable data in a digitally 
standardised, interconnected world
Based on ...
Products and services that leverage widely 
used technological platforms and tap into 
global markets
Driven by ...
Large or medium-sized transnational 
corporations.
Modelled on ...
Proprietary or open innovation in 
industrial research and development
Open if ...
You set dominant technological, economic 
and legal standards, or are sophisticated 
enough to comply
Based on ...
Improvisational, small-scale solutions 
adapting existing or foreign strategies to 
new or local problems
Driven by ...
Users, individual entrepreneurs and 
micro-enterprises
Modelled on ...
Grassroots and user innovation at the base 
of the pyramid
Open if ...
You have trusted social networks in close 
physical proximity and a reliable reputation
Based on ...
Holistic appreciation of long-term social, 
cultural, economic and ecological actions 
and reactions
Driven by ...
Ethnocentric partnerships and co-operative 
ventures
Modelled on ...
Gradual and sustainable innovation among 
well-established communities
Open if ...
You belong to a group sharing common 
cultural, spiritual, ethnic or other identities 
and values
Obtained from ...
Formal education systems and 
self-teaching using online tools
Depends on ...
What you know
Innovation systems Knowledge governanceValuable knowledge
Formal, standardised and 
controversial systems are governed 
by copyrights, patents, utility models, 
scholarly publications, trademarks 
and industrial designs
Interpersonal, dynamic and 
pragmatic systems are governed by 
improvisation, complexity, secrecy, 
first-mover advantage, customer 
loyalty and moral rights
Traditional, sacred and hierarchical 
systems are governed by customary 
norms over traditional knowledge, 
benefit sharing, geographic 
indications and certification schemes
Skills are ...
Technical, legal and managerial ability to 
plug into global electronic commerce
Potential for ...
Contextualised, tacit and contingent 
instincts in trusted relationships at the 
base of the pyramid
Obtained from ...
Apprenticeships, vocational training and 
learning-by-doing
Depends on ...
Who you know
Skills are ...
Social and interpersonal skills to understand, 
anticipate and adapt to group dynamics
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anticipate and adapt to group dynamics
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Innovation has, in recent years, 
become a hot buzzword for 
government policymakers, industry 
lobbyists, civil society advocates and 
researchers in general. The term is 
used especially often in the context 
of intellectual property policy, with 
proponents of different viewpoints 
all arguing why certain measures 
will help or hinder innovators. 
Despite the hype, too few people 
appreciate the well-established 
scholarly research and extensive 
empirical work that has been done 
during the past three-quarters of 
a century around the concept of 
innovation, and its links to IP.
In order to support policymakers 
and researchers in confronting 
and solving complex problems 
concerning IP and innovation, this 
primer:1
 n provides an overview of key 
terms and expert consensus 
on what innovation is, why it 
happens and how it is changing
 n offers a basic explanation of how 
IPRs and innovation are related, 
without making assumptions 
or drawing conclusions about 
positive or negative causal effects
 n identifies, summarises and 
synthesises the essential 
materials and most recent 
insights on innovation and IP, 
and sets out the basic concepts, 
consensus points and lingering 
uncertainties.
UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT 
OF INNOVATION
Definition: innovation
“The implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new 
organisational method in 
business practices, workplace 
organisation or external 
relations.
Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development2
The Oslo Manual, a joint publication 
of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and Eurostat, provides the 
agreed definition for innovation 
and guidelines for researchers 
and statisticians collecting and 
interpreting data regarding 
indicators of technological 
Reference 
section innovation in countries around the world. An innovation can be a new technological product or service offering, production process, marketing method or organisational practice, as well as significantly 
improved products, processes, 
methods and practices. However, 
to qualify as an innovation, the 
new product or process must 
be implemented, not merely 
abstract. Implementation usually 
refers to market availability, i.e. 
commercialisation, but the market 
is understood broadly so that public 
sector as well as social innovations 
may be included.
A process innovation is not the 
same as an innovation process. An 
innovation process is the series of 
steps taken to research, develop and 
bring something new to market, i.e. 
the process of innovating. A process 
innovation is an innovation in the 
process of producing innovations.
VARYING DEGREES OF 
INNOVATIVENESS
There is a subtle, but important, 
distinction between innovation 
and innovativeness. Innovations 
are frequently classified into 
typologies according to degrees 
of innovativeness. The labels used 
Appendix: 
A primer on 
innovation and 
intellectual 
property
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INNOVATION FOR INDUSTRIAL 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Dating back to the work of Adam 
Smith,7 classical economists have 
tried to explain how competitive 
markets facilitate invention and 
innovation. Neoclassical economists, 
such as Alfred Marshall,8 began 
in the 20th Century to posit 
links between innovation and 
local economic development. But 
innovation was not a subject of 
specialised study until Joseph 
Schumpeter9 first suggested that 
abrupt and uneven adjustments 
in capitalist economies happen 
sporadically, displacing old 
equilibriums and creating radically 
new and more efficient socio-
economic conditions through 
“creative destruction”.
By the late 1950s and early 
1960s, economists were suggesting 
that technological development is 
the stimulus that pushes countries 
along the path of modernisation.10 
A revolutionary growth model was 
presented, which focused on the 
role of technological development 
to explain economic growth that 
could not be accounted for by 
capital accumulation or labour 
productivity.11 Such ideas informed 
economic development policy for 
decades following.12 Modernisation 
theories informed by insights 
from sociology,13 psychology14 
and political science15 helped to 
explain connections between 
industrialisation, innovation, 
economic growth and positive socio-
cultural change.
It is now well accepted that 
innovation is a desirable public 
policy objective. Indeed, by the 
1970s, researchers were relatively less 
interested in what innovation does 
than in how it happens.
INNOVATION SYSTEMS 
APPROACHES
Neoclassical economists’ 
preoccupation with profit 
maximisation and market 
equilibrium overlooked the 
uncertainties of innovation and 
the variety of institutions that 
support innovation across sectors. 
Accordingly, Nelson and Winter16 
developed an evolutionary theory 
The direction of change is also 
important. Continuous innovations 
follow in sequence from the status 
quo; discontinuous innovations 
break patterns to move in 
significantly new directions.6
There is no normative hierarchy 
of preferable forms of innovation. 
Experts do not generally distinguish 
between kinds of innovation 
based on economic, social, moral 
or other kinds of value. Doing so 
would be empirically difficult and 
theoretically controversial.
DISTINGUISHING INVENTION 
FROM INNOVATION
The relationship between an 
“invention” and an “innovation” is a 
common point of confusion. These 
terms are often wrongly conflated, 
but they are not synonymous. The 
term “innovation” carries certain 
connotations in management, 
engineering and related disciplines, 
which lawyers and legal scholars 
may not appreciate.
In every country that is a member 
of the World Trade Organisation, 
and thus legally bound by the 
1994 Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), a patentable 
invention is, by legal definition, 
new, applicable and inventive. A 
new invention means new to the 
whole world, unlike an innovation, 
which may be new merely to 
the firm, industry or country 
concerned. Applicable means 
capable of industrial application, 
but not necessarily applied, i.e. not 
necessarily used. An innovation, in 
contrast, exists only once a product 
or process is put into practice outside 
a laboratory. And to be inventive, 
at least in the context of patents, an 
invention must have been previously 
unobvious to experts in the field. 
No such qualification applies to 
an innovation. In sum, many 
inventions are not innovative, and 
many innovations are not inventive. 
Indeed, the gap between these 
concepts is much wider than often 
assumed.
in classification schemes vary 
widely across empirical studies. 
An innovation may be “radical”, 
“really new”, “discontinuous”, 
“breakthrough”, “generational”, 
“incremental”, “evolutionary”, 
“imitative” and so on. The most 
popular distinction is between 
incremental versus disruptive 
innovations, a dichotomy often 
attributed to Christensen.3
Various other studies may 
characterise these degrees of 
innovativeness according to whether 
an innovation disrupts a particular 
product or firm, or an entire 
industry or the world generally. 
The steam engine and the world 
wide web are examples of “highly 
radically” innovative products that 
caused discontinuity in the world. 
The Sony Walkman and Apple 
Computer, in contrast, created 
discontinuity in an industry. Some 
studies break down innovations 
according to market or technological 
factors. Some studies treat 
innovativeness as a spectrum; others 
are categorical.
At least one well-known review 
of the literature has revealed some 
common ground. Innovativeness 
commonly refers to the degree of 
potential discontinuity or paradigm 
shift between an innovation and 
previously implemented products 
or processes.4 Notably, the 
taxonomy proposed in Garcia and 
Calantone’s study is relative to the 
firm implementing the innovation, 
not to the innovation itself. So an 
innovation may be radical to one 
firm, but incremental to another. 
According to Garcia and Calantone:
“Incremental innovations” 
incorporate product improvements 
(features, benefits, price, 
manufacturing, process) into 
innovations using existing 
technologies, targeted towards 
existing markets. […] Really new 
products include new technologies 
to existing markets (product line 
extensions or new product lines) 
or existing technologies to new 
markets (also new product lines). 
[…] On rare occasion, a radical 
innovation will […] result in 
discontinuities in both the existing 
market structure and the existing 
technology structure.5
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of innovation modelled on biology. 
Other key scholars broadened the 
field of evolutionary economics 
later in the 1980s by explaining the 
importance of national systems of 
innovation.17 The most recent edition 
of the Oslo Manual explains systems 
approaches to innovation as follows:
Systems approaches to innovation 
shift the focus of policy towards 
an emphasis on the interplay of 
institutions and the interactive 
processes at work in the creation of 
knowledge and in its diffusion and 
application. The term “national 
innovation system” has been coined 
to represent this set of institutions 
and these knowledge flows.18 
INNOVATION FOR 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Early thinking about innovation 
in the context of development was 
oriented around industrialisation 
and economic growth. As our 
understanding of development 
has become more sophisticated, 
however, so has thinking about how 
innovation evolved. Work by Nobel 
prize-winning economist Amartya 
Sen19 and renowned philosopher 
Martha Nussbaum20 has been 
especially influential in reframing 
the objectives of development and, 
toward that end, innovation policy. 
Economic growth is no longer 
viewed as the sole or dominant 
goal of development, but rather as 
a means to the end of facilitating 
human freedom21 and creating 
human capabilities.22 Innovation is 
instrumental in promoting freedom 
and capabilities.
Consequently, literature that 
links innovation to development 
has become more nuanced, with 
many experts studying distinct 
features of innovation systems 
in less developed countries. In 
this context, innovation scholars 
highlight the importance of 
nurturing indigenous knowledge 
and capabilities rather than relying 
on technology transfer.23 Those 
working on IP and global knowledge 
governance have, independently, 
reached similar conclusions about 
indigenous peoples’ innovation and 
development.24
There is no doubt that promoting 
innovation is a high priority for 
policymakers seeking solutions to 
global development challenges.25 
One significant challenge, however, 
is measuring innovation in 
developing countries, particularly 
in informal economic sectors.26 
Another is ensuring that innovation 
benefits not just elites, but all 
segments of society, through the 
emerging concept of “inclusive 
innovation”.27 
OPEN, USER AND OTHER 
EMERGING INNOVATION 
PARADIGMS
The notion of inclusive 
innovation for development is linked 
to parallel evolutions in innovation 
systems thinking more generally. 
Among the most popular labels 
coined in the past decade is “open 
innovation”, which according to 
Chesbrough is “a paradigm that 
assumes that firms can and should 
use external ideas as well as internal 
ideas, and internal and external 
paths to market, as the firms look 
to advance their technology”.28 
Several recent literature reviews 
show how openness has entered the 
mainstream innovation discourse.29
“User innovation” is another 
emerging paradigm, popularised 
through Eric von Hippel’s 
Democratizing Innovation.30 While 
open innovation starts from the 
perspective of firms supplying 
innovation, user innovation tends 
to highlight the nature and motives 
of end-users or intermediaries 
involved in innovation processes. 
This parallels cutting-edge 
thinking about the dynamics 
of “peer production” in the 
transformation from a hierarchical 
industrial economy to a networked 
information economy.31 Benkler, 
Chesbrough and Von Hippel’s 
work also connects to mainstream 
literature on “crowdsourcing”.32
Open and user innovation are 
not synonymous with each other 
or with inclusive innovation. 
Inclusive innovation may be more 
closely connected with the concept 
of “grassroots” innovation, also 
referred to as innovation “for the 
poor, by the poor” or “base of 
the pyramid” innovation.33 The 
latter terms connote research and 
policymaking concerned not only 
with why and how innovation 
happens, but also with its socio-
economic and human impacts.
RELEVANT FORMS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Patents are the IPRs most often 
discussed in the context of 
innovation, but they are not the only 
relevant form of legal protection. 
There are two broad categories 
and many more subcategories 
of formal IPRs, namely (i) 
copyright and related rights and 
(ii) industrial property. Industrial 
property includes trade secrets, 
patents, trademarks, geographical 
indications and designs.
What is copyright? 
Copyright protects a whole range of 
works, which are the expression of 
ideas such as literary works, artistic 
works and dramatic works. It gives 
its holder (the owner, who is often 
not the author) the right to exclude 
others from exploiting the protected 
work commercially through 
copying, adapting, distributing and 
other means. It also gives the author 
of the work the “moral rights” to 
be identified as the author of the 
work and the right to object to the 
distortion of the work. 
Copyright is regulated by 
legislation in each country. It is 
extended automatically, without 
registration, to certain works if 
they are original and recorded in a 
permanent form (such as writing, a 
picture or an audio clip). In addition, 
to benefit from automatic protection 
in most foreign countries, the work 
must have been created by a person 
who is a citizen or resident of a 
country that is party to the Berne 
Convention, the key international 
treaty governing cross-border 
copyright issues since 1886.
What is a trademark?
Trademarks protect marks that 
distinguish a person’s or a business’s 
goods and services from those of 
others. Examples of registrable 
marks include made-up words 
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implementing legislative reforms to 
implement international frameworks 
for protection.
THE ROLES OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
INNOVATION SYSTEMS
The relationships between IP and 
innovation are complex, variable 
and dynamic. But, in general, IP 
can sometimes be (i) an indicator 
of innovation, (ii) an incentive 
for innovation, and/or (iii) an 
impediment to innovation.
Intellectual property as an 
indicator
Researchers use many different 
metrics to measure innovation, 
including IP statistics. In this 
context, patent statistics dominate, 
partly because they are among the 
most readily available data, and 
partly because of the orthodox (but 
incorrect) view that they are the 
form of protection most relevant 
or important for innovation. By far 
the most widely cited measure of 
patent protection in cross-country 
economic analyses of IP is the 
Ginarte-Park (GP) index, introduced 
in an article by Juan Ginarte and 
Walter Park34 and updated in Park’s 
subsequent work.35 It measures select 
aspects of the strength of countries’ 
patent legislation in five-year 
intervals between 1960 and 2005. 
Similar indexes were developed to 
measure copyright and trademark 
protection.36 These indexes, though 
incomplete, are used for modelling 
relationships between IP and 
innovation, R&D, GDP, technology 
transfer and other variables.
Intellectual property indicators 
are not only a tool for econometric 
analyses but also influential in 
various organisations’ rankings 
of innovation performance, by 
country and by firm. The two most 
notable indexes are the Global 
Innovation Index (GII), jointly 
produced by Cornell University, 
INSEAD and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization,37 and 
the innovation sub-index of the 
Global Competitiveness Report, 
produced by the World Economic 
Forum.38 Such indices consider IPRs, 
specifically certain kinds of patents 
how to make and use it. Trade 
secrets (not to be confused with 
trademarks), on the other hand, are 
the opposite: they protect firms that 
choose not to disclose information 
to the public. Competition laws or 
other regulations may prohibit firms 
from accessing or using competitors’ 
confidential data or other 
information, while contract laws 
establish rules for non-disclosure 
agreements.
Some countries offer a shorter 
duration of protection for “utility 
models”, which typically have less 
stringent application requirements 
better suited for minor or 
incremental innovations.
Informal appropriation 
mechanisms
Informal modes of appropriation, 
like trade secrecy, confidentiality 
agreements, first-mover advantage 
and technological complexity play 
crucial roles in innovation systems. 
In some circumstances, these 
appropriation mechanisms are based 
on statutes or legal precedents, and 
establish rights that are enforceable 
in courts. More often, however, these 
mechanisms reflect commercial 
realities or conventional practices. 
For example, products and processes 
that depend on know-how, instead 
of know-what, are in reality difficult 
to reverse engineer, which itself 
provides a measure of exclusivity to 
the innovator. Similarly, formal IPRs 
cannot effectively protect tacit rather 
than codified knowledge, so “who 
you know” matters more than “what 
you know”. 
In many regions of Africa and the 
rest of the world, and in particular 
sectors and industries, conventional 
business practices and social norms, 
and the risk of being ostracised 
by customers, suppliers or other 
important connections, are more 
powerful appropriation mechanisms 
than formal IPRs ever could be. 
Traditional ecological, agricultural 
or medicinal knowledge related to 
genetic resources, and traditional 
expressions of folklore or cultural 
heritage, are likewise enforced 
more by social and spiritual norms 
than by legal norms. A growing 
number of countries, however, are 
such as “Kodak”, existing words 
used in unconventional ways, such 
as “Blackberry” for smartphones, 
and logos consisting of shapes and 
colours, such as the three stripes 
used by Adidas.
An application has to be made for 
a trademark registration, and marks 
that are not distinctive or that are 
deceptively similar to other marks 
will not be registered. An application 
to register a mark from someone 
who is not legitimately entitled to the 
mark will also be rejected. In some 
countries, protection is provided 
for unregistered or common law 
trademarks through the law of 
unlawful competition.
Geographic indications can be 
understood as a particular kind of 
trademark. They are brands that 
capture and convey the value of 
products or processes associated 
with specific geographic regions, 
such as Darjeeling tea. Similarly, 
certification marks protect 
products or processes that comply 
with particular quality assurance 
standards, such as Certified Organic 
or Fair Trade.
What is a patent?
Patents are regulated by legislation 
in each country. They protect 
inventions, which could be products 
or processes. Patents are granted by 
individual states for inventions that 
are new, have inventive step (are not 
obvious to a person with knowledge 
of the field) and have industrial 
applicability. Unlike copyright, a 
formal application has to be made 
for a patent. This application must 
fully detail or disclose the invention 
for which the patent is being sought. 
Some countries then examine the 
patent application to ascertain 
whether the invention is new, has 
inventive step and is industrially 
applicable. Other countries do not 
examine patents and simply register 
them. This approach is known as 
the registration or depository patent 
system.
Patents are supposed to 
encourage the full disclosure of 
technical information about an 
invention to the public, so that when 
protection expires after twenty 
years, the public may know precisely 
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growth in countries with conducive 
complementary economic and 
regulatory conditions.48
Experts outside the discipline of 
economics agree with Maskus that 
IP reforms such as TRIPs are doing 
the job they were designed to do. 
But some scholars from political 
science, international relations 
and law see that job differently 
to many economists. This group 
of experts explains how radical 
changes in the global governance of 
IP, although ostensibly about trade 
and economics, were really designed 
to – and did – fundamentally alter 
geopolitical power dynamics in 
anticipation of controlling the 
future of the knowledge society.49 
Dominant narratives of IP incentives 
are incomplete without recognising 
these important political economic 
perspectives.
Intellectual property as an 
impediment
Knowledge is not only non-
excludable without legal 
intervention; it is also non-rivalrous, 
meaning multiple people can hold 
the same idea simultaneously 
without damaging or “using up” 
the knowledge itself. Indeed, the 
value of knowledge often increases 
through network effects: the more 
people that share an idea, the more 
valuable it becomes. This fact 
leads to the insight that exclusive 
IPRs can sometimes frustrate 
rather than facilitate innovation. 
Too much IP protection can be a 
problem, especially for sequential 
innovations that build upon earlier 
technologies,50 and especially 
if rights are fragmented among 
multiple owners.51
Issues include market hold-ups, 
where one owner of an essential 
technology is unwilling to license 
it to others, and transaction costs, 
which increase the more complex 
the IP landscape becomes. The 
resulting gridlock has been called a 
“tragedy of the anti-commons” by 
the theory’s leading proponent,52 
mirroring seminal work on the 
“tragedy of the commons” that 
posits private property as a solution 
to underinvestment in public 
goods.53 Later, Shapiro54 coined 
or innovative countries might simply 
introduce more patent reforms. 
All we really know is that stronger 
patent laws are likely to lead to more 
patents.
Evidence also suggests that IP 
is more important to large firms in 
industries such as pharmaceuticals 
and semiconductors. In the 
semiconductor industry, large 
firms use IPRs more to cross-
license portfolios and defensively 
preserve freedom to operate 
than to incentivise or recoup 
R&D investments, while smaller 
firms use IP mainly to signal 
commercialisation potential to 
venture capitalists.44 A recent global 
statistical and economic policy 
analysis by the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation45 explains 
how economists have refined their 
view of IP systems, especially 
the patent system, to pay greater 
attention to cumulative innovation 
and collaboration as opposed to 
market exclusivity.
In theory, IP protection also leads 
to technology transfer by reducing 
the threat of imitation in other 
countries, increasing the availability 
of technical information, and 
facilitating cross-border licensing 
transactions. Studies reviewed 
by Maskus46 show that patent 
reforms have positive effects on 
inward technology transfer, attract 
foreign patents and expand the 
activities of multinationals through 
local sales, investment, R&D and 
licensing. These effects, however, 
are generally only found in large 
and middle-income countries, not 
the smallest and poorest countries. 
Moreover, Maskus cautions, these 
international activities may threaten 
local firms or undermine learning 
from abroad through non-market 
channels, meaning that international 
technology may not increase overall 
welfare.47 In general, however, 
available economic evidence 
supports the claim that transparent 
and enforced IPRs facilitate 
international transactions in 
technology, at least among 
emerging-market countries.  
In turn, this enhanced access to 
global information materially 
contributes to domestic structural 
transformation and industrial 
and trademarks, as outputs of the 
process of innovation. These are 
weighted with other outputs, such 
as scientific publications, as well as 
inputs, like R&D expenditures, to 
create a consolidated measure of 
countries’ innovative activity.
Intellectual property as an 
incentive
As a matter of public policy, the 
exclusive rights protected by IP 
are predominantly justified as an 
incentive to invest in innovation 
through research, development 
and commercialisation of new 
products and processes. The basic 
economic theory, well explained 
by experts such as Greenhalgh 
and Rogers,39 Landes and Posner,40 
and Scotchmer,41 is that without 
the guarantee of exclusivity that 
IP provides, the world would have 
less creativity and fewer inventions. 
Because knowledge and ideas are 
intangible, one person cannot 
physically exclude another from  
the possession of ideas, as one could 
with land or goods. Intellectual 
property rights create artificial 
scarcity through laws establishing 
the temporal, geographic and 
substantive boundaries of 
exclusivity. The promise of even 
temporary market exclusivity should 
motivate firms to invest in the 
inherently uncertain activity  
of innovation.
Empirical evidence proving 
this theory in practice, however, 
is scarce. Maskus42 offers among 
the most recent and authoritative 
reviews of econometric analyses of 
IP’s impact on innovation and/or 
technology transfer. “[T]here are no 
clear and universal relationships,”  
he explains, “between policy reforms 
to strengthen IPRs and subsequent 
innovation or R&D investments.”43 
While IP can and does stimulate 
activity in advanced markets, 
especially by multinational firms, 
patent law reforms have little if any 
impact on domestic innovation 
in poor countries. Also, even in 
developed countries, almost every 
economic study Maskus reviews 
fails to resolve the reverse causality 
problem: patent reforms could 
increase R&D and innovation,  
142 Knowledge and Innovation in Africa – Scenarios for the Future
and exploitation by a group of firms, 
are also examples of systems that 
are common to group insiders but 
private to group outsiders.
Furthermore, solid commons 
systems support the private 
marketplace through contributing 
to economic opportunity, as well as 
a healthy and educated population. 
In the 1960s, Garrett Hardin argued 
that the lack of individual ownership 
and inability to restrict usage in 
the commons would eventually 
lead to overuse and depletion of 
commons-pool resources, resulting 
in irreversible environmental 
degradation. Subsequently, however, 
experts in the field refuted his claim. 
Most notably, Nobel-prize winner 
Elinor Ostrom’s work on the topic 
demonstrated that if done correctly, 
a self-governed system of organising 
and sustainably managing commons 
resources could sufficiently protect 
these resources from overuse and 
degradation, and thus safeguard 
their long-term use.57 A comparison 
between tangible and intangible 
resources reveals, moreover, that 
these resources are configured quite 
differently, as knowledge is non-
rivalrous and its value is enhanced 
by network effects.
Nevertheless, it is in the public 
interest to have workable governance 
approaches for sustainable commons 
systems for both tangible and 
intangible goods. But while the focus 
in relation to tangible goods is on 
avoiding overuse and destruction, 
it appears that from a public 
policy perspective the key risk for 
commons systems comprising of 
intangible goods currently is the 
privatisation or overprotection of 
knowledge by means of IP laws. 
Grassroots initiatives have found 
ways to safeguard free access to 
knowledge material, for example 
by using open licences, but more 
work is required to tackle the issue 
holistically, and to adapt Hess and 
Ostrom’s work on management 
of tangible resources to the 
management of intangible commons 
resources.
the term “thickets” to describe 
the phenomenon of overlapping 
IPRs that may impede, not induce, 
innovation. 
Clear and universal econometric 
evidence of the thicket theory 
operating in practice is, however, 
not widely available. Brownwyn 
Hall and her co-authors55 usefully 
summarise the limited empirical 
evidence regarding thickets and 
R&D investments. Existing studies 
do show that thicket exists in specific 
technology areas, and patent density 
is associated with reduced entry into 
those areas.
THE COMMONS
The “commons” is another way of 
governing knowledge. 
[T]he analysis of knowledge as a 
commons has its roots in the broad, 
interdisciplinary study of shared 
natural resources, such as water 
resources, forests, fisheries, and 
wildlife. Commons is a general 
term that refers to a resource 
shared by a group of people. In 
a commons, the resource can 
be small and serve a tiny group 
(the family refrigerator), it can 
be community-level (sidewalks, 
playgrounds, libraries, and so on), 
or it can extend to international 
and global levels (deep seas, the 
atmosphere, the Internet, and 
scientific knowledge). The commons 
can be well bounded (a community 
park or library); transboundary 
(the Danube River, migrating 
wildlife, the Internet); or without 
clear boundaries (knowledge, the 
ozone layer).56 
Sometimes, a false dichotomy is 
constructed between commons 
systems and the private marketplace. 
In reality, many kinds of “commons” 
systems depend on property rights 
to function properly. The Creative 
Commons system of copyright 
licensing is a good example. This 
system enables certain kinds of 
sharing by licensing protected works 
for the use of other people who 
are willing to accept the copyright 
owners’ conditions. “Open source” 
approaches to software licensing, 
and patents that are put into a 
“pool” together for common use 
Photos taken during launch of Open 
A.I.R. scenarios at the Open A.I.R. 
Conference on Innovation and IP in 
Africa (9-11 December 2014)
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Appendix:  
Building and using 
the Open A.I.R. 
scenarios
Open A.I.R. scenarios try to make 
sense of uncharted territory and, 
though incomplete, they have the 
potential to help navigate our way 
into an uncertain future.
The success of any system, nation, 
organisation or community depends 
as much on the decisions it makes 
today about tomorrow as it does on 
the resources it has available to it. 
In an uncertain world there is little 
point in trying to predict the future. 
What matters is finding a framework 
for thinking about possible futures 
and their implications.
WHAT ARE SCENARIOS?
Scenarios are maps of the future 
and, like any maps, they link the 
world, our existing knowledge, to 
new terrain – new experiences, 
ideas and thought processes. 
Scenarios describe a particular 
context and record a specific way 
of perceiving how the future might 
unfold.1 When the context and the 
landscape change, so too must the 
map. However, mapmaking takes 
time and, when the environment is 
turbulent or rapidly changing, time 
is a commodity in short supply.
Scenarios are useful when the 
context of an organisation or system 
is rapidly changing, or when the 
issues are complex or uncertain. 
Perhaps the data cannot be 
quantified or analysed, or there are 
conflicting perceptions and opinions 
on a subject. Instead of analysing 
individual, isolated components and 
issues, scenarios look at the system 
as a whole, seeking to understand 
interconnectedness, complexity and 
whole systems in relationship with 
one another. The whole is greater 
than the sum of the parts.
Scenarios fill a void by creating 
a series of imaginary “memories 
of the future”. They don’t make 
predictions, but rather create 
mental scaffolding2 to link existing 
constructions – our current mental 
models – to new ones, in this case 
three possible futures. In this way, 
they extend our range of thought. 
Like scaffolding, they are temporary 
and easily dismantled and re-erected 
when necessary. They are not 
preferences about the world we want, 
but plausible and challenging stories 
of how the future might unfold in 
ways over which we may have little 
or no control.
Scenarios work as a set. Their 
insights come as much from 
comparing and contrasting them 
as from exploring the implications 
of each in depth. Collectively, 
they provide a framework for 
examining the system as a whole 
and highlighting the key driving 
forces that are likely to influence 
the evolution of the patent and 
IP system, irrespective of which 
future unfolds. With these maps, 
policymakers, communities and 
indeed anyone with an interest in 
how the future might unfold can 
take steps to rehearse the future 
and explore how these three diverse 
worlds might impact upon their 
actions or policies.
USING SCENARIOS
Scenario planning is simply the 
beginning of a process. Scenarios 
are a flexible, adaptable tool with as 
many uses as imagination allows. 
These uses will depend on the 
requirements of the users and the 
context that they are exploring. 
Like any other tool, without use 
they are simply a waste of resources. 
Foresight is expensive, but hindsight 
much more so. With a small 
investment of time, as well as the 
courage to ask awkward questions 
such as “what if?”, the user can 
avoid “if only” – those unintended 
consequences that often come in the 
wake of decisions and actions.
The power of scenarios lies is 
the shared language they impart, 
which allows differences to be 
explored as an asset instead of 
a liability. They can be used to 
create and offer information and 
insights, as a strategic tool, and 
can be communicated as a shared 
language for exploring multiple 
possible futures. It is up to the 
user community – participants, 
stakeholders, decision-makers, 
businesspeople, planners, strategists 
and interested parties – to put them 
to use.
Using scenarios is usually a 
collaborative process, as the power 
of scenarios lies in forming the 
common ground, finding shared 
values, exploring diversity and 
turning differences into a source of 
strength. This usually takes place in 
workshops and seminars, but it is 
not essential.
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Here are some ways that they could 
be useful:
 n Dialogue: Talking and exploring 
differences allows stakeholders 
with diverse perspectives and 
interests to find common 
ground. The aim is not to find 
a single answer, but to have 
strategic conversations that 
open possibilities and enable 
participants to acknowledge 
different worldviews and 
perspectives. The process 
increases fairness, if not in the 
outcomes, then at least in the 
procedure, as all are given a 
voice.3 
 n “What if?” is much cheaper than 
“if only”. Using scenarios allows 
strategists and policymakers to 
anticipate events and prevent 
mistakes and their consequences. 
At national, regional or local 
level, try to find ways to link 
scenarios into existing decision-
making processes so that they 
can help inform vision and 
strategy.
 n Another scenario? A useful 
conversation is whether there 
might be a missing scenario, a 
world that is currently not on the 
radar of policymaking. 
 n In turbulent environments, it 
is essential to continually scan 
the horizon and assess how the 
situation is changing. Determine 
the early warning signals of an 
unfolding scenario and update 
your thinking accordingly.
 n Who else? Future success in 
changing environments requires 
co-operation and collaboration. 
Start a strategic conversation and 
determine who else to involve, 
who else you need to co-create 
the future. 
 n What happens to…? Stakeholders 
are likely to react differently in 
the different scenarios. Their 
priorities and interests are 
unlikely to stay the same. In an 
exercise we undertook, we found 
that the roles of both civil society 
and transnational corporations 
were likely to change. (See table 
above.)
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havens and third parties.
The roles of both IP civil society and transnational corporations are likely to change
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